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I am deeply indebted to all of those with whom I have worked in Aboriginal 
Australia since I commenced research and fieldwork in the early 1970s. 
While this is not an ethnography of any Indigenous Australian group, but 
a study of the application of anthropology to native title law in Australia, 
I could not have written as I have without the benefit of my research 
and study with Aboriginal people over many years. While there are too 
many individuals to mention by name, I am particularly grateful to the 
people of Yandeearra in the Pilbara region of Western Australia who were 
my first mentors and guides and who introduced me to the richness and 
complexity of Australian Indigenous cultures. In particular, I thank the 
late Peter Coffin, Clancy McKenna and Sam Coffin who taught me so 
much. In subsequent years I worked in the Maralinga Lands and Yalata 
(South Australia), over many parts of the Top End including the Victoria 
River District (VRD), Galiwinku, Numbulwar and Groote Eylandt. Later, 
as a consultant, I worked in many areas of rural and remote Australia on 
native title claims lodged over areas of the southwest, southeast, Goldfields, 
Pilbara and Kimberley regions of Western Australia. In South Australia, 
I worked with claimants in the far west and remote northeast of the state. 
In Queensland, I worked with Indigenous claimants who had lodged 
claims to central, north-western and eastern parts of the state and in the 
Torres Strait. In the Northern Territory, I worked on claims in the VRD. 
To all of the many hundreds of claimants with whom I  have worked, 
I express my thanks and appreciation for their generosity, patience and 
forbearance as I sought to understand their culture.
Some colleagues have provided comments, suggestions, information 
or pointed out errors for correction. Others have discussed native title 
issues with me in the course of our work together and I have benefitted 
from their perspectives and expert knowledge. All have contributed in 
some way to what follows, and I thank them all for their assistance. 
Mindful that I may have inadvertently omitted some who should rightly 
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be listed below, I apologise, but a book written over several years owes 
acknowledgement to many and this list may not be exhaustive. In 
particular, then, I  thank Jon Altman, Wendy Asche, Robert Blowes, 
Lyn Coad, Ambrose Cummins, Julie Finlayson, Sturt Glacken, Vance 
Hughston, George Irving, Ian Irving, Tina Jowett, Sophie Kilpatrick, 
Jonathan Kneebone, Justin Lincoln, David Martin, Dante Mavec, Pam 
McGrath, John Morton, Olivia Norris, Sandra Pannell, David Parsons, 
Nic Peterson, Susan Phillips, Ophelia Rubinich, Lee Sackett, Basil 
Sansom, Sheree Sharma, Peter Sutton, Sarah Thomson, David Trigger, 
David Turnbull, Amy Usher, Daniel Vachon, James Weiner and Stephen 
Wright.
I thank Lea Gardam of the South Australian Museum for facilitating 
permissions for the reproduction of the Tindale genealogy, which is 
Figure 9.1 in this book. In particular, I thank Uncle Lewis Yerloburka 
O’Brien for generously giving permission for the use of this genealogy. 
I also thank two anonymous reviewers who took the trouble to read 
an earlier draft of this book and provide many helpful comments and 
suggestions, all of which I was pleased to consider and mostly adopt.
I thank Emily Hazlewood and the ANU Press staff for their many editorial 
amendments and suggestions, and for delivering this book in its present 
form.
Finally, I thank Catherine Wohlan for urging me to finish this book, and 




This is a book about the practice of anthropology in the context of 
Australian native title claims. The Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) established 
a means whereby Indigenous Australians can make application to the 
Federal Court for the recognition of their rights to the continental 
landmass of Australia and its islands and seas. Such rights were identified 
in the legislation as ‘native title rights’. The application is subject to legal 
process. Those who make the claim (the applicant) have to prove to the 
court that the native title rights have continued to exist substantially 
uninterrupted since the acquisition of sovereignty over Australia by the 
British Crown. They also have to show that the native title rights have not 
been extinguished by subsequent acts of the colonisers. In this, the onus 
of proof lies with the applicant. Even applications that seek determination 
by the consent of the participating parties have to satisfy the Federal 
Court of the justice of their claim according to the Native Title Act and 
subsequent case law. Consequently, applications for the recognition of 
native title require that the case be prepared and the pleadings developed. 
Lawyers must draft the application under instruction from those who 
make the claim, typically a group of Indigenous Australians who lay claim 
to a common area of land. Legal counsel must prosecute the application 
and, should the matter not be settled by the parties prior to trial, the 
application goes to a hearing. In these regards, an application made to 
the Federal Court for a determination of native title shares much common 
ground with other applications brought to that court. Like much else that 
depends upon a judicial process for its resolution, a significant factor in 
the prosecution of a native title claim is the evidence that supports the 
applicant’s case.
Indigenous testimony was and remains the most significant component of 
the evidentiary process of a native title claim. However, others have also 
been recruited to the process. Principal amongst these are anthropologists. 
The involvement of anthropology and anthropologists in the native 
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title process marked a continuance of their professional involvement in 
Indigenous relationships with the state – and in particular with legislation 
and related legal action that sought to recognise the rights of the original 
inhabitants of Australia. By the end of 1993, when the Native  Title 
Act received royal assent, anthropologists had clocked up a  substantial 
record of involvement in processes that sought to codify the recognition 
of Indigenous rights in Australia. Anthropologists had seen action in 
relation to legislation enacted by state governments, including the Anangu 
Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara Land Rights Act 1981 and the Maralinga 
Tjarutja Land Rights Act 1984. But it was in relation to the Aboriginal 
Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 that anthropologists had found 
substantial scope for the application of their discipline. The late 1970s 
and much of the 1980s saw their frequent involvement in the preparation 
and adjudication of claims in the Northern Territory. The  transition 
from this sustained involvement of some members of the profession in 
the Territory’s Land Rights Act to the Native Title Act was not altogether 
smooth, particularly following amendments to the Native Title Act in 
1998. Anthropologists who had undertaken research on an application 
and whose views, data and opinions were provided to the court were 
subsequently subject to a level of scrutiny, examination and cross-
examination not previously encountered. The uses of anthropology in 
a native title claim consequently required a very exact application of the 
discipline and its methods.
A need for the expertise of an anthropologist in advancing applications 
for the recognition of native title is a response to legal process. The court 
recognised that the questions it had to consider in relation to an application 
were not likely to be illuminated solely by common or popular knowledge 
or even wholly by the lay evidence of the claimants. Comprehension of 
the claimants’ society and its normative systems, beliefs, customs, land 
law and customary rights were all complex matters that required expert 
explanation and exegesis. A good anthropologist had the necessary 
training and expertise to explain to the court and the respondent 
parties how these Indigenous systems worked. This was usually done by 
presenting data collected during fieldwork along with anthropological 
commentary and archival research in a report, which also served to 
provide a helpful ethnographic guide to the parties to the application 
regarding the claimants, their beliefs and practices and therefore to key 
elements of the application itself. As a consequence, then, anthropologists 
were called to give evidence as expert witnesses both as a result of their 
3
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contributing research, but also because they were recognised by the court 
as having specialist knowledge that might be of assistance in coming to an 
understanding of the perdurance of laws and customs – a key aspect of the 
proof of native title. Respondent parties also appreciated the importance 
of having an expert to comment on the application, on the reports 
provided by the claimants’ anthropologist and any other matters judged 
relevant. Native title was then and remains a dynamic and active business 
ground for Australian anthropologists with a knowledge of and expertise 
in Indigenous cultures.
Native title activity has engendered numerous organisations. Claims 
are lodged and managed on behalf of the claimants by bodies created 
by the Native Title Act and known as Native Title Representative 
Bodies (or colloquially, ‘Rep Bodies’). These organisations soon found 
that employing one or more anthropologists was helpful and indeed 
necessary. The National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT), also created by 
the Native Title Act, formerly employed a  number of anthropologists, 
although this has decreased over recent years and is now reduced to 
one.1 In the post-determination era, Prescribed Bodies Corporate, set 
up to administer land over which native title had been recognised, also 
had need of anthropologists, while existing land councils also employed 
anthropologists who were likely to become involved in native title claims 
one way or another. Respondent parties to claims – particularly the state 
departments with oversight of the assessment of claims made within their 
state – also employ anthropologists, as do mining companies and others 
with an interest in native title applications. Added to this list must be 
consultant anthropologists who work by commission for the various 
groups noted above and who have typically worked on researching claims 
and writing expert or connection reports used to further the application 
before the court.
Figures on the numbers of anthropologists directly involved in the native 
title business are found in a study undertaken by David Martin in 2004. 
Martin provided an analysis of anthropologists engaged in the native title 
business, based on a sample of those who responded to a questionnaire 
that returned 55 respondents (Martin 2004, 9). Martin considered 
this to represent ‘between half and two-thirds of the field of current 
anthropological native title practitioners’ (ibid.). Martin is uncertain as 
to what might be the total number of those employed directly in the 
1  Pam McGrath, research director, NNTT, pers. comm. January 2017.
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field of native title, but noted that government as well as non-government 
agencies also employed some anthropologists. A more recent study by 
McGrath and Acciaioli (2016a) surveyed 433 Australian anthropologists 
and found that there are at least 135 anthropologists currently working in 
Australia who have some level of expertise in native title and land rights.2 
The authors accept, however, that they do not know how representative 
the results of the survey are. The survey also provided an analysis of 
the age, sex and qualification levels of the respondents, and other data. 
These findings were presented by the authors at the 2016 Australian 
Anthropological Society conference, but are not at the time of writing 
available in published form.3
While the actual number of anthropologists directly engaged in native 
title may be quite small, the issues raised in this book will be of interest to 
others who do not engage directly with the native title process. As a part 
of the practice of anthropology, native title has attracted the attention of 
many academics as the subject of debate, particularly over the issue 
of the nature of applied anthropology and possible prejudices such direct 
application might have to the integrity of the discipline – a matter to which 
I return in the first chapter of this book. Despite this debate or perhaps 
in part because of it, native title anthropology has become the subject 
of specialised courses within universities. Native title features as a part of 
curricula, either with a view to educating those who might wish to take 
up a career in the native title arena or as a part of an understanding and 
appreciation of the practice of the discipline of anthropology in Australia. 
That anthropology has become a significant factor in the preparation and 
adjudication of both applications for the recognition of native title, as 
well as post-recognition management, is evident. But native title is, as 
this book will demonstrate, principally about law. Members of the legal 
profession are more numerous than their anthropological colleagues 
and their involvement in native title business is significant. The role 
anthropology has to play is one of the many issues a good native title 
lawyer has to consider in his or her prosecution of a native title case. 
Present indications are that native title claims are set to continue for 
a while yet – a matter I discuss in greater detail in the following chapter. 
Along with outstanding claims and those yet to be lodged is the relatively 
2  I thank Pam McGrath for drawing my attention to this survey and the survey results and 
accompanying references.
3  McGrath and Acciaioli 2016b.
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new question of compensation claimable under the Native Title Act 
(see Chapter 10) and the post-determination management of native title, 
particularly disputes (see Chapter 8).
These considerations all speak to an anthropology that requires an 
understanding of the particular application of the discipline to the 
native title questions. This is something that lies outside of mainstream 
anthropological teaching and accompanying texts. It is a specialist craft of 
anthropology and one that has to be learnt, studied and explored by would-
be practitioners. What I have attempted to do in the following pages is 
to provide some guidance as to ‘how to do native title anthropology’, and 
I have done so in the context of the broader issues of the Native Title Act 
and its associated social and public policy considerations. Above all else, 
I have contextualised native title anthropology within the framework of 
the legislation and the law that determines how it is prosecuted and how 
it might be practised.
There is a growing corpus of writings available about native title and 
I refer to these books and articles in what follows. The principal and still 
significant contribution to the practice of Australian anthropology in 
relation to native title claims is that by Peter Sutton who published in 2003 
Native title in Australia: an ethnographic perspective. Sutton’s scholarly work 
continues to provide an essential reference for all involved in any aspect 
of anthropological research in native title and I have relied on his findings 
and commentaries in what follows. However, much has developed in the 
native title field since Sutton published his work, and he did not cover 
some issues which I regard as now essential to any consideration of the 
anthropology required for a native title claim. Alternatively, Sutton has 
covered some topics that I have not addressed directly. It is my intention 
that this book will extend the account of the application of the discipline 
of anthropology to native title questions and provide materials relevant 
to the developing jurisprudence that so strongly informs and sometimes 
defines native title research.
This book has evolved through my own practice of native title 
anthropology  and my observations over some decades of the often 
recurrent issues that appear to inform anthropological contributions – or, 
as the case may be, fail to inform them. Because of this, it is a book that 
is written with the practice of anthropology by anthropologists in mind. 
This should in no way be understood to be restricted to those who have 
been commissioned by the applicant in a particular native title claim. 
AusTRAlIAN NATIvE TITlE ANThRopoloGy
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Anthropologists who have been commissioned by respondents should 
also find what I present in the following pages of interest. Thus, while one 
reading of the following chapters could be that they provide an outline 
of what needs to be considered in a native title report, the text could 
also be used by a respondent to provide an indication of omissions in 
a native title report filed by the applicant. Given the necessarily close 
working relationship demanded by native title between lawyers and 
anthropologists, I also hope that members of the legal profession will find 
what I have to write in the following pages of assistance. It may also help 
to dispel some of the misapprehensions that some members of the legal 
profession, including judges, have of the work of anthropologists and 
help to explain in relatively straightforward terms some of the issues that 
agitate our interest. While I hope that what I have written here will be 
of interest and assistance to lawyers, I have endeavoured to steer well clear 
of points of legal interpretation. It will be evident to all who have had any 
involvement in the native title process that the case law and the underlying 
statutes are never far away. Thus, a book about native title anthropology 
cannot be written without some appreciation of the law that defines it. 
I have done my best to ensure that what I have written in this regard is 
correct but I write as an anthropologist, not as one who has any training 
or pretentions in matters pertaining to the law.
For those who study native title in universities or through dedicated 
courses, this work should provide a useful handbook of the practical 
application of anthropology to native title. It may also provide an 
appreciation of this branch of applied anthropology in the context of 
the continuing debate about the uses of anthropology in the twenty-first 
century. This debate is not unique to Australia and the involvement of 
anthropologists and anthropology in Australian native title claims will 
also be of interest to those involved in the application of the discipline 
to the recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples in many other 
countries as well. A more general readership may find the first and last 
chapters of particular interest since they seek to contextualise and then 
review native title in terms of the broader canvas of postcolonial Australia. 
Chapter 8 may be of interest to anyone who has an interest in mediating 
disputes and the relationship between objective ‘truth’ and resolution 




Writing about native title does require a certain structure since some 
topics cannot be properly discussed until others have been set straight. 
The order of Chapters 2–5 reflects this requirement. Other ways might 
be devised in order to satisfy the demands of orderly discourse, but the 
arrangement suggested here has worked for me in the past. In Chapter 2 
I examine the society question – identified in the Yorta Yorta case as a key 
concept in the proof of native title. My own observation is that courts are 
less concerned with the society question than they used to be. However, 
it remains a fundamental question for native title anthropology: how 
can the claimants be understood to comprise a society, whose members 
entertain laws, customs and share normative values that have endured 
since sovereignty?
In Chapters 3 and 4, I look at how anthropology can best understand 
rights and duties exercised in relation to country in Aboriginal Australia. 
In particular, I am interested to chart, in outline at least, the manner in 
which the customary system of rights to country has been understood 
by earlier ethnographies and anthropologists. Later studies subsequently 
developed a more ecumenical view of the system that is likely to have been 
in evidence over most of the Australian continent and islands, including 
the Torres Strait. Chapter 4 looks at how rights might be understood to 
be exercised in practice, according to the normative systems in evidence, 
along with some of the topics that frequently emerge from the ethnography 
and field data that may have relevance to a native title claim. Chapter 5 
extends and builds upon the previous chapter and I examine some of the 
principal elements of Aboriginal religious belief and practice that might 
be relevant to a native title report. This can only be regarded as a very 
partial account of an enormously complex and sometimes arcane subject. 
I spend time discussing the difficulties of conducting research work in 
this context, particularly with respect to hidden or secret categories of 
knowledge that are gender and age restricted.
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 tackle what I have come to regard as some of the 
thornier problems encountered while undertaking native title research. 
While courts generally privilege the evidence of the claimants above all else, 
there is an all too evident problem about the reliability of such testimony 
in relation to issues of continuity, which I explore in Chapter 6. Assertions 
along the lines that ‘we have always done it this way’ may resound with 
conviction, but in an increasingly critical legal environment may not 
withstand close scrutiny of the sort offered up by respondent parties. 
This becomes particularly acute should authoritative assertions be made 
AusTRAlIAN NATIvE TITlE ANThRopoloGy
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in contradictory form by opposing Indigenous groups. Oral testimony, 
particularly as it relates to continuity since sovereignty, is a matter that 
demands attention. In this context, the use of early texts (Chapter 7) has 
direct relevance as these may provide a means to demonstrate whether 
a particular law or custom was in evidence in earlier times. Use of the early 
texts and their interpretation is not, however, a straightforward matter. 
It  is my aim in Chapter 7 to explore some of the difficulties attendant 
upon the use of early texts and how these might be obviated.
Chapter 8 is about inter-Indigenous disputes, a phenomenon I have 
witnessed increasing over the last few years of my practice. Such contests 
of truth and will place the anthropologist in a difficult position and 
such situations must be navigated with skill and caution. Native title has 
undoubtedly exacerbated disputes between Australia’s Indigenous people. 
It is worth noting in this context, however, that when a group of people are 
recognised as having no rights to landed property, the scope for disputes 
over country is necessarily minimal. Native title affords recognition of 
rights to property and the (perhaps) inevitable disputes that follow are 
a consequence of that restoration. In this context, anthropologists have 
a particular role to play and I have set out what I have termed a practice 
guide to applied research undertaken in these often difficult and vexing 
circumstances.
Chapter 9 might be regarded as providing a guide for a must-have chapter 
in a native title report. Genealogies are becoming increasingly important 
in native title research as a result of the more or less universal acceptance 
that rights to country are gained from forebears. Thus, issues of the descent 
of rights through a bloodline may overshadow other means of gaining 
rights, while the necessary conditions for the realisation of rights through 
descent may get lost as time and intention denude filiation to render it 
a matter of genealogical reckoning through the provision of a pedigree.
Chapter 10 takes a brief look at a developing field of native title research: 
compensation. Based on a recent decision of the Federal Court in relation 
to an application for compensation for the loss of native title rights, I have 
set out some preliminary views on the sort of anthropology that might 
be conducted in relation to future claims. This is a topic that might be 
developed as the jurisprudence matures.
9
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This book represents a compilation of materials I have slowly assembled 
over some years. All chapters have been expressly written for this book. 
They contain elements of my research and findings gathered over many 
years working in Aboriginal Australia, both in the native title era as 
well as prior to it. Chapter 1 contains the seeds of ideas developed for 
a seminar paper I delivered with Wendy Asche to the North Australian 
Research Unit in Darwin in 2011. Chapter 6 builds upon a paper 
I published in 2011 (Palmer 2011a). A draft portion of Chapter 8 was 
presented to a native title seminar held in Perth in 2017, convened by 
the Federal Court of Australia, the NNTT and the Centre for Native 
Title Anthropology (CNTA) at The Australian National University, 
Canberra. Likewise, a draft portion of Chapter 10 was first presented to 
the CNTA annual conference in Perth in 2017. Some of the material 
contained in the following pages has seen the light of day, in somewhat 
different forms, as prior publications. An earlier version of Chapter 2 was 
first published by the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Studies (AIATSIS) in 2009 and later reproduced as a chapter 
in Lisa Strelein’s Dialogue about land justice: papers from the National 
Native Title Conference (2010). I have substantially revised and updated 
it for this publication. Some of the ideas set out in Chapter 7 were first 
entertained in a paper I gave to the Australian Anthropological Society 
conference, Macquarie University, December 2009, and subsequently 





Certainty and uncertainty: Native 
title anthropology in Australia
The promise
Recognition of native title in Australia opened a new chapter in a legislated 
history that helped define relationships between the state and Australia’s 
Indigenous minority. It was a complex mix of political will, postcolonial 
idealism and necessity. Its genesis was the High Court’s recognition of 
a right in the famous Mabo case.1 For some at least the Mabo decision 
was seen as a problem. It was understood to throw uncertainty in the 
way of development by acknowledging in law that there had been 
prior owners of the Australian continent. Moreover, the rights of these 
original owners of the Australian continent continued to be capable of 
recognition by the very jurisprudence that had alienated much of the 
land upon assertion of sovereignty by the British Crown. Prime minister 
Paul Keating, in his second reading speech for the Native Title Bill 1993, 
highlighted the problem, which he also embraced as an opportunity. In 
the context of the International Year for the World’s Indigenous People, 
the formation of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission 
and a Labor policy sympathetic to Indigenous needs and aspirations, this 
was part of the longer-term legislated approach to remedy past wrongs. 
But there was a difference to previous attempts to afford protection to 
Indigenous attachment to land or restore rights to alienated country. The 
1  Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1 (HCA: Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, 
Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
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Native Title Bill was demanded by many as a means to ensure certainty 
in the face of doubts as to the legal status of land – assumed since first 
European settlement to be the secure property of the state and foreign 
settlers. Keating promised certainty in this regard. 
Mr Speaker, some seem to see the High Court as having just handed 
Australia a problem. The fact is that the High Court has handed this 
nation an opportunity. When I spoke last December in Redfern at the 
Australian launch of the International Year for the World’s Indigenous 
People, I said we could make the Mabo decision an historic turning point: 
the basis of a new relationship between indigenous and other Australians. 
For the 17 months since the High Court handed down its decision, the 
government has worked to meet this challenge. As well as clearing up 
the uncertainties of the past, this bill provides for the future – it delivers 
justice and certainty for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, 
industry, and the whole community. It provides for the determination of 
native title and for dealings over native title land.2
Sites and rights
In Australia, the late 1960s and early 1970s saw an addition to the 
legislated direction of Aboriginal affairs. As a result of campaigning 
by some leading academics at the time and a growing awareness of 
Australia’s Indigenous minority and its members’ close associations and 
deep spiritual relationships with country, attempts were made to protect 
land as isolated pockets of special significance that might be cordoned off 
and protected. With such ‘sites’ identified, development could go ahead 
without impediment and, so it was hoped, would avoid the difficulties 
that developed from an increasingly aware and vocal minority. Examples 
of such legislation that remain on the statute books are found in most 
states and territories,3 sometimes preceded by attempts to vest land in an 
2 Paul Keating, Native Title Bill 1993, second reading speech (1993).
3  Australian Capital Territory: Heritage Act 2004, Heritage Objects Act 1991. New South Wales: 
Heritage Act 1977, National Parks and Wildlife Amendment (Aboriginal Ownership) Act 1996. Northern 
Territory: Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act 1989, Heritage Conservation Act 1991. Queensland: Aboriginal 
Cultural Heritage Act 2003, Torres Strait Islander Cultural Heritage Act 2003. South Australia: 
Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988. Tasmania: Aboriginal Relics Act 1975. Victoria: Aboriginal Heritage Act 
2006, Heritage Act 1994. Western Australia: Aboriginal Heritage Act 1972. Copies of these laws can 
be downloaded from www.austlii.edu.au. Source: www.environment.gov.au/topics/heritage/laws-and-
notices/ indigenous-heritage-laws/protection-under-state-and-territory-laws, accessed 4 January 2017. 
Many of these Acts amend or replace prior legislation of which the South Australian Aboriginal and 
Historic Relics Preservation Act 1965 was the earliest.
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Aboriginal Land Trust to ensure its safekeeping for future generations. 
While site protection legislation mostly placed the onus on the developer 
to ensure that no damage was done to sites in the path of the work 
proposed, the legislation was framed with the idea of providing protection 
for relatively small areas, effectively isolating significant places from their 
broader spiritual and social contexts. Thus, the ‘sphere of influence’ of 
a site, as it was termed in the famous Noonkanbah dispute,4 was difficult 
to define and was often cynically regarded as employed by Indigenous 
interests in an attempt to stretch the site-based legislation to accomplish 
political ends. 
Site-based legislation endures across the Australian states and territories 
but its usefulness is limited by its fundamental concept and, of course, by 
the political will (or lack of political will) to uphold it. For the most part 
(but not without exception5), prosecutions in relation to site destruction 
have been insignificant, unsuccessful or not forthcoming. Site protection 
legislation was, in its fundamentals, a liberal, beneficial act of the state 
to stem or mitigate damage or destruction of culturally significant sites 
while ensuring that the business of expansion and exploitation of the 
land and its resources continued relatively unimpeded. The legislation did 
not confer rights on Indigenous owners or recognise prior ownership – it 
protected certain things as being culturally important, like other heritage 
legislation or natural resource legislation, but generally at the discretion of 
the relevant state minister. It was a useful way forward but did not address 
the fundamental problem of the neglect of prior rights to country.
What became known in popular discourse as ‘land rights’ for Australia’s 
Indigenous people also had a long history and provided a far more radical 
solution than site protection. The term was not always as commonplace as it 
4  The Noonkanbah dispute developed as a result of a petroleum exploration company, supported 
by the WA state government, drilling on an area of cultural significance to the Noonkanbah people of 
the Fitzroy River valley in the central western Kimberley region of Western Australia. The community 
strenuously opposed the drilling and blockaded the access road to prevent the company’s convoy 
from reaching the proposed drill site. Police, sent by the state government to accompany the convoy, 
broke up the blockade and arrested protestors. These dramatic events and those that followed received 
both national as well as international news coverage. A full account of the Noonkanbah dispute 
was given by Hawke and Gallagher (1989). These writers stated that I first used the term ‘sphere 
of influence’ in relation to the spiritual imbuement of the countryside extending from a focal point 
when giving evidence to the Mining Warden’s Court in Broome in 1978 (ibid., 119). As far as I know, 
the transcripts of this hearing have not survived. 
5  In 2013, OM Manganese was fined $150,000 for desecration and damage to an Aboriginal 
sacred site at their Bootu Creek manganese mine on Banka Banka Station, 120 km north of Tennant 
Creek in the Northern Territory. Aboriginal Area Protection Authority press release, 2 August 2013.
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is today. I recall meeting Aboriginal people in the Pilbara in 1973 in relation 
to my work under the Aboriginal Heritage Act of Western Australia – the 
1972 state legislation that sought to protect sites across the state. When 
I made mention of the phrase ‘land rights’, I found it to be an altogether 
new phrase for those with whom I worked. By the middle of the decade, 
however, it was seen as a promise of better things to come. But the realisation 
of ‘land rights’, that is, the recognition of Indigenous rights to land, was 
initially limited to the Northern Territory. Here it had its genesis in the failed 
attempt to gain recognition of customary rights to the Gove Peninsula.6 
Eventually, the federal government initiated legislation in conjunction 
with the Northern Territory to recognise large areas of Aboriginal Reserve 
land (so-called Schedule A land) as the property of its ‘traditional owners’, 
which was given over as fee simple title. Other land had to be won in ‘land 
claims’, a commissioner being appointed to hear claims, which were heard 
rather like a court case and adjudicated by the commissioner who made his 
recommendation to the federal minister responsible. 
Some other states and territories also enacted their own land rights 
legislation. In 1981, the South Australian Government passed the Anangu 
Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara Land Rights Act which afforded recognition 
of Indigenous rights to land of the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara 
people in South Australia, but did not allow others in the state to make 
claim for rights to country. The Maralinga Tjarutja Land Rights Act 
followed in 1984 and gave recognition of ownership to land that included 
land adjacent to the former atomic test sites in the Maralinga area of 
South Australia. In 1983, the New South Wales Government passed the 
Aboriginal Land Rights Act and there was also land rights legislation passed 
in Queensland (1985 and 1991), Tasmania (1995) and Victoria (1989, 
1991 and 1992).
Like site legislation, however, these acts of state and territory parliaments 
were driven by liberal notions of justice and a desire to attempt to right 
past wrongs. There was no implicit or explicit acknowledgement of a prior 
right existing in Australian law that had survived colonisation. Rather, 
they were beneficial legislated enactments, acts of favour not of right, by 
seemingly fair-minded governments. 
6  Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141 (NTSC: Blackburn J).
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The paradigm shifts
All this was to change dramatically with the case brought by the people of 
Mer (Murray Island) in the Torres Strait for the recognition of what was 
termed ‘native title’ for those who claimed the island, its reefs and waters 
as their own since time immemorial. The idea that Australia was devoid 
of owners when the Europeans arrived and started to settle its eastern 
shores in 1788 was encapsulated in the convenient fiction of terra nullius, 
which means simply ‘void country’. The British Crown assumed ownership 
of the Australian continent because, so it was argued, it belonged to no 
one else. The Mabo case showed that the title assumed by the Crown 
was, in fact, burdened by an existing title. The concept of terra nullius was 
wrong in fact and wrong in law. There were owners and they had been 
dispossessed, a process effected by force of arms, audacity and, eventually, 
weight of numbers, legitimated by the false assumption that the Indigenous 
inhabitants did not own land, but rather wandered aimlessly across it in 
search of food and water. Mabo changed all that. The rights of these owners, 
in accordance with their laws and customs, in their traditional lands, had in 
this case, so the High Court of Australia eventually found, endured through 
the decades of colonial settlement and were still effectual and recognisable 
in law. Acknowledgment of the reality of native title meant that Indigenous 
rights to country did not necessarily need to be legislated back into existence 
by beneficial acts of parliament because on Murray Island at least they had 
endured. And what obtained in the Torres Strait might equally apply over 
many other areas of Australia as well.
The Mabo case was brought under common law and potentially laid the 
way open for other similar actions. While outcomes in the court might be 
uncertain and might not yield the same result for applicants as it had in 
the Mabo case, the events relating to a small island in the Torres Strait and 
the High Court’s ruling in that regard had set a precedent that might lock 
up land for years to come. The resultant uncertainty might only slowly 
dissolve with a complex, evolving and uncertain jurisprudence. There was 
an additional problem that developed from the application of the Racial 
Discrimination Act that had been passed into law in 1975. One provision 
of the Act was to make it an offence to discriminate against a person on 
the basis of their race. Mabo brought with it the possibility that any grant 
of an interest in land by the state might, in fact, be burdened by a prior 
native title right. Thus, the grant might be compromised or invalid. In 
order that the state might continue to effect its dealings with the land of 
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Australia over which it had previously exercised an unfettered and assumed 
sovereignty, there had to be some remedy to this possibility. A legislated 
framework would allow claims for the recognition of native title, subject 
to the criteria for proof of continuity of that title since sovereignty by 
the British Crown. Such an arrangement would allow for certainty in 
matters relating to grants of an interest in land and so alleviate potential 
ambiguities that developed from the Mabo decision.
At first some voiced what was to become briefly a popular hysteria: that 
the sacred Australian quarter acre block upon which the family home was 
built was now in danger of being appropriated. Miners, developers and 
pastoralists saw the Mabo decision as a serious impediment to progress 
and the federal government also no doubt saw this, as well as what prime 
minister Keating called ‘an opportunity’. The ‘problem’ created by Mabo 
could be resolved through legislation that provided the framework for the 
recognition of native title which would provide ‘certainty’ as well as the 
basis for ‘a new relationship between Indigenous and other Australians’. 
Unlike the sites protection and land rights legislation discussed above, 
the Native Title Act was an act of necessity, forced upon the government 
by the Mabo decision. The aspirations of the liberal postcolonial state 
were not absent from this equation, as the ‘opportunity’ was an idealised 
means to improve the lot of Indigenous Australians and the relationship 
between the state and the original owners of the continent. However, this 
opportunity would not have been manifest had it not been for the legal 
and political necessity to enact the native title legislation.
In this regard one legal commentator has remarked:
Statutory land rights, though, do not represent ‘native title’ in a technical 
sense: the former is created by parliament while the latter refers to an 
inherent common law right, the recognition of something already there, 
with origins not in the authority of the settler state but in pre-existing 
systems of law and custom. It is the difference between a right and a favour. 
(Ritter 2009, 3)
Validation and recognition
Given this background it is hardly surprising that the Native Title Act 
was a complex and extremely bulky piece of legislation. The Preamble to 
the Act stated that the legislation would provide for certainty and for the 
‘validation of those acts’ previously performed by the Commonwealth. 
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It would also rectify the ‘consequences of past injustices’ and ‘ensure that 
Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders receive the full recognition 
and status within the Australian nation to which history, their prior 
rights and interests, and their rich and diverse culture, fully entitle them 
to aspire’.7 But bolting down the framework for a post-Mabo certainty 
while furthering a human rights agenda was never going to be a simple 
process. Running to well over 500 pages, the Act set out a whole range of 
procedural matters and organisations for the recognition of native title and 
its subsequent administration. These included issues of extinguishment, 
proposals to undertake work or development on land subject to claim 
(known as ‘future acts’), agreements, compensation, corporate bodies 
that would administer native title if recognised, representative bodies 
that would progress applications for recognition of native title, the role of 
the Federal Court and the creation of the National Native Title Tribunal 
(NNTT). 
There was at the beginning an idea that native title recognition could 
be accomplished through consensus and mediation. The NNTT, 
as established by the legislation, originally had a key role in this and its 
members were charged with mediating disputes without recourse to the 
Federal Court, which was seen as the last resort. The NNTT also served 
to provide an administrative function, undertook research and provided 
information and publications relating to native title. The NNTT was 
responsible for the registration of a claim which provided advantages 
for claimants in terms of negotiation over ‘future acts’; that is, proposed 
developments on land subject to claim. 
The role of the NNTT was subsequently eroded and, at the time of 
writing, applications for recognition of native title, while subject to the 
registration test by the NNTT, are now matters for the Federal Court. 
Inevitably, then, their progress to determination in favour of the applicant 
or dismissal is likely to be one of litigation and trial, unless there is 
agreement between the state or territory and the applicants paving the 
way for a consent determination.
Hidden in the labyrinthine edifice that was the Native Title Act was 
the definition of native title, which provided the basis in law for what 
applicants for the recognition of law might have to prove before the court 
or the NNTT:
7  Native Title Act 1993, Preamble.
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223 Native title
Common law rights and interests
(1) The expression native title or native title rights and interests means 
the communal, group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal 
peoples or Torres Strait Islanders in relation to land or waters, where:
(a) the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional laws 
acknowledged, and the traditional customs observed, by the Aboriginal 
peoples or Torres Strait Islanders; and
(b) the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and 
customs, have a connection with the land or waters; and
(c) the rights and interests are recognised by the common law of Australia.
Hunting, gathering and fishing covered
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), rights and interests in that subsection 
includes hunting, gathering, or fishing, rights and interests.8
A finding that native title exists (a ‘determination of native title’) 
is defined as:
whether or not native title exists in relation to a particular area 
(the  determination area) of land or waters and, if it does exist, 
a determination of:
(a) who the persons, or each group of persons, holding the common 
or group rights comprising the native title are; and
(b) the nature and extent of the native title rights and interests in relation 
to the determination area; and
(c) the nature and extent of any other interests in relation to the 
determination area; and
(d) the relationship between the rights and interests in paragraphs (b) 
and (c) (taking into account the effect of this Act); and
(e) to the extent that the land or waters in the determination area are not 
covered by a non-exclusive agricultural lease or a non-exclusive pastoral 
lease—whether the native title rights and interests confer possession, 
occupation, use and enjoyment of that land or waters on the native title 
holders to the exclusion of all others.
8 Native Title Act 1993, section 223.
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Note: The determination may deal with the matters in paragraphs (c) and 
(d) by referring to a particular kind or particular kinds of non-native title 
interests.9
It was, then, very much a lawyer’s piece of legislation and, from the 
start, a business directed and controlled by the legal process. Unlike 
the federal government’s Northern Territory Aboriginal Land Rights 
Act, the native title legislation did not benefit from close and informed 
advice from anthropologists. Nor was it a development made in close 
consultation with Aboriginal people. The popular phrase ‘land rights’ 
used in other legislation was replaced by the arcane ‘native title rights and 
interests’,10 which were ‘possessed under traditional laws acknowledged 
and  traditional customs observed’ by those with a connection to the 
land (or waters) that are recognised by the ‘common law of Australia’. 
Moreover, only rights that are ‘in relation to land and waters’ can be native 
title rights. While ‘native title rights and interests’ specifically included 
those relating to ‘hunting, gathering, or fishing’, there was no attempt 
in the legislation to accommodate Indigenous systems and criteria of 
proprietary rights to country as had been the case in the Aboriginal Land 
Rights Act. The legal concept of native title rights and interests did not 
invite or readily identify issues or avenues for research that were obvious 
to the anthropological endeavour. There were no terms here that were 
common to anthropology or, indeed, that recommended themselves as 
the subject of our research. The critical anthropological issues were going 
to be ones that were to develop over the ensuing court cases that identified 
for potential litigants the matters that the courts held essential to the 
proof of native title. It would require a close working relationship between 
lawyers and researchers in order that their inquiry would be relevant to 
the legal processes and court requirements.
9 Native Title Act 1993, section 225.
10  The difference between a ‘right’ and an ‘interest’ is seldom, in my experience, brought to notice. 
A right is a legal concept, denoting an advantage or benefit conferred on a person by the rules of 
a particular legal system (Walker 1980, 1070). Interests, on the other hand, are ‘those claims, wants, 
desires or demands which persons individually or in groups seek to satisfy and protect, and of which 
the ordering of human relations in a society must take into account. The legal system of a country 
does not create interests; these are created or extinguished by the social, moral, religious, political, 
economic, and other views of individuals, groups or whole communities. The legal system recognises 
or declines to recognise particular interests as worthy of legal protection …’ (ibid., 629). According 
to this distinction, then, a right is the realisation in law of an interest: a benefit secured into the future 
of a present aspiration. ‘Interest’ is defined in section 253 of the Native Title Act self-referentially: 
‘a legal or equitable estate or interest’, ‘any other right’ and a restriction, all in relation to land or water. 
The phrase ‘rights and interests’ is common in the native title literature, presumably because of its 
privileging in the Act. But the two terms are seldom differentiated in practice.
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Interests, rights and the Federal Court
It soon became evident that progress for recognition of native title would 
be neither rapid nor expeditious. The original ideal that claims would be 
mediated by the NNTT met with limited success and amendments to 
the Act slowly diminished its role. While the Federal Court has always 
had a central role in the determination of native title claims under Parts 3 
and 4 of the Native Title Act, the Federal Court became the principal 
focus of any applications and was also then responsible for the progress 
(or lack of progress) of the claims before it. Codifying and giving legal 
recognition to Indigenous interests in land by defining them as rights 
was inevitably a matter for the Australian judicial system. There is some 
irony in the fact that it is now the Federal Court that is responsible for the 
determination of rights that had previously been regarded by the colonial 
and more latterly the Australian legal systems as non-existent, consistent 
with the doctrine of terra nullius.
A judge of the Federal Court, Dowsett J, made comment on the centrality 
of the courts in the process of recognition of native title. He acknowledged 
that there was common law recognition that Australia’s Indigenous 
inhabitants, in accordance with their laws or customs, were ‘entitled as 
against the whole world to possession, occupation, use and enjoyment’ of 
their lands, subject to prior extinguishment. That proposition, he wrote:
set the course for the development of Native Title in this country … This 
led inevitably to the result that disputes concerning the existence and 
extent of Native Title would be the business of the courts. By virtue of 
Commonwealth legislation, those matters are now within the jurisdiction 
of the Federal Court. It is the primary Native Title court.
The judge continued:
It is for the Court to supervise every aspect of each case so as to bring it to 
trial at the earliest practicable time and to resolve it according to law. That 
role, in no sense, excludes the possibility, or probability, of the parties 
reaching agreement. However the Court cannot properly leave the matter 
to the parties, or to anybody else, to resolve in their own time. The public, 
as well as the parties, have a clear interest in the speedy resolution of all 
litigation, including Native Title litigation. (Dowsett J 2009)
The declared fact that the ‘court cannot properly leave the matter to 
the parties, or to anybody else, to resolve in their own time’ asserts the 
status quo. Aboriginal Australians who seek recognition of native title 
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are committed to be players in a legal process conducted according to 
alien rules and subject to uncertain outcomes in terms of gaining legal 
recognition of a native title right. It is true that native title law remains 
rooted in the recognition of prior right. However, the codification of 
that common law right into a legislative form, justified on the ground 
of providing ‘certainty’, has emasculated the ability of potential rights 
holders to gain recognition of those rights within the very system that was 
responsible for their first (and eventual) recognition under the common 
law of Australia. 
The concept of native title in Australia brought with it the notion of 
continuity and discontinuity. Native title was capable of recognition only 
where there was a continuing system of laws or customs to support it. 
Moreover, native title had not survived the colonial settlement unscathed. 
Indeed, acts by the settlers and their legislators had emaciated the native 
title of Australia’s Indigenous and original owners. Thus, native title was 
understood to exist where it had not been extinguished – that is, freehold 
and some leasehold and reservations for particular purposes rendered 
native title gone. Consequently, the family home was safe for the majority 
of Australians whose land was held as freehold, a fact that slowly cooled 
the initial hysteria over claims being made to people’s backyards. Native 
title had survived on what was called ‘Crown Land’ that had not been 
granted by the state for any particular purpose and co-existed on most 
pastoral properties and some reserve land. 
In time it became apparent that the Native Title Act did not confer land 
rights on Australia’s Indigenous minority but rather set a relatively high bar 
for them to attempt to prove that their rights had not been extinguished 
or languished into oblivion. This had implications for how the claims, or 
applications for the recognition of native title, would be run. Apparent 
surrender of rights that had been assumed by parties who had since the time 
of sovereignty believed them to be unencumbered was not going to happen 
without a fight. Principal amongst the opponents of native title were those 
who considered they had most to lose from loss of rights to non-extinguished 
land – the states, the mining interests and the pastoralists. Under section 
84(4) of the Native Title Act the states or territories were automatically a party 
to a proceeding, unless choosing not to join the matter. The Commonwealth 
was also entitled to intervene (section 84a). This meant that the role of 
the states and territories in court hearings was of fundamental importance 
and they took their role seriously, claiming they had a duty to challenge 
native title applications made with respect to land within their jurisdiction. 
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Most set up a review process to gauge ‘connection’ and so took the lead in 
evaluating claims, a role they have sustained. ‘Connection Guidelines’ were 
written with a view to providing guidance as to how connection materials 
should be presented. In this way, states and territories also became a de facto 
judiciary dictating the terms whereby a claim might be considered settled 
by ‘consent’, and if states or territories accepted ‘connection’ it was likely 
that other respondent parties would too. The object of this quasi-judicial 
evaluation was the evidence of the claimants, to the extent that it could be 
presented via affidavit or other ‘connection’ material as well. The views of 
the applicant’s anthropologist were set out either as a connection report (to 
reflect the ‘Connection Guidelines’) or as an expert report, a manifestation 
of a court process relating to expert witnesses and forensic anthropology. 
This too was subject to scrutiny and evaluation. At least one Federal Court 
judge has been critical of this approach, finding that the states have at times 
assumed a judicial role that was never intended for them in the Native Title 
Act.11 The assumed role might have the potential to prejudice the role of the 
Federal Court in the determination of native title, as set down in sections 
87 and 87a of the Act. Anthropologists were not only operating in a highly 
contested field, but according to rules and conventions that lay far from 
their academic comfort zone.
Statistics on the numbers of outstanding claims are out of date almost 
before they have been garnered from the internet in a publication of this 
sort. However, the reader can check the statistics for him or herself at 
the time of reading this chapter at the NNTT website,12 although web 
addresses seldom stay valid for long. By way of providing some idea of 
the situation, I have collected some data published by the Tribunal in 
November 2011 and compared it with similar figures published in June 
2014 and again in January 2017. The table below shows these figures set 
alongside each other for comparative purposes.
11  ‘The power conferred by the Act on the Court to approve agreements is given in order to avoid 
lengthy hearings before the Court. The Act does not intend to substitute a trial, in effect, conducted 
by State parties for a trial before the Court. Thus, something significantly less than the material 
necessary to justify a judicial determination is sufficient to satisfy a State party of a credible basis for 
an application.’ North J in Lovett on behalf of the Gunditjmara People v State of Victoria [2007] FCA 
474 [37] to [38]. See also North J in Hunter v State of Western Australia [2009] FCA 654 [22] to [25].
12  The website current at the time of writing was www.nntt.gov.au/Pages/Home-Page.aspx, with a 
link to ‘Statistics’ on that page. However, the categories of the statistics provided by the Tribunal have 
changed over the years.
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Table 1.1: Claims lost and won, 2011 to 2017
November 2011 June 2014 March 20171
Active native title applications 485 412 316
Finalised applications: native title 
determined in whole
66 92 315
Finalised applications: native title 
determined in part
65 142
Finalised applications: no native title 41 59 63
Finalised applications: discontinued, 
struck out, dismissed, withdrawn, 
rejected or pre-combination
1295 1125
1 While the NNTT provides statistics available through its website, the categories for 
which data are provided are not consistent with past data sourced from the same site. 
Thus in January 2017 finalised applications for recognition of native title in whole are not 
disaggregated from finalised applications for recognition of native title in part. data for 
applications discontinued, struck out, dismissed, withdrawn, rejected or pre-combination 
are not available.
source: National Native Title Tribunal: www.nntt.gov.au.
In a period of just over two-and-a-half years between November 2011 and 
June 2014 the number of ‘active’ claims was reduced from 485 to 412, 
which is a reduction rate of approximately 30 claims per year. For the 
period of just over two-and-a-half years between June 2014 and January 
2017 the number of ‘active’ claims was reduced from 412 to 316, which 
is a reduction rate of approximately 38 claims per year. Assuming that 
this increased rate of progress is sustained, it will be another eight or so 
years before all claims are finalised. Claims determined in whole or in 
part by January 2017 amount to 314, or a little over 14 a year for the 
23-year period since the Act come into effect. The failure rate represented 
by the row ‘Finalised applications: no native title’ indicates only those 
applications that were not accepted by the court, indicating perhaps that 
should a  claim go to court it has a reasonable chance of success. This 
is probably because lawyers are reluctant to expend the enormous funds 
required to bring a  case to trial unless they consider they have at least 
a reasonable chance of success. The seemingly high figures of ‘finalised 
applications’ are variously described as ‘discontinued, struck out, 
dismissed, withdrawn, rejected or pre-combination’, being applications 
removed as a result of court decisions, technical problems or combining 
existing claims into a  single new claim. Whatever the reason, these 
claims are not those that resulted in a positive determination of native 
title. This gives some indication of the complex web of the legal process 
and counter process that typifies much native title dealing in the court. 
This statistic is not available in the 2017 listing.
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However these figure are read, it seems most likely that native title will 
exercise the attention of the Federal Court, the NNTT, Indigenous 
representative bodies and all the lawyers as well as the anthropologists 
who service them for some time to come yet.
The native title we had to have
In the initial essentialities that accompanied the decision of the High 
Court in Mabo, there was no necessary compassion or the conferral of 
the benefit of doubt. The finding of a native title right to Murray Island 
was a truth born of the common law and a matter settled according to 
the facts as the court had found them, subject to the rules that govern 
the Australian legal and judicial process. The consequential ‘uncertainty’ 
that accompanied this landmark decision drove the matter into the 
political domain. The ambiguities that faced the Keating government 
of 1992–96 gave them little choice. The fundamentals of British 
sovereignty and Australian dominion had been challenged by the Mabo 
decision. Prospective common law claims threatened the status quo while 
application of the Racial Discrimination Act meant that grants of land 
might be invalid or compromised. The final form of the Native Title Act 
1993 that passed through the parliament was a product of the political 
environment of the time. It was, as one legal commentator has it, a:
product of petitioning, alliance-building, negotiation and compromise 
that in the end and for diverse reasons was supported by Labor, the minor 
parties in the Senate, most Aboriginal leadership, the Labor-held state 
governments and the National Farmer’s Federation, but opposed by the 
Liberal and National parties, the Minerals Council of Australia, the states 
held by the centre-right and the government of the Northern Territory. 
(Ritter 2009, 5)
The legislation reflects the truth of Otto von Bismarck’s reputed comment 
that ‘laws are like sausages – it is best not to see them being made’. Like 
many terms of settlement, this was the last act of war rather than the 
first act of peace. Legislative amendments have continued that war of 
attrition. The state, territories and representatives of mining interests 
and primary industry are accepting of the legislation because it is now 
accommodating of their interests and, some would argue, loaded in their 
favour. This is why there is now but muted discussion of any further 
amendment and no political will on either side of the political divide to 
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discuss native title law. Subsequent acquiescence to the state’s demands 
for connection, substantial amendments, and the ever changing and 
seemingly compromised jurisprudence, now make this law that prescribes 
uncertain outcomes. For claimants, the way that involves least risk of 
failure is achieved through mediated agreements: deals done with the state 
as a result of their benefaction, indulgence and the granting of favours. 
This may also mean significant compromise and loss of rights, just as has 
been the case with many other acts of favour that have sought to protect, 
bestow advantage or right past wrongs.
Adding the anthropology
I have set out this brief potted history of the development of native title 
in Australia in the context of its legislative and political origins because 
it represents a field of inquiry that has significant keynotes. Native title is 
a perverse and conflicted field noted for its complexity and professional 
pitfalls. For anthropologists it brings immediate contact with much 
that is alien and the risk of damage and harm. This field of endeavour 
represents significant challenges for the practice of anthropology. After 
the initial and, with the benefit of hindsight, misplaced enthusiasm on 
the part of anthropologists for involvement in native title, the decisions 
of the Federal Court started to make their mark. I think it is fair to say 
that, for some of us involved in those early native title applications, we 
regarded the venture as being little different to claims made under the 
Northern Territory Land Rights Act. This was certainly true for aspects of 
the Miriuwung and Gajerrong13 native title application as advanced in the 
Northern Territory portion of the claim. The court was not hostile to the 
aspirations of the Indigenous witnesses and the anthropology was fairly 
basic. However, the failure of the Yorta Yorta case, then Wongatha case,14 
and the later dismissal of the Jango compensation case15 were sobering 
reminders of the complex nature of native title claims, their dangers, 
pitfalls and the vulnerability of anthropologists and claimants in the 
process. For anthropologists, to be involved in a native title proceeding is 
to be involved first and foremost in a legal context, boxed in by a legislated 
13  Ward v Western Australia (WCD2006/002–Miriuwung Gajerrong #4), WAD124/2004. 
Determined 2006, FCA 1848.
14  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422 (HCA); 
Harrington-Smith on behalf of the Wongatha People v State of Western Australia (No. 9) [2007] FCA 31.
15  Jango v Northern Territory of Australia (2006) 152 FCR 150 (FCA: Sackville J).
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framework and subject to a judicial process. If an application ends up at 
trial, the anthropologist becomes a witness and subject to lengthy and 
at times disconcerting cross-examination. The Native Title Act and the 
developing jurisprudence that has emerged over the two decades since 
1993 is one replete with non-anthropological concepts and definitions. 
It is as though there is now a whole new vocabulary that anthropologists 
must learn when researching and writing native title, which must then be 
accommodated within the theoretical and epistemological framework of 
the discipline. Thus, phrases like ‘laws and customs’, ‘rights and interests’, 
‘substantially uninterrupted’, ‘normative system’ and words like ‘society’ 
and ‘continuity’ gained technical legal meanings that were not always 
amenable to anthropological analysis or even identification. To do native 
title anthropology was to attempt to straddle a divide between the law and 
the discipline – a divide that appeared to become bigger as the case law 
evolved (Glaskin 2017, 84–85).
Despite these difficulties, I think that it was never a realistic option to 
exclude anthropologists and anthropology from the native title process. 
At the heart of the proof of native title was the ability of the law to recognise 
an Indigenous system of law. The system whereby rights to country had 
been sustained and perpetuated in times past had been the subject of much 
anthropological analysis in Australia, particularly since the late 1950s. The 
academic contributions in this field, which I will discuss in later chapters 
of this book, were influential in both the Gove case and the drafting of 
the Northern Territory land rights legislation that followed. That stated, 
understanding how an Indigenous system of rights to land worked as both 
a religious process and a political undertaking was complex and likely not 
to have been uniform across the continent. Native title inquiry demanded 
a proper understanding of the particulars of this system relevant to the 
application area in question. Anthropology provided some insights that 
aided a gaining of this understanding. However, it was an understanding 
that had to accommodate the requirements of the Native Title Act and 
the constraints of the Australian legal system and the jurisprudential 
heritage from which they were descended. It was not and could not be 
simply a scholarly enterprise that sought to comprehend an Indigenous 
system that was part of another culture through the lens lent to it by the 
discipline of anthropology.
This disjunction was compounded by the sheer difficulty of the 
requirements of the burden of proof laid upon the applicants. For native 
title to have survived, it had to be demonstrated that the laws and customs 
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of the relevant group or society had remained substantially intact since 
sovereignty. This back-dating of the evidence meant that anthropologists 
had to attempt to recover past systems and social formations. The only 
way to do this was to explore the diaries of early explorers, the journals 
of early European settlers and comb the later works of the early 
anthropologists. These, so it might be argued, recorded at least some 
aspects of the customary systems. Anthropologists generally work with 
the present and observe what goes on around them, rather than attempt 
to work out how things might have been in former times. The task, then, 
for anthropologists was challenging and was one for which the profession 
was largely unprepared. There was no obvious heuristic framework and 
little theoretical underpinning that would assist the manner in which 
these tasks might be accomplished. Yet, it became clear as native title 
progressed that the court would expect anthropologists to set out their 
views in this regard with authority and submit to rigorous testing through 
cross-examination in the witness box. 
Native title as the recognition of a prior right is inevitably subject to 
dispute. Such contestation is not limited to debate between the state 
and Indigenous Australians, but extends to disputes between parties, 
including Indigenous groups, who are not in agreement as to who should 
be recognised as holding the native title right or being included in the 
group that is recognised ultimately by the court as doing so. This has 
led to overlapping claims and disputes between Indigenous parties that 
find their ultimate expression before a judge of the Federal Court. Being 
an anthropologist in the crossfire that typifies these disputes can never 
be expected to be a rewarding or welcoming experience. This contested 
environment is also one deeply informed by Indigenous values, systems 
and ways of holding rights to country that are subject to scrutiny by the 
court that seeks to determine whether they have endured, fundamentally 
unchanged, since the time of sovereignty. 
Finally, and perhaps no new thing for the profession of anthropology, 
the development of native title opened up old wounds in the profession 
between the academy and those involved in the practical application 
of the discipline, often referred to as ‘applied anthropology’. Practitioners 
in the native title field were accused16 of prostituting their profession in 
16  See Trigger 2011, 235–240 for a review of criticisms of applied anthropology advanced by a 
number of anthropologists including Bastin and Morris (2004), Cowlishaw (2003, 2010), Kapferer 
(2000), Lattas and Morris (2010a, 2010b) and Morris (2004).
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favour of a legal system that determined outcomes, defined research practice 
and paradigms and narrowed the field of inquiry and, so the argument 
ran, the subsequent advancement of knowledge. Some said that applied 
anthropologists were complicit in imperial hegemonic process. While this 
is not a matter I tackle in any detail in this book, it is nonetheless an 
additional complexity in the anthropological endeavour and one which 
has coloured debate and no doubt influenced those considering a career 
in applied anthropology in native title work in Australia.
An ensuing defence in the literature characterised the involvement of 
anthropologists in the native title process – as well as in earlier times 
in the Aboriginal Land Rights Act – as legitimate applications of the 
discipline (Morphy 2006). Trigger (2011) provided a summary of the 
applied anthropology debate and refuted derogatory views about applied 
anthropology, particularly in native title contexts. He argued that rather 
than diminish anthropological clarity and focus, communicating findings 
to members of different professions and disciplines made for a better 
discourse and removed anthropologists from their ‘intellectual comfort 
zone among colleagues’ (ibid., 245). Sackett, an anthropologist with many 
decades of experience in the applied field, recognised in his native title 
work a requirement to base conclusions of facts transparently stated so 
that ‘persuasion flows from opinions based on proof, not artful footwork’ 
(2006, 7).
This is a book about the uses of anthropology in native title claims in 
Australia. The complexities and challenges I have outlined above raise 
issues for our practice and counsel the development of methodological 
and theoretical approaches to our inquiry. Some of these are novel while 
others may require a difference in emphasis and a reassessment of focus. 
The discipline needs a better tool kit to undertake complex research in 
difficult and overly fraught environments. The series of essays that follow 
examine some of the more important of the issues I have identified 
over the years of my practice as a native title anthropologist. Given the 
inherent complications, the seemingly alien operating environment and 
the potential to get burnt in the process, it is not a field for the faint-
hearted. However, if anthropology is to be useful, then it also has to be 
relevant. It is my hope that what follows will contribute to some extent 




Of proof and process
In native title cases an anthropologist is generally asked to bring data 
to bear on a legal proposition (though usually more than one) relevant to 
the points of claim and provide an expert opinion developed from field 
data, prior ethnography or perhaps the paradigms of the discipline more 
generally. This is not inimical to the orthodox practice of anthropology but 
it is both more narrowly defined and focused. Consequently, this is not 
the same as undertaking an anthropological study (‘doing anthropology’), 
which is more open ended and may have an indeterminate destination, 
being variously a study of process or structure, change and meaning or 
a combination of two or more of these. Given that the understandings 
of a culture that develop from ‘doing anthropology’ are likely to be 
relevant to the opinions required by the lawyers, it is helpful to come 
to an understanding of the structural relationship between anthropology 
and the law. While the application of anthropology to the legal matter 
develops from the doing of anthropology, the two represent distinct fields 
of operation, with different parameters and theoretical underpinnings. 
In understanding this, we can come to an appreciation of the reasons why 
there may appear to be disjunction between ‘doing anthropology’ and the 
use of skills developed in that discipline to provide opinions to a court 
that will have status as expert testimony.
1  An earlier version of this paper appeared as Chapter 9 in Lisa Strelein’s Dialogue about land justice 
(Aboriginal Studies Press, Canberra, 2010). It has here been revised, updated and expanded. 
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Getting involved with native title anthropology is, then, not simply about 
learning the process or developing an appreciation of the jurisprudence 
that defines the questions that we should address. It is also about 
understanding the nature of the interface between anthropology and 
the law and the ramifications that develop as a result of fundamental 
epistemological differences between the law and anthropology. The 
dissonance between anthropologists and the application of their science in 
native title inquiries develops from differences between the characteristics 
of the former and the demands of the latter. At the heart of this difference 
is the nature of the process whereby anthropologists seek to describe and 
understand social process (relationships, meanings) and a legal process that 
seeks evidence (testimony, statements, expert views) to support or deny 
that a particular criterion or requirement has been met. The former sees 
social process as occurring through time and defies absoluteness; the latter 
tests propositions at a point in time and requires a concluded view. The 
former stresses change and mutability, the latter stasis and immutability. 
It follows, then, that the gathering of data and comprehending them as 
social science, on the one hand, and meeting the requirements of the 
legal system with respect to the uses of anthropology as expert opinion in 
native title inquiries, on the other, are quite different activities. 
The juxtaposition of law and anthropology is nowhere as immediate as 
when respective practitioners are required to develop an understanding 
of words that have attracted a special privilege, status and consequential 
meanings in both discourses. One example is the use of the terms ‘society’ 
and ‘community’. These are both legal terms (derived, in this case, from 
native title law but not statute) that are fundamental to jurisprudential 
thinking. They are also terms of anthropology. The words and the 
ways whereby they come to have different meanings provide a point of 
departure for this chapter. I consider below how anthropologists might 
best accommodate terms that are words of law rather than of anthropology, 
while bringing their anthropology to bear on the subject at hand. 
Native title society
In native title inquiries, the term ‘society’ has a meaning that is 
determined by jurisprudence rather than anthropology. The decision of 
the High Court with respect to the application made by members of the 
Yorta Yorta Aboriginal community provides the usual reference point for 
discussion of legal ideas about the centrality of a society to the concept 
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of the perdurance of native title rights.2 It also raises critical issues about 
the nature of the society, as required for native title law, at sovereignty, 
and a consideration of the relationship of the society at sovereignty to that 
of the claimants. 
In the judgment of the High Court, the relationship between 
the continuity of laws and customs, and rights to land or water and the 
society, is set down:
If that normative system has not existed throughout that period, the 
rights and interests which owe their existence to that system will have 
ceased to exist. And any later attempt to revive adherence to the tenets of 
that former system cannot and will not reconstitute the traditional laws 
and customs out of which rights and interests must spring if they are to 
fall within the definition of native title.3
The judgment then sets out how the relationship between laws and 
customs and the society is to be understood:
To speak of rights and interests possessed under an identified body of 
laws and customs, is, therefore, to speak of rights and interests that are 
the creatures of the laws and customs of a particular society that exists as 
a group which acknowledges and observes those laws and customs. And if 
the society out of which the body of laws and customs arises ceases to exist 
as a group which acknowledges and observes those laws and customs, those 
laws and customs cease to have continued existence and vitality. Their 
content may be known but if there is no society which acknowledges and 
observes them, it ceases to be useful, even meaningful, to speak of them 
as a body of laws and customs acknowledged and observed, or productive 
of existing rights or interests, whether in relation to land or waters 
or otherwise.4
The judges of the High Court found as a consequence that in a native title 
proceeding:
it will be necessary to inquire about the relationship between the 
laws and customs now acknowledged and observed, and those that 
were acknowledged and observed before sovereignty, and to do so by 
considering whether the laws and customs can be said to be the laws and 
customs of the society whose laws and customs are properly described as 
traditional laws and customs.5
2  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422.
3  ibid., [47].
4  ibid., [50].
5  ibid., [56].
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The ‘society’ provides the medium for the articulation of the relationship 
between the people and the laws and customs of that group. There is, then, 
a nexus between the ‘society’ and the laws and customs of its members.6 
An implication of this is that if the society ceases to exist then its laws and 
customs, while they might be recalled, are not meaningful.7
Law and custom arise out of and, in important respects, go to define 
a  particular society. In this context, ‘society’ is to be understood as a 
body of persons united in and by its acknowledgment and observance 
of a body of law and customs.8
In another native title decision (largely in favour of the applicants), 
Weinberg J quoted one of his colleagues as helpful in defining a society. 
He also went back to the Yorta Yorta case:
The concept of a ‘society’ in existence since sovereignty as the repository 
of traditional laws and customs in existence since that time derives from 
the reasoning in Yorta Yorta. The relevant ordinary meaning of society 
is ‘a body of people forming a community or living under the same 
government’–Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. It does not require arcane 
construction. It is not a word which appears in the NT Act [Native Title 
Act]. It is a conceptual tool for use in its application. It does not introduce, 
into the judgments required by the NT Act [Native Title Act], technical, 
jurisprudential or social scientific criteria for the classification of groups or 
aggregations of people as ‘societies’.9
His Honour asserted that for the application of native title law the 
common English sense of the term ‘community’ is what is relevant. 
‘Arcane construction’ (the likely province of an expert perhaps?) is not 
only unnecessary but would involve application of criteria ‘foreign’ to 
native title law.
His Honour Merkel J was less critical of potential experts but made it clear 
as to what was required. Merkel J wrote, in relation to the Rubibi claim, 
that the Yawuru applicants made claim for the recognition of native title 
as a community:
6  ibid., [49].
7  ibid., [50].
8  ibid., [49].
9  Northern Territory v Alyawarr [2005] 145 FCAFC135 [78], quoted in Griffiths v Northern 
Territory of Australia [2006] FCA 903 [513].
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As stated above, the Yawuru claim is a claim for communal native title 
rights and interests as it is claimed to be made on behalf of a community 
of people, namely the Yawuru community as defined in the application. 
The Yawuru claimants, relying on Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal 
Community v State of Victoria [2002] 214 CLR 422 (‘Yorta Yorta’) at 439 
[29], 444-445 [47] and 445 [49], claim that the Yawuru community is 
a body of persons united in and by its acknowledgment and observance 
of a body of traditional laws and customs. Those traditional laws and 
customs are said to constitute the normative system under which the 
rights and interests claimed are created.10
In other judgments I have read, the term ‘society’ is used freely, but to 
convey the sense that it comprises those who share cultural commonalities 
and adhere to the same system of laws and customs. For example:
In 1838 there was an established Aboriginal society close to the western 
boundary of the claim area (Glenelg River). It was an organised society, 
the members of which built structures and adorned their environment 
with paintings including Wanjina paintings, made artefacts of wood, and 
used stone to crush and grind seeds and to shape into spearheads.11
In native title law, according to one authority, ‘society’ is chosen 
over ‘community’ because the former serves to emphasise ‘this close 
relationship between the identification of the group and the identification 
of the laws and customs of that group’.12 Presumably this differentiation 
is drawn from the ordinary English use of the terms, rather than from 
anthropology. Conversely, anthropologists might use the term ‘society’ for 
larger, complex groupings – I provide some general examples of this in the 
next section. The term ‘community’ is sometimes used for smaller groups 
characterised by closer social ties and interaction and the typical subject of 
anthropological inquiry.13 The point is simple. Legal meanings and those 
of the social sciences show no automatic correlation.
In summary, there is a consistent legal view that a community has to be 
recognisable, because the laws and customs (the normative system) of its 
constituents unite members through joint or common observance. While 
10  Rubibi Community v State of Western Australia (No. 5) [2005] FCA 1025 [18].
11  Neowarra v State of Western Australia [2003] FCA 1402 [61].
12  Strelein 2009, 101.
13  An example is a paper by S. Holcombe (2004, 163–184). The author shows that the term 
‘community’ has a ‘deep genealogy’ in the social sciences.
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it is not stated, it would be a reasonable assumption that those people 
who did not share these laws and customs, but observed others, would 
constitute a different society or community.
The identity of the pre-sovereignty claimant society is thus of fundamental 
importance to any consideration of the continuity of laws and customs, 
rights and interests. Getting to grips with the idea of a ‘society’ in a native 
title claim is then an essential first step in planning the way in which the 
case is to be presented and adjudicated. Strelein has commented:
The need to establish a coherent and continuous society defined by 
a  pre-sovereignty normative system creates enormous ambiguity in 
the requirements of proof. The nature of the group has emerged as 
a fundamental threshold question for native title claimants. The High 
Court’s deference to the views of the trial judge in Yorta Yorta demonstrated 
the vagaries of an assessment based to a significant degree on a judge’s 
perceptions of the group. … Native title claimants must rely on the 
ability of a non-Indigenous judiciary to conceptualise the contemporary 
expressions of Indigenous identity, culture and law as consistent with the 
idea of a pre-sovereignty normative system. (Strelein 2009, 80)
In considering these matters, the court is also likely to have regard to the 
evidence of experts. Since no first-hand evidence can be adduced as to 
the nature of the society at sovereignty, the court must rely on experts 
to provide a view in this regard – though a court may draw inferences from 
the evidence of Indigenous witnesses as well. In determining the nature 
of the contemporary society the court is also likely to need the assistance of 
an expert, since the concept is a product of law not of Indigenous culture.
While the jurisprudence has moved toward a broader rather than 
a  narrower  understanding of how a society might be constituted and 
manifest, the native title society remains a starting point when defining 
the customary content of the claimants in any native title application. 
In this a good starting point is to consider a society for the purposes 
of a native title claim as being ‘a body of persons united in and by its 
acknowledgment and observance of a body of law and customs’. 
While, as I noted above, the terms ‘society’ and ‘community’ are often 
used interchangeably, it is best to pick one and stick to it, examining 
the facts to see if the members of an applicant group can be shown, on 
the ethnographic evidence, to recognise the mutual observance of laws 
and customs and adhere to  a  common normative system. Members of 
a society should be shown to have an internal correlation of laws and 
customs such that its members can be understood, in the common sense 
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of the word, to be members of a single ‘society’. It is not necessary for 
a member of a society to know all other members of that society or to 
expect to interact with all others. Neither is it necessary for all members 
of a society to live in peace and harmony, since the sharing of laws and 
customs does not mandate concord. Constituent groups of a native 
title society may exhibit different cultural traits – including speaking 
a different language or dialect – and occupy or are customarily associated 
with distinct areas. This is a matter that has been subject to some debate 
by anthropologists (e.g. Palmer 2010b) and is a fundamental question for 
native title (Strelein 2009, 80, 98). In 2010, judges of the Federal Court14 
considered some of those aspects of ‘law and culture’ that had been held 
to provide grounds for concluding that the Bardi and Jawi constituted 
separate societies. These included such things as language (dialects),15 self-
referential terms, 16 country of association17 and the circumstances of each 
native title application.18 The judges concluded:
Thus, in our judgment the linguistic evidence, the evidence of distinct 
territories or the existence of self-referents was not sufficient to displace 
the inference from the wealth of other evidence that the Bardi and Jawi 
people were a single society at sovereignty.19
The judges make reference to a number of other cases where this broader 
view of a society has been accommodated.20
In a more recent decision,21 Finn J wrote that the evidence supported 
the conclusion that groups inhabiting the Torres Strait islands comprise 
a single society. His Honour likened the body of laws and customs 
(following the anthropologist Professor Beckett) to a quilt of united 
parts.22 His Honour recognised there to be a relationship between the 
operation of the component island groups.
14  Sampi on behalf of the Bardi and Jawi People v State of Western Australia [2010] FCAFC 26.
15  ibid., [68].
16  ibid., [69].
17  ibid., [69].
18  ibid., [71].
19  ibid., [75].
20  ibid., [72] to [74].
21  Akiba on behalf of the Torres Strait Islanders of the Regional Seas Claim Group v State of Queensland 
(No. 2) [2010] FCA 643.
22  ibid., [490].
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The laws and customs which regulate the internal (or ‘domestic’) 
workings, relationships, etc. of each island community largely replicate 
those of other communities though not entirely or in all respects. The 
communities themselves are linked each to the others not only by these 
largely common ‘domestic’ laws and customs, but also by common laws 
and customs which govern the relationship of one community’s members 
to the members of another, both within and beyond the former’s own 
land and waters.23
Societies are often made up of component subsets that may also need 
to be identified in native title anthropology and it is important not to 
conflate the parts with the sum of the parts. Thus, the term ‘group’ may 
serve to identify any component subset of the society. 
Anthropological society
Social scientists in Australia have used the terms ‘society’ and ‘community’ 
without specialist sense to mean a set of people who can be grouped 
together because of shared cultural attributes. For example, the term has 
been used in the title of a few books and articles that examine Aboriginal 
topics. Ken Maddock had A portrait of their society as a subtitle to his 1974 
book The Australian Aborigines (Maddock 1974). C.D. Rowley (1980) 
wrote a  classic account of The destruction of Aboriginal society. More 
recently, Ian Keen (2004) has used the term ‘society’ in the title of his 
book Aboriginal economy and society as well as from time to time in the text 
without defining it. It is not included in his glossary of terms. However, 
the meaning is, to my mind, evident from the context (ibid., 2–5).
The term ‘society’ as used in the examples cited above provides, then, 
a useful concept rather than a specific one. It has the facility to convey 
a meaning that implies a group of people who together have things in 
common. This might include cultural practices, language and beliefs. 
However, it does not provide for a very tight or exact definition of what 
might be meant and therein lies its usefulness perhaps for those who have 
chosen to use it. Should this use be not understood for the shorthand 
it probably is, the use obfuscates important distinctions in the way 
anthropology understands the nature of social groups.
23  ibid., [490].
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Generally, a ‘society’ for an anthropologist is not a ‘thing’ but comprises sets 
of relationships (Beattie 1964, 34–35). Beattie counselled that thinking of 
‘society’ as a thing, like a frog or a jellyfish, was ‘more embarrassing than 
useful’ (ibid., 56). He argued that it was essential to jettison any analogy 
with an organism in order to focus on the relationships that exist between 
people who thereby recognise commonalities (ibid., 58–59). 
Michael Herzfeld, in what he described as ‘an overview of social and 
cultural anthropology’, told us that at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, ‘one thing is for sure: the attempt to abolish uncertainty has 
failed’ (2001, 133). He cited the ‘most obvious victim’ of this uncertainty 
as being ‘the idea of the bounded human group – the “society” or “culture” 
of the classic anthropological imagination’ (ibid.). Earlier, he cited Arturo 
Escobar who wrote, ‘societies are not the organic wholes with structures 
and laws that we thought them to be until recently but fluid entities 
stretched on all sides by migrations, border crossings and economic forces’ 
(ibid.).24
These views reflect a trend that typifies anthropology and its interest in 
understanding diachronic relationships and meaning, developed over 
time, through social process, rather than a science based on synchronic 
and structural classification. More recent anthropology has, according 
to Weiner (2007, 154), been ‘dominated by social constructionism 
in its own “strong” voluntarist version – that, as agents, human beings 
make their own world consciously and deliberately’. This manner of 
understanding social process as construction and agency through time 
is in marked contrast to the idea of a society as a relatively stable and 
discretely modelled entity. 
Based on some of the legal views cited above (‘repository of traditional 
laws and customs’), it would appear that in law a society is indeed a thing. 
In anthropology, on the other hand, it is made up of sets of relationships, 
changing through time, defying reification and certainty. Herein, then, 
lies a fundamental point of difference. 
24  Herzfeld provides no citation for this quotation, although he provides references to five 
of Escobar’s works in the bibliography.
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Aboriginal society
In Australian Aboriginal studies, terms like ‘nation’, ‘community’ and 
‘tribe’ abounded, particularly in the early literature as early ethnographers 
sought to identify the building blocks (sets of relationships) that constituted 
Aboriginal society (or societies). For example, R.H. Mathews published 
a map in 1898 showing what he determined to be different cultural blocs, 
based on difference in types of initiation rituals as he had collected them 
from his correspondents (1898a). Mathews went on to publish several 
additional similar accounts (1898b, 1898c, 1898e, 1900). Mathews 
was not alone in this endeavour. Howitt (1904, 41) defined nations by 
reference to the terms used for ‘man’ by its constituent members, while 
Bates also mapped ‘nations’, inventing names for them and relying on 
kinship, social categorisations and totemism25 to identify groups that she 
considered to share cultural commonalities (e.g. 1985, 39–61). Many of 
these ‘nations’ would be much larger in the extent of their country and 
constituent membership than most native title applications today.26 
These early accounts are of importance in native title research since 
establishing a view as to the continuity of a social formation (a society) 
must rely, to a considerable extent, upon the accounts provided by early 
ethnographers. Those assisting or assessing an application for native title 
are likely to go to this early literature to see what was said about the 
society in question at or about the time of sovereignty.
Anthropologists writing post-1950 generally did not use the term 
‘community’ and the word fell out of favour. Two exceptions are 
Meggitt (1962) and Hiatt (1996), which were discussed by Sutton (2003, 
99–107). R.M. and C.H. Berndt (1993, 19) dismissed the term ‘nation’ 
on the ground that its use implied a degree of political unity that was never 
apparent. The word is not much found in the Australian anthropological 
literature today, although it has found its place in the vocabulary of some 
contemporary Indigenous political discourse.
Applications for recognition of native title have used a variety of different 
models of society as a means of establishing the parameters within 
which laws and customs were held in common (see Strelein 2009, 98–
25  I discuss the meaning of this word in Chapter 5, under the heading ‘Religious beliefs’.
26  Peter Sutton has reviewed these and other attempts to map ‘nations’ and his account may be 
of interest to those seeking additional information on the subject. See Sutton 2003, 42.
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105, 123–125). Peter Sutton (2003, 88) took the view that there were 
several kinds of Aboriginal groups that could be defined in relation to 
land. He observed that a choice in how a claimant community was to be 
defined reflected the reality of ‘different landed entities’ that would yield 
‘a number of overlapping “territories” for the same population’ (ibid.). 
Sutton also noted that there were different sorts of Aboriginal ‘community’: 
he identified two, one defined in relation to geography, another defined 
in terms of the relationships of its members (ibid., 89–92). Each was 
different and neither necessarily comprised members who were the 
same as members of a native title community – that is, a group who 
together shared rights in the same country. By this account, then, not 
all ‘communities’ will be relevant to a native title application. For the 
anthropologist there is choice in how the word will be applied. There is no 
absolute ‘community’. The anthropologist needs to ensure that the sort of 
community chosen is relevant to the group understood to have customary 
rights to the application area.
The two-fold question in relation to any native title claim, then, is which 
sort of ‘landed entity’ is to be chosen and how broad a compass does its 
collective interest in land circumscribe?
It is not my intention here to review and categorise the types of society 
that have been presented in native title applications, even if this were 
practical. However, there are some sorts of societies that can be regarded 
as models and may provide useful starting points for the definition of the 
native title society in a particular claim. For the most part they relate to 
models that might be applicable to larger rather than smaller-scale social 
formations. All would appear to me to be anthropologically defensible in 




The concept of a ‘cultural bloc’ as an aggregation of constituent tribes 
or  other groups has been the subject of a number of early studies, 
including  Radcliffe-Brown, who was interested in expansions of 
‘social  solidarity’ beyond the range of the local group (Radcliffe-Brown 
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1930–31, 445–455; Sutton 2003, 46). Similarly, Roth (1897, 41) 
characterised larger aggregates in Western Queensland as ‘messmates’, 
united by the use of mutually intelligible languages, ‘bonds of comradeship’, 
endogamy and cooperation in times of war.
Sutton reviewed other accounts that provided evidence of aggregations or 
‘nations’ (2003, 92–98). In the context of a discussion of both Mathews 
and Howitt, Sutton (2003, 95) stated that the early accounts support 
the view that there were regional aggregations with substantial cultural 
commonalities:
Certain extensive areas of south-eastern Australia, for example, were 
characterised by a widely reported classical complex in which were to 
be found matrilineal moieties, sections, matrilineal unlocalised social 
totems, single linguistic groups numbering several thousand (not just 
a few hundred people), a bora (sacred ceremony) type of initiation system, 
emphasis on site-bound increase rites, a prominent religious and social 
role for the medicine-men of high degree who were able to fly, a belief 
in an ‘All-Father’ figure located in the heavens, fragmentary evidence of 
primary recruitment to country through birth or, possibly, conception 
and, probably, a system of individualised life-time site or tract tenure 
resting on an underlying communal estate title system. 
Sutton also noted that some later writers attempted to identify regional 
aggregations in relation to drainage divisions (ibid., 96; Peterson 1976, 
50–71). 
The ‘cultural bloc’ is sometimes associated with the Western Desert 
region. In 1959, R.M. Berndt published an account of local organisation 
for some Australian desert regions, suggesting that the term ‘tribe’ was ‘not 
entirely applicable’ (Berndt 1959, 104). Instead, he suggested that the use 
of a common language, with dialect variations, resulted in ‘a common 
awareness of belonging to a cultural and linguistic unit, over and above 
the smaller units signified by these [dialect] names’ (ibid., 92). Berndt 
identified such a group as a ‘culture bloc’ (ibid., 84). Berndt suggested that 
within the culture bloc was a ‘wider unit’ ‘formed seasonally by members 
of a number of hordes coming together for the purpose of performing 
certain sacred rituals’ (ibid., 104). These wider units would have changed 
composition over time and the degree of interaction would have been 
variable. There would not necessarily have been a consistency of horde 
membership of a ‘wider group’ (ibid., 105). He concludes: 
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One might expect to find a number of these [wider groups] throughout 
the Western Desert, with some of their members interchangeable from 
time to time … Each one of these might be termed a society, with the 
main criteria being, (a) sustained interaction between its members; 
(b) the possession of broadly common aims; (c) effective and consistent 
communication between them. It is suggested, therefore, on the basis of 
material presented here, that it is more rewarding to speak of Western 
Desert societies, rather than ambiguously of tribes. (ibid., 105)
For Berndt, the Western Desert cultural bloc was made up of a number of 
societies – it was not a single ‘society’ in the sense that he used the term. 
The characteristics he ascribed to a society do not clearly equate to the 
characteristics of a society of native title law. The societies were both labile 
and ephemeral, so lacked corporate attributes and were social rather than 
land-holding groups. ‘Broadly common aims’ is the closest we get to any 
idea that the members of such a society might share laws and customs – 
although their social interaction might imply that they do.
In a later paper the same writer was to apply this concept to a non-arid 
region which he called the ‘northeastern Arnhem Land bloc’ (Berndt, 
R.M. 1976, 145–146). This identity was marked by a ‘local recognition of 
a broadly common culture’, an acceptance of dialect variation constituting 
a common language and acknowledgement of ‘mythic’ relationships 
– that  is, relationships that existed between constituent groups or 
individuals  that developed from spiritual ties between themselves, the 
land and each other (ibid.). 
Berndt’s comments on tribes and societies provide a useful introduction 
to what is, to my mind, a more problematic concept and one that Berndt 
found unhelpful, at least for Western Desert societies. I refer to the word 
‘tribe’, which occurs with depressing frequency in native title discourse.
Tribe
The idea of the tribe lies deep within the popular psyche and has 
dogged much debate about local organisation and society, often without 
discrimination. Indigenous societies, it seems, must be made up of 
tribes, reflecting I think some arcane perception that employment of 
the term readily identifies Australian Indigenous systems, matching 
stereotypes of  ‘exotic’ peoples in Africa or South America. If there was 
one word that  should be banished from the native title discourse – 
published, unpublished, spoken or written – it should be the term ‘tribe’. 
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Unfortunately, use of the term is not confined to lawyers, state bureaucrats 
and the occasional anthropologist. Claimants commonly press an identity 
by reference to a  ‘tribal name’ and define their country by reference to 
a tribal territory. Such arrangements are not, as I will explain below, 
founded on customary systems of social or local organisation. Rather, 
they represent a telescoping of prior local interests into what is sometimes 
an undifferentiated whole, managed by reference to contemporary 
corporate structures that typify the administration of Aboriginal Australia 
at a regional or local level. Because of these canards ‘tribes’ are sometimes 
misrepresented as land-owning corporations, which (to the extent that the 
term might be used of customary systems in Aboriginal Australia) they 
were not. As a model for a native title society then, the concept of the tribe 
provides for more pitfalls than it does advantages, but it may have some 
facility if employed with definitional clarity and caution.
The term ‘tribe’ retains popular currency, in part as a result of Tindale’s 
1974 map and, to a lesser extent, because of subsequent reincarnations by 
Horton (1994) and others. There has been an assumption, common in lay 
thinking, that a set of language speakers may form a discrete community 
with an internal political structure that merited the appellation of ‘tribe’.27 
Thus, the name of a spoken language becomes a ‘tribal’ name. A corollary 
of this is a view that the ‘tribe’ was the maximal territorial unit, whose 
members together held a defined area of land in common. There was also 
an assumption in much early Australian anthropological literature that 
this model was generally applicable.28
Anthropologists in Australia have not always been in agreement as to 
how best to characterise Indigenous societies in terms that can be shown 
to have empirical validity. This is a consequence of the fact that the 
social units that comprise Aboriginal groupings are not easily or simply 
identified. It is likely that within what was a hunting and gathering society 
there were several ways by which people identified, according to activity 
(economic, ritual or regional) as well as by reference to kin relationships. 
This multiplicity of referents presents a problem if a single unambiguous 
identity is sought. Moreover, some aggregations are likely to have been 
labile and so would have changed composition over time, providing an 
obstacle to the identification of enduring social formations.
27  For a comprehensive summary of this issue, see Rumsey 1993.
28  See, for example, Elkin 1945, 22ff.; Tindale 1974, 30–33.
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The assumptions and preconceptions about Aboriginal political 
organisation are particularly common in the early Australian literature. 
They developed from conjecture that a ‘native’ society would take the 
form of a named ‘tribe’, with little or no understanding of the variety 
of social formations and the multitude of names applied by Aboriginal 
people themselves to social and regional groupings. For many early 
writers, a  ‘tribe’ was explicitly or implicitly understood to comprise 
a community of people, with a classifying name, whose members spoke 
the same language and adhered to a system of government that included 
a chief or leader. In early (and, indeed, in some later) ethnographies, the 
use of a name to identify the ‘tribe’ was, then, a convenience born of 
a preconception that obfuscated a more complex reality. In any event, 
unless the term ‘tribe’ was being used in a narrowly defined sense, the field 
data did not support the existence of ‘tribes’ in the popularly understood 
sense of the term, as later writers were to show.
As far back as 1938, Davidson, who also provided an early example of 
a ‘tribal map’, stated that the largest political unit in Aboriginal local 
organisation was what he termed the ‘horde’.29 He understood:
Larger groupings are recognised and named by the natives on the bases of 
dialect and cultural similarities and geographical contiguity. These larger 
units, which furnish a more practical basis for ethnological considerations, 
can be spoken of as tribes in spite of the fact that there is no semblance 
of centralized political authority nor any sense of political confederation. 
(Davidson 1938, 649)
For Davidson, then, the use of the term ‘tribe’ was a convenience, the term 
used to identify groups whose members recognised ‘dialect and cultural 
similarities’, furnishing a practical basis for ‘ethnological considerations’.
For the native title anthropologist it is generally a short journey to 
Norman Tindale’s classic map of Australian tribes, published in 1974. 
The Tindale map and its accompanying text has provided the basis for 
countless native title application boundaries and is often referred to by 
claimants and lawyers alike in justification for their claim. I will have 
more to say about Tindale’s work in Chapter 7, when I examine the use 
of his ‘tribal’ materials in native title research and some of the difficulties 
29  Generally later called the ‘local descent group’ (Berndt 1959, 102–103) and also called the 
‘country group’ (Keen 2004, 277, Sutton 2003, 54–66). 
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that have developed as a result of his lack of clarity in relation to social 
groupings which have become prominent points of reference in the native 
title debate.
Tindale’s characterisation of ‘tribes’ and ‘boundaries’ was examined in 
detail by Monaghan in a thesis presented in 2003. Monaghan sought 
to understand the extent to which Tindale’s representations were in fact 
the result of his theoretical preoccupations and his ideas of linguistic and 
racial purity. While the focus of Monaghan’s study was on areas identified 
as ‘Pitjantjatjara’, his arguments are relevant here. 
Tindale effectively reduced a diversity of indigenous practices to ordered 
categories more reflective of Western and colonial concepts than 
indigenous views. Tindale did not consider linguistic criteria in any depth, 
his informants were few, and the tribal boundaries appear to a large extent 
to be arbitrary. (Monaghan 2003, xi)
Monaghan counselled against accepting Tindale’s research findings, 
‘at face value, as lawyers, anthropologists and linguists have done in the 
past’ (ibid.).
Early ethnographers had found ‘tribal’ names to be sometimes ‘vague’ 
(e.g. Mathew 1910, 128) and boundaries to be drawn without ‘exactness 
even on river frontages where land is most valuable’ (Curr 1886, xviii). 
The indefinite nature of boundaries in Aboriginal local organisation has 
been remarked upon by a number of anthropologists, including Warner 
(1937, 18), Stanner (1965, 11), Hiatt (1965, 16), Peterson and Long 
(1986, 55) and Williams (1986, 83). Other writers have also pointed 
out the difficulties and errors of ‘tribal’ models. As mentioned above, 
R.M. Berndt had questioned the applicability of the term to Western 
Desert societies in 1959 (Berndt 1959, 91–95). Rumsey provided 
a helpful critique of the use of the term ‘tribe’ and exposed some of the 
assumptions related to its unquestioned use, particularly with respect to 
the relationship to both a single language and territory (1993, 191–195). 
Rumsey was of the view that the misconception regarding tribes is still 
current (ibid.,  191), a  conclusion which I think cannot be much in 
contention. ‘Tribes’ are well represented in NNTT research reports that 
reproduce maps produced by linguists (and others) – of which there would 
appear to be many, showing ‘tribal’ territories drawn onto maps by means 
of boundary lines. This would appear to confirm my view that ‘tribes’ 
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are regarded by at least some of those involved in native title research as 
a valid unit in defining customary native title groups. This stems from the 
lingering popular misconceptions about ‘tribes’ in Aboriginal Australia. 
Since the ‘tribe’ was not a political entity, it could not have a bounded 
territory. The territorial regime was, as Davidson pointed out, a matter for 
what he called the ‘horde’ or local group. Boundaries were a product of 
the assertion of rights by members of these groups. Where several groups 
recognised linguistic commonalities, it seems reasonable that boundaries 
might also be conceptualised in language-group terms, especially in 
a regional context. In some cases it is evident that language was imputed 
into country by reference to both place names and myth, further enhancing 
the association of language and country. However, it is not the case that 
this is only by reference to one language (ibid., 201–204). From my own 
experience, this process was not universal and was (and is) more strongly 
marked in some areas than others.
Some years later Ian Keen wrote:
Many early ethnographers assumed that Aborigines were divided into 
relatively large and discrete ‘tribes’, each of which shared a common 
language, culture, and territory. This model survived through the first 
two-thirds of the twentieth century, adhered to, with variations, by 
Radcliffe-Brown, Elkin, Tindale and Birdsell … the tribal model had 
begun to unravel more than a decade before Tindale published his book 
and maps of Aboriginal tribes in 1974. (Keen 2004, 234)30 
Keen noted that the early ethnographer Howitt wrote of ‘mixed’ language 
group areas and that some marriages took place between people of 
different language varieties, making their children, presumably, in his 
view, of mixed language identity (ibid., 149). More recently, researchers 
(in  Queensland) have demonstrated that the relationship between 
language, social identity and community is complex (ibid., 134–135). 
People tend to be multilingual (or to speak several dialects of the same 
language), people sometimes marry those from other language or dialect 
groups and this language, while important, could not be seen alone 
as a  diacritic of group membership. The formation of an identity also 
involved references to a locality or a relative appellation, like ‘northerner’ 
or ‘coastal dweller’ (ibid., 135).
30  See also Howard (1976, 17–19) for a similar view.
AusTRAlIAN NATIvE TITlE ANThRopoloGy
46
While accepting that much of the early literature casts Aboriginal social 
life and culture in terms of discrete ‘tribes’, Keen concluded that ‘several 
critiques have cast doubt on the validity of a cellular model of Aboriginal 
society’ (ibid., 6). With respect to the named ‘tribal’ groups that were the 
subject of his analyses, he warned, ‘it should not be assumed that these 
names refer to societies or localised “social systems”, especially given the 
degree of heterogeneity of both ecologies and cultural forms documented 
for some regions’ (ibid.). 
Defining what might constitute a ‘society’ or a ‘community’ in terms of the 
account of ‘tribes’ will need to accommodate these difficulties and avoid 
these obstacles. This is not to say that a ‘tribal’ model is not sometimes 
helpful. However, designation of a ‘tribal group’ cannot, of itself, assume 
commonalities of law, language and culture. Conversely, a society could 
comprise more than one ‘tribe’, since laws and customs transcend the 
territorial boundaries of country groups and commonly traverse a number 
of different language groups.31
Language groups
Given that ‘tribes’ are problematic for anthropologists, the characteristics 
of a group of people that have been labelled a ‘tribe’ might provide 
for a  more profitable line of inquiry. Language spoken or used as 
a  characteristic of group membership can be a useful tool in defining 
a society for the purposes of native title. In so far as a language group 
corresponds to the old fashioned notion of a ‘tribe’ there are likely to be 
ethnographic references resting on assumptions of ‘tribal’ unity to support 
the representation of the society as a relatively unified body of people.
Language variation, however, is an issue that has to be addressed in such 
cases. Pertinent questions include whether dialect variations are a means 
of asserting difference and what is the Aboriginal understanding of 
similarity and difference in this regard. Analyses effected by linguists can 
be misleading in cases where languages are shown to be technically similar, 
and so classed together, while social and political difference between 
speakers marks substantial difference. Conversely, there are instances where 
31  There are examples of successful native title applications that have included members of more 
than one language-speaking group. See, for example, Ward v Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483, 
Neowarra v State of Western Australia [2003] FCA 1402, Griffiths v Northern Territory of Australia 
[2006] FCA 903 and Watson on behalf of the Nyikina Mangala People v State of Western Australia 
[2015] FCA 1132. 
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languages that are technically classed as being quite different are regarded 
by multilingual speakers as being much the same. Linguist Bill McGregor 
made relevant comment on the nature of linguistic classifications in this 
regard. Writing of the Kimberley, he distinguished between technical 
classification and how a speaker of a language understands the relationship 
between his or her own language and that spoken by another.
It should be noted that speakers may classify languages quite differently 
from linguists, and may perceive similarities on the basis of cultural 
affiliations over and above formal resemblances of either typological or the 
genetic type, which are the basis of linguists’ classifications. (McGregor 
1988, 97)
Linguists and others have also made a distinction between language-
speaking groups and language-owning groups (Walsh 2002, 233). 
The distinction between an ability to speak a language and being regarded 
as an owner of the language was first made over 35 years ago by Peter 
Sutton and Arthur Palmer (Sutton and Palmer 1980). In short, the former 
group are characterised by members who speak the language in question; 
the latter group by those who consider they are associated with a language 
name, but who do not themselves necessarily speak the language. It is, 
however, something that they consider they own and thus is a cornerstone 
of their common identity. This distinction is obviously of importance for 
many areas of Australia where a traditional language is no longer spoken. 
I find the use of the phrase ‘language group’ to be a convenient way of 
identifying those who claim commonality by reference to an ancestral 
language (often no longer spoken except as isolated words). Language 
groups, so understood, are a significant feature of the native title landscape 
and it is rare to be involved in a claim that does not have one or more 
language groups as core components of the concept of the society of its 
constituent members.
Cultural cohesion
A fourth model for a society is one characterised by close kinship, ritual 
and economic links, perhaps in relation to a unifying geographic feature, 
like a river or drainage system. Such an arrangement would not preclude 
the use of different languages, as multilingualism would be a necessary 
feature of the population’s skill set where the society was comprised of 
speakers of more than one language. One such example was Griffiths v 
Northern Territory of Australia in the Timber Creek area. In his judgment 
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Weinberg J accepted that five discrete country groups, representing 
two different language groups, constituted the society whose members 
together held native title in the application area.32
Likewise, Sundberg J, in a determination of native title in the northwest 
Kimberley region of Western Australia, found that a number of groups 
together made up a community bound together through observance of 
a number of laws and customs. These were clearly enunciated in evidence.
The body of evidence in pars [162]–[322] shows that the claimants regard 
themselves as part of a community inhabiting the Ngarinyin, Worrorra 
and Wunambal region. Throughout the evidence there is an emphasis 
on shared customs and traditions that transcend any particular dambun 
or language area. Central to this sharing is the belief in Wanjina; that 
Wanjina impressed themselves on the landscape, principally in painting 
sites. Wanalirri, though in Ngarinyin country, is regarded throughout the 
claim area as the source of the laws and customs laid down by Wanjina. 
This belief extends beyond the borders of the claim area into the claim 
region. The Wunggurr tradition also extends across the claim area and 
beyond, as do other practices and customs: moieties, the marriage rules, 
wurnan, wudu, rambarr, traditional burial, dambun and kinship rules. 
The evidence collected earlier is inconsistent with any description of the 
group or groups that hold the native title rights other than those who are 
members of the Wanjina-Wunggurr community.33
The Wanjina–Wunggurr community is substantially larger than the 
Timber Creek society, although the principle of recruitment would appear 
to have much in common. The commonalties that the groups were held to 
exhibit by the judges in question relate to the same sort of cultural beliefs, 
practices and norms as were outlined for regional aggregations by Sutton 
(see subsection ‘Cultural bloc’, above) and is perhaps a contraction of 
the regional aggregation model, which I also noted at the same reference 
above.
The application of models
Native title law requires recognition of a defensible society or community 
– one that is anthropologically viable in terms of both contemporary 
practice and past ethnographies. Thus, the proper society for an application 
32  Griffiths v Northern Territory of Australia [2006] FCA 903 [6], [377].
33  Neowarra v State of Western Australia [2003] FCA 1402 [386].
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must be founded upon a reasonably argued expert view that such a body 
of persons were united through observance of common laws and customs 
in the past. 
The models I have discussed above may provide a basis for developing 
an idea of a community or society. It is possible that no single one will 
match the ethnography, and the final construct will be an amalgam of 
parts of more than one. A ‘society’ is a group (or body) of people who 
recognise themselves and are recognised by others to share commonalities 
developed and expressed through actual or potential social relationships. 
In this, they identify themselves as having more in common with their 
fellows than they do with others who may be differentiated as ‘strangers’. 
Cultural commonality is underpinned by the observance of common 
laws and customs. Other factors may also play a part, but not invariably. 
For example, members of a society may use the same language (or dialects 
of the same language), or be multilingual, utilising a suite of languages 
with varying degrees of proficiency. Members may also feel themselves 
to be united by social bonds and recognise kinship links by reference to 
classificatory as well as consanguineal reckonings. 
I have set out above some of the choices for a ‘society’ that have 
anthropological credibility. These have the potential, given the right 
supporting data and evidence, to have relevance to a consideration 
of native title. However, finding a fit between what might be a native 
title society or community, however understood, for the purposes of the 
Native Title Act, and a society or community defined by reference to 
the available ethnography, presents a challenge for anthropology. There 
are three reasons for this.
First, for anthropologists unqualified terms like ‘community’ or ‘society’ 
invoke a number of different and sometimes conflicting referents. This is 
true generally in relation to the discourse of the profession, which counsels 
strict definitional use of the words. It is also true in relation to Aboriginal 
studies in particular where many different terms have been used, without 
consistency, for different types of social formation – real or imagined. 
As Sutton has pointed out (2003, 88), this may afford some flexibility 
and choice over the type of social formation identified as apposite in the 
context of a native title application. On the other hand, the form of the 
society used to characterise the claimant community needs to be robust 
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and defensible, clearly defined and substantiated by the field data. In 
short, anthropologists need to do a proper job in their application and 
definition.
Second, demonstration of continuity of a society necessarily relies upon 
ethnographic reconstruction. While the early ethnographic accounts 
for some areas of Australia are many, quality and reliability are both 
questionable.34 This is a consequence of assumptions made by observers 
about ‘tribal’ organisation and other groupings, their often inconsistent 
use of terminology and the manner in which their data were collected – 
mostly at arm’s length and second or third hand.
Given substantial difficulties in developing reasonable reconstructions 
of  social formations, expert views about correlations between 
a  contemporary community of native title holders and that likely to 
have been in evidence at the time of first sustained European settlement 
will be qualified. Moreover, they will, at least potentially, be subject to 
criticism on the ground that the contemporary society has little or no 
correspondence with that developed from the early ethnography. Again, 
the anthropologist needs to be aware of this potential difficulty and ensure 
that it is addressed in his or her account.
The third issue relates to scale. As a general rule, the smaller a society, 
the more likely will be the uniformity of observance of law and custom. 
Conversely, the larger the society, the greater the likelihood of internal 
variation. In the case of a clearly bounded society, discontinuity is 
identified as a boundary. Such is the case, for example, with the so-called 
‘circumcision line’ that Tindale drew on his maps.35 The line purports 
to show a discontinuity of a cultural practice (a law) within geographic 
space. On one side of the line people practised circumcision, on the other 
they did not.
Such a boundary is necessarily a cadastral and cartographic construct. 
It has the intention of demonstrating the incidence of cultural practice in 
geographic space, at least in general terms. At the boundary of two distinct 
societies there would be a defined representation of difference. However, 
34  Sansom has disagreed, arguing in relation to the Yulara ethnography that ‘earliest sources are 
best’ (2007, 79). It was a view challenged by some other anthropologists (Burke 2007, 164; Glaskin 
2007, 167; Morton 2007, 172). 
35  See, for example, N.B. Tindale 1940a and 1974. 
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social space is not always so clearly bounded.36 In an arrangement where 
aggregations of groups recognise commonalities between themselves 
and their near neighbours, bounded cultural space as a recognition of 
cultural correlation is going to be a function of relative proximity. 
In such a case, distinctive commonalities would diminish gradually across 
space. At opposite ends of a spectrum would be those who understood 
one another to be observers of different laws and customs while those 
at various intervals in between might appreciate more or less difference, 
a greater or lesser degree of correlation. 
The question then is this: at what point, for the purposes of a native 
title application, is cultural dissonance tantamount to disunity and the 
admission of two or more different societies? Were this the case there 
would be two (or more) sets of laws and customs relating to rights in 
country, resulting in different groups of rights holders for the same country. 
Again, these issues must be addressed in any expert anthropological view, 
although, as I explore below, issues of cultural process sit with some 
difficulty with many aspects of the native title legal process.
Anthropology and law: disjunction 
or snug fit?
An essential task for the court – or for the state if it is considering the 
acceptability of an application for a potential consent determination – 
relates to a necessity that certain criteria have been met. This is, like any 
matter of proof, a question of examining whether requirements set down 
in statute and encased by judgment can be understood to have been 
attained. In this activity, evidence is judged (by the court or by another set 
of persons) either to have satisfied those conditions or not. While native 
title law can accommodate the notion that things have not stood still in 
relation to the form and structure of a society over time, the essentially 
synchronic process of adjudication remains fundamental to the enterprise.
36  Indeed, Bates tells us that, along the line that marked the circumcising people of the southwest 
of Western Australia from the neighbours to the north and east, ‘On the borders of this line, right 
through to its north-western point, the local groups appear to become mixed’ (1985, 45). See also 
Palmer 2016, 76.
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I noted above, in my discussion about the extent of a society, that forming 
a view of commonalities can provide a challenge for anthropologists. This 
is because an anthropological account often understands societies to be 
moving, vibrant entities, which do not remain the same from one moment 
to the next. Moreover, seeing societies as discrete entities is neither a part 
of our contemporary discourse nor a reflection of the manner whereby 
our science makes sense of and comprehends them.
There is, then, a difficulty between a mode of thinking that sees a 
society as a thing and a snapshot in time, and a society seen as sets of 
relationships that are likely to be in a constant state of flux and to change 
in some ways most of the time. It is not that native title law admits no 
change: it can accommodate significant change and adaptation provided 
there is a clear connection with pre-sovereignty formations. Thus, in 
native title law the structure is the focus of attention and interrogation. 
Typically in anthropology it is relationships and meanings and their social 
construction, perpetuation and transformation that are our concern. 
The  study of structure does not, of itself, comprehend the complexity 
of the social universe we seek to explore and explain. 
The ideas I have explored in this chapter about community and society 
have one thing in common: they are all descriptive of structures. That is, 
they represent a view of a social formation during a single slice in time. 
While what I have called ‘cultural cohesion’ exhibits some propensity 
toward a diachronic analysis, it is still essentially a description of a society 
at a point in time. This fact is what makes these descriptive structures 
helpful in the context of the consideration of applications for the legal 
recognition of native title.
The sorts of social formations that I have set out above that could 
correspond to a ‘society’ for the purpose of an application for the 
recognition of native title are what could be termed models. A model is 
(amongst other things) a small scale replica founded after reality. It is also, 
by virtue of its replicated but small scale construction, both an ideal and 
a representation of that reality presented at a particular moment in time. 
For an anthropologist, models are useful heuristic devices. But in the sense 
that I use the term here, models cannot easily accommodate social process: 
the ebb and flow of relationships, the fluctuations in identity in response 
to political motion, the rise of one man and the demise of another, and 
the essential uncertainties these vacillations generate. These are the sorts 
of things that provide the basis for an understanding of social process 
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over time. The use of models, a legitimate instrument for the preparation 
of an expert view for an anthropologist, provides then for a means of 
mediation between a requirement of the legal process and the tools 
available to the anthropologist. It permits the anthropologist to provide 
expert views in a manner that will be comprehensible to the requirements 
of a legal process. Because models are founded after the  ethnographic 
reality (and will be tested in court to see if indeed they are so), they are 
the product of the anthropological endeavour. In this way there is a clear 
differentiation, but no necessary disjunction, between doing anthropology 
(understanding social process and meaning) and being an expert witness 
(furnishing a synchronic model based on that research).
What the court requires is an understanding and a view that relates to 
the particular constructs and technical requirements of the law – in this 
case, the Native Title Act. The focus of an expert view needs to be a clear 
understanding of that requirement. The anthropologists’ view, then, 
relates to the field of endeavour that is set and defined by the legislation 
and the legal process. The apparent difficulties that develop in this 
regard relate to anthropological and legal fundamentals. Social process 
is never discrete, final or absolute. In contrast, forensic determination is 
the absolute product of relating completed evidence to a defined claim. 
In this chapter I have argued that it is beneficial for anthropologists to 
pay heed to these facts and differences and so to recognise the process 
with which they are engaged. In the adoption of models it is possible 
to follow the anthropological discipline while developing methodological 
discriminations that mediate between the fundamentals of social inquiry 




Customary rights to country
Owning rights
At the heart of any native title inquiry is a thorough examination and 
understanding of the ways the claimants gain rights to the country they call 
their own. For reasons that should by now be evident, the system of gaining 
and perpetuating rights to country must be based on customary practices, 
if they are to be capable of recognition by the court. So fundamental is 
the notion of elucidating the system of Indigenous rights to land in native 
title matters that one lawyer has argued for a primacy of its consideration, 
implying perhaps that other ethnography is of secondary or only minor 
importance (Hiley 2008). This may have some justification from a legal 
point of view, but anthropologists who have studied Australian Aboriginal 
systems of law and land would find it difficult to separate out the strands 
of spiritual belief and practice, kinship relationships and hunter gatherer 
economics as isolated and discrete subjects of study. Rather, land and 
a person’s relationship to land is enunciated and codified by reference to 
spiritual relationships, totemic referents and interpersonal relationships, 
making separation impractical. Moreover, as I have discussed in earlier 
chapters of this book, native title law demands that the laws and customs 
of a society be shown to have continuity as practised by members of the 
relevant society. Arguably, demonstration of the practice and observance 
of laws and customs adds to the evidence that the society remains extant, 
vigorous and viable.
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Anthropologists, perhaps like many of their non-legal colleagues, are not 
always clear as to what exactly is meant by the use of terms of ownership 
and possession. Thus it is commonplace enough to state that you ‘own’ 
something or to refer to another as the ‘owner’ of a piece of property. 
We also use the word ‘own’ to identify a relationship of possession with 
a thing by saying, ‘That’s my own …’ article or whatever, as opposed 
to acknowledging that it belongs to someone else. These generalised 
statements allow us to communicate on a daily basis, usually without 
much misunderstanding. However, the terms ‘own’ and ‘owner’ are 
inadequate for the purposes of developing a comprehensive understanding 
of an Indigenous system of tenure or possession. This is because the words 
do not reflect the complexities of the process whereby human beings 
have appropriated to themselves certain objects or lands according to 
a normative system of rules and regulations that are accepted by others 
to hold good for themselves and others with respect to property. In short, 
‘owning’ something is not as straightforward as the use of the word might 
imply. The desire to gain clarity in this regard has been seen as important 
by Sutton (2003, 15–17) who examines some of the same materials as 
I consider here.
Anthropologists have visited this issue and can contribute to the present 
discourse. Max Gluckman, an anthropologist who was particularly 
interested in customary law, noted the evident but implicit imprecision of 
the term ‘ownership’. In this regard, he cited a classic work of jurisprudence:
Ownership, in its most complete signification, denotes the relation 
between a person and any right that is vested in him. That which a man 
owns is in all cases a right. When as is often the case, he speaks of ownership 
of a material object, this is merely a convenient figure of speech. To own 
a piece of land means to own a particular kind of right in the land, namely 
the fee simple of it. (Salmond 1920, 220, quoted by Gluckman 1943, 8)
Discussing land tenure of the Lozi of southeast Africa, Gluckman 
commented, ‘The so called owner of a thing has one particular set of 
rights in it; some of these may be abrogated, limited, or opposed, 
by other  rights  held by other people, and the State always has certain 
ultimate rights’ (Gluckman 1943, 8). Later, but in similar vein, Gluckman 
expanded this account:
We say that a person or a group ‘owns’ a piece of land or some item of 
property. We are speaking loosely when we use this sort of phrasing: what 
is owned in fact is a claim to have power to do certain things with the land 
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or property, to possess immunities against the encroachments of others on 
one’s rights in them, and to exercise certain privileges in respect of them. 
But in addition other persons may have certain rights, claims, powers, 
privileges and immunities in respect of the same land or property … land 
… may be subject to a cluster of rights held by different persons in terms 
of their relationship within the network of kinship ties. (Gluckman 1977, 
36)
Gluckman noted that that ‘ownership’ is seldom absolute (ibid., 45). What 
is generally termed ‘ownership’ is a right to claims, powers, privileges and 
immunities. The exercise of these rights also involves a duty (ibid., 36). 
Where rights are not absolute they are exercised in accordance with the 
rights of others and are burdened by them (ibid., 49–50). It follows 
from this that the exercise of rights may also be subject to obligations to 
others while more generally there are rules that govern how rights may 
be exercised and so also burden those rights.
Radcliffe-Brown understood ownership in terms of what he termed the 
‘social usage’ of the exercise of control (1952, 32). He wrote, ‘A right may 
be that of an individual or a collection of individuals. It may be defined 
as a measure of control that a person, or a collection of persons, has over 
the acts of some person or persons, said to be thereby made liable to the 
performance of a duty’ (ibid.).
The implications of these definitions are substantial and pertinent to any 
inquiry into a customary system of rights to country. So-called ‘ownership’ 
is, in fact, an expression of a right that is not likely to be exclusive, meaning 
that it exists alongside rights that are exercised by others, in which case 
it is ‘burdened’ by the rights of others. ‘Rights’ are manifest as complex 
social arrangements that characterise a system whereby the use and access 
to property is organised. Anthropologists attempt to understand the 
system relevant to the native title claim that is the focus of their inquiry. 
An ability to distinguish clearly the nature, origin and potential of rights 
within the cultural context is essential. 
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Distinguishing rights in cultural context
Rights determinative and contingent
It is helpful to distinguish two sorts of rights discussed in this chapter. 
The distinction has implications for the perdurance of rights through the 
generations and so is important to native title inquiries. Understanding 
how rights are endorsed by and sustained by social exchanges and 
adherence to a normative system are essential to any native title inquiry 
that seeks to show that there is a system of rights to country rather than 
a haphazard, ever-changing disarray in the social organisation of relations 
to country. In any social system the continuity of rights depends upon 
acceptance of the process that characterises the transmission of rights 
over time and generations by participants. Thus, the mode of derivation 
of a right may have important implications for the nature of that right, 
its transmissibility and perhaps its relationship to rights gained by 
other means.
A very common way whereby rights to country are gained is through 
descent. Claimants will often say that they own an area of country because 
it belonged to their father (or sometimes their mother) and grandparents 
before them. An expression I hear quite often in my fieldwork is that 
rights to country are ‘in the blood’. Just as a person is understood to have 
the same ‘blood’ as their mother or father, so too they share a common 
bond with the country of their parents. Rights gained by descent are 
determinative rights. By this I mean that they are determined by the fact 
of one’s birth and cannot be altered or changed. If the rule of descent is 
applicable a child gains rights to the country of his or her father and is 
a member of the father’s country group. He can leave the group only on 
his death. There is no other way out. Generally it seems that rights gained 
through descent are always transmissible – that is, they are automatically 
passed on to the next generation, the rule of descent (unilineal or cognatic) 
determining the extent of their exercise in descendent generations.
In contrast, rights that depend upon the attainment of some qualification, 
such as a command of ritual knowledge or objects, are contingent rights 
in that they depend upon the satisfaction of a contingency. The child of a 
man who enjoys a contingent right does not gain that right automatically 
but would in turn have to gain that qualification on his or her own 
account. Contingent rights are, then, generally not transmissible in 
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customary arrangements. Place of birth or conception probably also 
falls into this category since the rights develop from the belief that the 
individual gained a spiritual (totemic) attachment to country through 
their place of birth. It might be argued that this spiritual connection was 
passed on ‘through the blood’ by descent, but I think this is a matter that 
would require further testing against the ethnographic materials available 
both from contemporary field data and from the earlier literature. When 
undertaking research in relation to such asserted rights, care must be 
exercised to ensure that the command of ritual knowledge or place of 
birth or spiritual conception translates to a real exercise of right and not 
merely a personal connection or responsibility. Rights that do inure by 
reference to such contingent acts or incidents may relate to specific areas 
or places, rather than to a whole estate of the country group.
Other ways to classify rights and the importance 
of duty
In Western legal systems some rights are generally not available to minors 
(drinking alcohol, owning real property) but are potential rights that 
become exercisable upon an individual reaching adulthood, at whatever 
age that is recognised. Others again depend on gaining a particular 
qualification prior to their exercise (driving a car is the most obvious) 
and in this sense have to be realised by gaining the required qualification. 
Generally, it seems that some rights are given greater centrality in social 
arrangements and these might be termed ‘core’ or ‘presumptive’ rights – 
that is, those that are probably not dependent on gaining qualification 
or contingent circumstances but are generally regarded as automatic – 
although according to this analysis it can be appreciated that no right 
within a social system is automatic. A right that is understood to afford less 
direction or control over something than another sort of right might be 
understood as a ‘secondary right’, in contradistinction to a ‘primary right’ 
to which it is inferior. This is a distinction to which I will return later as 
its use raises some difficulties in native title inquiries. A person who owns 
a right may also be able to license that right to another person, perhaps on 
certain terms and conditions, including the ability to revoke the licence 
should they choose to do so.
In a social system that provides the structure whereby a proprietary 
interest in something is articulated, the exercise of the right generally 
implies a duty so that the duty is a concomitant of the right. In Aboriginal 
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discourse a duty of this sort relating to land is often expressed in terms 
of ‘looking after’ the country, that is, keeping it regularly burnt or free 
of rubbish and preventing it from being damaged or entered by those 
who have no permission to do so. The exercise of a duty may then be 
an indication of the presence of a right and can provide evidence of the 
latter’s vitality.1 Another example of a duty commonly found in Aboriginal 
discourse is the requirement that a right holder takes care of visitors, who 
are understood to be his or her responsibility. This may include advising 
them of places within the country that are believed to be spiritually 
potent and consequentially potentially dangerous and performing a ritual 
that introduces the visitor to the country so that the spirits will be more 
accepting of his or her presence there.
These types of rights and associated duties take us a long way from the 
simple and potentially misleading idea that a person ‘owns’ something, 
implying in much common thinking the ability to do with it more or 
less as the ‘owner’ pleases. Rights of possession are complex expressions 
of relationships developed and codified within a culture. In native title 
dealings these codifications are often referred to as the ‘laws’ of the 
society in question and represent an accepted and agreed way of ordering 
social relationships that relate to property, including land. For those 
who gain their livelihood directly and solely from the land (as is the case 
with hunting and gathering societies), having a right to country which 
is acknowledged and accepted by others legitimated by reference to an 
accepted set of rules is immensely important since it helps to give certainty 
in an aleatory environment. The system that encapsulates this regulation, 
comprising the laws, customs, mores, and emotional and spiritual values 
of the society, can be referred to as a ‘normative system’.2
When is a ‘right’ a ‘rule’?
In an oral tradition, the rules that determine and define rights are expressed 
through practice and the enunciation of dogma. In this, we must examine 
the ethnography carefully to gain an understanding of the particulars 
of the normative system in question. The complexities inherent in the sorts 
1  Presumably, it is possible in a normative system for there to be a duty without a right. Those 
holding rights recognise the rule that they respect the duty and accommodate its exercise. I thank 
Robert Blowes for this observation.
2  This term is not found in the Native Title Act but is a product of the ensuing jurisprudence 
(Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria [2002] HCA 58, [37] and following).
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of systems that may be revealed in native title research relating to rights to 
land and sea country present some challenges when they are translated into 
an alien legal framework that is native title law. For example, a contingent 
right has to be understood as having legitimate potency in and of itself 
and not dependent upon or a benefit of the exercise of a superior right. 
The contingent right has to be capable of exercise without the need for 
permission or licence from a person who holds a determinative right to 
the same area – although it may be exercised with due regard to their 
needs, desires and obligations as it is burdened by that other right.
While this distinction may be helpful, in practice the field data may 
provide for some ambiguity. For example, a person with rights to country 
by descent may say of another, ‘Well, he’s got something to say for my 
country because his spirit comes from there, but he’s got to stand behind 
the real owners’. The question for the anthropologist is, then, whether the 
‘real owner’ is the one with the right, while the person who has ‘something 
to say’ is awarded a certain privilege but that this does not amount to 
a right. The matter becomes more complex in situations that I have 
encountered where a claimant says of another that they lack a ‘right’ to 
the country in question. The assertion is then qualified (usually on further 
questioning) by the admission that the leverage exercised by the person 
in question upon the country (say, through place of spiritual conception) 
is such that their accommodation must be afforded because to deny it 
would be contrary to customary practice (usually expressed as ‘the Law’). 
The anthropologist will need to consider questions about the relationship 
between rights and duties prescribed as rules. If access to country is gained 
by virtue of the existence of a rule that they be permitted to do so, that 
does not mean that the person who so accesses the country has a right to 
do so. This is an important distinction and one that has to be explored 
in the field data collected during the research for a claim. In separating 
out ‘rights’ from ‘rules’ it may be helpful to bear in mind a fundamental 
characterisation of the derivation of rights in Aboriginal systems of land 
and sea tenure. The right has to be derived from a relationship between 
person and country: descent, which is believed to carry such a link through 
the blood, totemic spiritual connectedness, ritual qualification or some 
other social or metaphysical construct that legitimates an essential and 
noumenal connectedness that lies at the heart of the relationship between 
Aboriginal people and the country wherein they exercise customary rights. 
The classic pathways identified in the anthropological literature whereby 
rights to country are gained (whether descent-based or founded on other 
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spiritual relationships) all articulate the metaphysical correlation between 
a person and country. It is upon that principle that a right is understood 
to exist. In a later section of this chapter I review how anthropologists 
have identified these different ways of gaining rights to country and the 
implications that this developing literature has had on our understanding 
of the complexities of the system whereby rights to country were both 
gained and exercised.
A rule, on the other hand, is not expressive of this fundamental correlation 
between a person and country. The application of a rule which, for 
example, requires that access to country be afforded to certain persons, 
while mandated and likely to be reflective of social relationships, is 
a concomitant of the right. It is a feature of the exercise of the right but 
does not, of itself, represent or reflect the spiritual relationship between 
a person and their country. It is also a matter of social dealing and even 
though it may be normatively a part of the exercise of rights is ultimately 
negotiable.
In my experience, these complexities and their associated complications 
and obstacles to the successful resolution of the claim arise when there 
is competition or dispute about the integrity of an asserted right. These 
are matters that will ultimately be a matter for the court. While the legal 
process must pay due regard to the Indigenous system of law, this is not 
necessarily easily or accurately translated into the provisions of the Native 
Title Act.
Succession to deceased estates
Country groups were subject to the vicissitudes of life and, just as families 
do today, waxed and waned, grew in numbers or declined. Factors that 
affected the viability of a country group would have included disease, 
warfare, infertility and probably natural disasters. Inevitably, then, 
some country groups would have been wiped out or diminished until 
eventually the last member died, leaving the group with no living 
representative. The country of that group became then a deceased estate. 
While the advance of the frontier, with introduced diseases and sometimes 
significant violence, undoubtedly increased the numbers of deceased 
estates, early commentators did not generally describe country without 
an owner as the sole product of European settlement. In a short but classic 
paper that addressed the issue of ‘succession to land’ (Peterson, Keen and 
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Sansom 1977) the authors wrote of the ‘extinction of clans’ as a ‘recurrent 
problem’. They suggested that the relatively small size of a clan rendered 
it vulnerable to extinction. It was their view that ‘the Aborigines have 
evolved mechanisms to deal with’ this eventuality (ibid., 2). Peterson, 
Keen and Sansom cite Spencer and Gillen, writing in 1899, who reported 
of a clan country:
if it happens that all the individuals associated with it die, then 
a neighbouring group will go in and possess the land. It is not, however, 
any neighbouring group which may do this, but it must be one the 
members of which are what is called Nakrakia to the extinct group – that 
is, they belong to the same moiety of the tribe as the latter. (Spencer and 
Gillen 1899, 153, cited in Peterson, Keen and Sansom 1977, 1004)
The early ethnographic observer Daisy Bates was also aware that country 
could become ‘vacant’. That is, a last surviving owner had died, leaving 
the area without a hereditary successor. She noted the term for this in 
the Bibbulmun language of the southwest of Western Australia as 
bindardee. She wrote, ‘it is the “Bindardee” country when the nyungar3 
dies who owned it. Nilgee’s house is called Bindardee because it has 
“no father”’.4 In South Australia, probably amongst the Wirangu with 
whom she camped at Ooldea, Bates recorded the term narruri to mean 
‘orphaned country’.5 Bates’s account lacks the insightful detail provided 
by Spencer and Gillen and the rich ethnography relating to sacred objects 
that could eventually be given over to a person believed to have their 
spiritual quickening from the country in question, so restoring what was 
believed to be an autochthonous clan (Spencer and Gillen 1899, 154, 
302). However, Bates confirms that the idea of country without owners 
due to the demise of the local group found expression in their language. 
Taken together these accounts strongly support the view that extinction 
and subsequent succession were a part of customary dealings prior to the 
arrival of Europeans.
Peterson, Keen and Sansom (1977) defined succession as a process 
contingent on the possession of some sort of right in the country in 
question. They differentiate in this regard ‘primary rights’ gained for 
the country by patrilineal descent from ‘secondary rights’ gained by 
other means including place of conception, birth, death/burial, kinship 
3  Footnote added: Aboriginal person.
4  Bates n.d., typescript from notebook 15, 54.
5  Bates n.d., typescript from notebook 5c, 63 (Bates folio 68, 23).
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and ritual ties and matrifiliation (ibid., 4–5). They go on to document 
a process of succession that was brought to light during the Yirrkala land 
rights case where a clan comprising two old women was ‘looked after’ by 
members of a clan of the same moiety (ibid., 6). Senior members of that 
clan went on to assert ownership of the country in question – and of its 
substantial resources – an arrangement that resulted in a longstanding 
dispute (Altman 1983, 22, 116–117).6
Sutton provided additional commentary on the distinction between 
‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ rights in relation to succession. In Sutton’s view:
‘secondary’ forms of connection to an estate may become activated as 
acceptable bases for claims of succession to estates whose owners have 
died out. Those who succeed in this way, a process which often takes 
many years or even decades, convert their interest in the relevant estate 
from a secondary one to a primary one, or at least ensure that the interests 
of certain of their descendants in that estate are recognised as primary 
ones in due course. (Sutton 2003, 4–5)
Sutton understood the process of succession to reach its endpoint when 
‘a “normal” situation has been restored whereby at least some people 
again enjoy unmediated rights in the country, and their precise origin 
is forgotten’ (ibid., 5, 121–122).7 
Sutton has also provided a helpful distinction between an individual or 
‘a close-knit set of siblings’ who forge their succession to an estate and that 
effected by a group (ibid., 5). The latter case applies when a whole subset 
of a language group becomes extinct as a result of catastrophic population 
collapse due to colonisation, killings, poisonings or disease, leading to 
sudden or eventual extinction. Given this territorial vacuum, the country 
is ‘subsumed by one or more extant groups’ (ibid., 5). Sutton provided 
examples that included the Ganggalida, who subsumed country of the 
defunct Min.ginda (Burketown area); the Waanyi, who subsumed country 
of the Injilarija (Lawn Hill region); and the Pangkala, who subsumed part 
of the territory of the much depleted Nauo (Eyre Peninsula) (ibid., 5). 
Sutton distinguished this ‘group succession’ from ‘small genealogical 
subgroup succession’ by reference to the scale of the event. However, both 
6  See, for example, www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/mar/23/indigenous-land-rights-
arnhem-land-bauxite-royalties, accessed 22 August 2017.
7  Sansom has called this process of forgetting ‘strategic amnesia’ (Sansom 2001).
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rely on some form of existing relationship including common language, 
geographic unity, moiety affiliations and ritual commonalities (ibid., 
6–7). He further remarked:
These cases do not involve the extinguishment of pre-colonial rights of 
surviving groups so much as their transformation – usually involving 
considerable simplification – and their generalisation to wider ‘tribal’ areas. 
One cannot exclude the possibility that similar catastrophic population 
losses may have occurred before the colonial era, where epidemics could 
have wiped people out in big numbers from time to time. (ibid., 6)
Other writers have also added to our understanding of the processes of 
succession and, to some extent, how they have interacted with the legal 
processes that have contextualised their ventilation (Glaskin 2017, 175, 
178, 193). In 2015, David Trigger wrote a paper that features instances of 
succession in native title cases, while providing a summary of some of the 
anthropological accounts relevant to their consideration (2015b, 53–55). 
I return to Trigger’s case studies below. 
In the context of a native title inquiry, the fact of a succession to country 
raises important issues regarding continuity. The processes of succession I 
have reviewed above all involve a change of owners – rights to country that 
were vested in one group become vested in another. That such a change 
happened post-sovereignty means that there is no continuity of ownership 
according to the principle of descent – given that that is the relevant means 
whereby rights to country are perpetuated. However, it is the operation 
and perdurance of the ‘laws and customs’ of the society in question that 
is a key to the question of continuity in a native title case. Consequently, 
a change of owners, per se, is not inimical to the recognition of native title 
by the court. However, a succession event is seen by some legal experts as 
potentially problematic. During a panel discussion, Senior Counsel Vance 
Hughston commented that, under native title law, ‘The requirement to 
demonstrate that members of the claimant group are part of a society 
and that that society has continued to exist since sovereignty united by its 
acknowledgement and observance of the laws and customs under which 
the rights and interests claimed is possessed is central’ (Blackshield, Sackett 
and Hughston 2011, 109). Laws and customs are, in native title thinking, 
a creature of a particular society. Consequently, an act of succession 
whereby members of one society take over the country of the members of 
another society would upon the succession render the laws and customs 
applicable to the country so taken over different to those evident at the 
time of sovereignty. Based on this reasoning, Hughston stated:
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On the current state of the law, the likelihood is that succession will only 
be recognised by the courts if it is intra-societal, that is, if it is within the 
one society. The courts have shown a distinct reluctance to accept that 
the members of one society can succeed to the country of another society 
(Dale v Moses 2007 at [120]). So, in Sebastian, the claimants had to 
demonstrate that the Djugan were part of the same society as the Yawuru, 
despite different languages, distinct territories, separate self referents and 
somewhat different legal traditions. (Blackshield, Sackett and Hughston 
2011, 110)
Following Sutton’s lead, Trigger provides an analysis of the Ganggalida 
group succession to the country of the Mingginda8 people in the vicinity 
of Burketown – based on his own long-term field research in the area 
(2015b, 55–59). Trigger was able to document the demise and eventual 
extinction of the Mingginda people through disease and frontier violence 
(ibid., 56). While older informants recalled the group, younger members 
did not (ibid., 57). Members of the Ganggalida group had moved 
into the area (around Burketown), claiming rights to it through birth 
conception and subsequently through Dreaming associations represented 
as mythology integrated into Ganggalida traditions (ibid., 57–58). Trigger 
called this ‘a case of completed succession’ (ibid.,  57). It was based on 
customary principles and won favour with the court. His Honour, Justice 
Cooper, stated:
130 The second respondent submitted that the interest claimed by the 
Gangalidda9 peoples in the former land and waters of the Mingginda 
peoples was not a right or interest held at sovereignty under the 
traditional laws and customs of the Gangalidda people. That is, it was an 
interest acquired post-sovereignty which was not recognised by s 223(1) 
of the Act.
131 In my view, the submission of the second respondent is incorrect. 
The new legal order at the time of sovereignty recognised both existing 
rights and interests in relation to lands and also ‘the efficiency of rules of 
transmission of rights and interests under traditional laws and traditional 
customs which existed at sovereignty.’: Yorta Yorta at [44]. If the rights and 
interests in respect of the Mingginda peoples’ countries was acquired 
under traditional laws and customs which provided for such a succession 
8  Sutton’s ‘Min.ginda’.
9  His Honour chose the spelling ‘Gangalidda’, which reflects the name of the application in 
contrast to Trigger’s published spelling, ‘Ganggalida’.
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and those laws and customs existed at sovereignty, then the interests of the 
Gangalidda peoples in respect of those lands and waters will be recognised 
and protected under the Act.10
In reaching this opinion, his Honour relied on the evidence of the 
anthropologist (Dr Trigger) that the succession had occurred ‘under 
traditional rules and customs which were acknowledged and observed at 
the time of sovereignty by both peoples’ and so were ‘capable of recognition 
and protection under s 223(1) of the Act’ (Lardil Peoples [132]).
Trigger added what I think to be an interesting and relevant observation. 
He wrote, ‘few if any living Aboriginal people disputed the fact that for 
many years the Burketown, Albert River, lower Nicholson River area had 
been Ganggalida country. This conviction was evident even among the 
few who nevertheless knew they had a likely Mingginda forebear in their 
own ancestry’ (Trigger 2015b, 59). A footnote qualifies the observation: 
‘However, this is not to conclude there was complete agreement of this 
kind in relation to other inland parts of Mingginda country’ (ibid., 
fn. 4). This raises an important question: would the matter have been so 
positively settled (for the applicant) had the matter been in dispute?
Trigger’s second case study also echoes Sutton’s earlier observation 
regarding the Waanyi. Trigger reports that the Waanyi people moved 
historically ‘eastwards into Nguburindi territory and southwards into parts 
of Injilarija country’ (ibid., 59). He observes that both areas were ‘believed 
by claimants to be culturally familiar, and since European arrival taken 
over according to Waanyi traditional law and custom with the demise of 
these two groups’ (ibid.). Trigger documents the cultural commonalities of 
the groups, even though their languages were distinct (ibid., 59–63) and 
considered that there was some evidence that these demographic changes 
occurred in part prior to the date of effective sovereignty (ibid.,  60). 
Land-based mythological traditions were incorporated within the 
landscape as part of the Waanyi’s succession eastward and their ‘associated 
cultural assimilation of the landscape’ (ibid., 63). Trigger concludes that, 
‘the Waanyi research, in the context of the native title claim, indicated 
a  completed case of adaptation and succession according to tradition-
based law and custom in relation to land and waters’ (ibid., 65). 
10 The Lardil Peoples v State of Queensland [2004] FCA 298 [130–131].
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The application was settled by consent.11 Trigger does not tell us what the 
judge found in relation to this succession for the matter is not addressed 
in any of the judgments I have viewed, except in passing in relation to 
a contentious issue of claim group membership.12 
Trigger is sanguine about the potential for accommodation of changing 
rights to country within the Australian native title legal system. He wrote, 
‘substantial change has occurred, yet forms of contemporary connection 
with country are also continuous with adaptations in the previously 
operating system’ (ibid., 66–67). In order to achieve recognition of these 
new-order rights in native title law, he takes the commonsense view that 
what is required is good research and thoroughly documented accounts 
of the process or processes involved. This would seem to be sage counsel 
applicable to all our anthropological research.
Part of the reason why anthropologists should pay particular attention to 
instances of succession is that they present an evident vulnerability in the 
proof of native title. In the Waanyi case discussed above, the Queensland 
Government and mining giant CRA argued that there was no evidence 
of transfer of native title from the Injilarija to the Waanyi (ibid., 67). 
In the Gangalidda case, as I noted above, the second respondents argued 
that the rights now asserted were not rights held at sovereignty but rather 
an interest held post-sovereignty. Research into instances of succession 
in relation to a native title claim must, then, tackle the fundamental 
question of how the transference of rights from one group to another 
has taken place consistent with the claimants’ laws and customs, as well 
as those which may reasonably have been supposed to have been those 
of the extinct group. It would appear that the laws and customs must be 
a product of the same native title society, otherwise they would necessarily 
be different and the issue of their continuity brought into doubt.
The task of researching and providing a positive opinion in relation to 
these matters is made much easier if the matter is not subject to rigorous 
challenge by respondent parties. Conversely, it is made much more 
difficult if it is subject to disputes between Indigenous parties. Trigger 
remarked in this regard:
11  Aplin on behalf of the Waanyi Peoples v State of Queensland (No. 3) [2010] FCA 1515.
12  Aplin on behalf of the Waanyi Peoples v State of Queensland [2010] FCA 625 [87], [100], [119].
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Where disagreement emerges between contesting Aboriginal parties 
about whether or not succession has been licit in terms of law and custom, 
or whether it is a completed process, it can be difficult to determine 
a  resolution. This can involve quite bitter disputes that continue over 
decades, as in the Finniss River area of the Northern Territory. (ibid., 67)
The process of succession to a deceased estate marks a hiatus in the 
seamless succession of rights through descent. When the process of 
succession is in train and knowledge remains of the original owners, those 
pressing claims through lesser rights or merely consociation are vulnerable 
to challenge. In the native title era, where claimants have increasing 
access to archival records, genealogical data and earlier ethnographies, the 
period of selective amnesia is simply illuminated. While the studies I have 
discussed above show that, under the right circumstances and with good 
research, succession to country can find recognition within the native title 
process, it represents a vulnerability and is ripe for the articulation of 
disagreements. It is not, then, an area of research for the inexperienced 
or the unwary.
Linking local organisation and title
In terms of property, ‘title’ refers to the legal basis of the ownership of 
that property. ‘Native’ title in the Australian context requires that there 
is a customary identifiable system of law and normative regulation that 
provides a basis for the allocation of rights to country that has legal-like 
qualities. These rules and regulations must be shown to relate to rights 
or obligations and be accepted by members of the society as ordering 
the allocation of rights to country. The recognition of native title today 
requires that the rights of the original Indigenous owners of the land and 
the system that sustained them have endured, substantially unaltered, 
since the time of sovereignty. As with other issues of continuity the 
anthropologist as expert must apply the ‘then and now’ test. By this, 
I mean that there must be a reliable account of the system of local 
organisation as it is likely to have been at or close to sovereignty, compared 
with the system that is avowed now by the claimants, as documented in 
the fieldwork data upon which the anthropologist founds his or her views. 
This is typically no easy task. Descriptions of local organisation found in 
the early settler literature are not only elusive but also were sometimes 
based on naive and inaccurate accounts of a system of land tenure that 
was poorly understood and incompletely recorded. Early accounts were 
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also sometimes prejudiced by preconceptions relating to ‘tribes’ (a matter 
discussed in the previous chapter) and hostility to the notion that the 
Indigenous inhabitants of Australia actually recognised property rights 
at all. As the frontier advanced, the subject was the focus of attention 
by anthropologists but there were misunderstandings and preconceptions 
here too. Radcliffe-Brown was a pioneer in this regard and some of his data 
go back as far as the beginning of the second decade of the last century and 
I consider some of his writing in this regard below. Anthropologists have 
not been in agreement as to the details of Aboriginal local organisation, 
although research in recent decades has probably developed what might be 
termed an ‘anthropological orthodoxy’ that has gained general (although 
not universal) acceptance amongst practitioners.
I do not trace all aspects of the anthropological debate here as this has 
been done by a number of other writers whose work can be consulted 
(Peterson 2006; Peterson and Long 1986; Sutton 2003, 38–53). 
A number of anthropologists who undertook fieldwork in Australia prior 
to the 1930s developed understandings of how the customary system 
of rights to country worked, according to their observations and field 
data. Of these, A.R. Radcliffe-Brown was one of the first anthropologists 
to  set out an understanding of local organisation in Australia (1913; 
1930–31, 34–37; 1952, 32–36). Based on a single and probably quite 
short period of fieldwork in 1911 amongst the Kariyarra of northwest 
Western Australia (not far from the present site of Port Hedland), 
Radcliffe-Brown attempted to reconstruct systems of land tenure for the 
Kariyarra. The paper he published in 1913, following his return from the 
field, has become a  citation classic amongst anthropologists because of 
its succinct statements relating to local and social organisation as well as 
its comparatively early date in the history of Australian Aboriginal studies. 
Consideration of his findings are helpful because they were central to 
a debate that ensued about the defensibility of his conclusions and so too 
to the development of a better understanding of customary systems of 
rights to country that are broadly applicable to other areas as well.
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Radcliffe-Brown
The people who Radcliffe-Brown identified as Kariyarra13 had been 
living on station properties for about 50 years by the time he undertook 
his research. Consequently, it is likely that most of his informants had 
not known a complete hunting and gathering lifestyle, although some 
older individuals may have recalled a time before European settlement. 
Radcliffe-Brown understood that the tenurial system was based on ‘Local 
groups, each with its own defined territory’ (1913, 145). Membership of 
a local group was determined by descent in the male line. The country of 
a local group was identified by reference to an important place or places 
within the country of that group (ibid.). He drew a map showing the 
location of some of these local groups (he admitted that his data were not 
complete) within Kariyarra territory that he represented on the map by 
means of an idealised boundary (ibid.,145).
According to Radcliffe-Brown, the ‘normal’14 Australian type of local 
organisation comprised a local group with rights to a defined area of 
country. Members of other hordes were required to seek permission to 
use another horde’s country, or be invited into it, so rights of ownership 
within the local group area were exclusive to members of the local group. 
He wrote:
The country of a local group, with all its products, animal, vegetable, and 
mineral, belongs to the members of the group in common. Any member 
has the right to hunt over the country of his group at all times. He may 
not, however, hunt over the country of any other local group without the 
permission of the owners. (ibid., 146)
Pursuit of game seems to have constituted a permissible exception to 
this rule, but otherwise trespass was punishable by death. Despite these 
strictures, Radcliffe-Brown noted that visiting and sharing of food was 
common (ibid., 146–147) such that there was ‘a perpetual shifting 
to and fro both within the country of the group and from one group to 
another’ (ibid., 147). Connubial relations also expanded the potential for 
13  Radcliffe-Brown spelt this language name ‘Kariera’. I here adopt the spelling employed by 
members of this group today (Kariyarra) but retain Radcliffe-Brown’s spelling where I have quoted 
from his writings. 
14  Radcliffe-Brown 1930–31, 29.
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the enjoyment of country. Radcliffe-Brown found that local groups were 
exogamous, so a man had to gain a wife from a local group different to 
his own. 
A woman seems to have retained a sort of right over the country of her 
birth, so that a man and his wife were generally welcome to visit the 
wife’s local group whenever they wished. A man seems also to have a sort 
of secondary right over the country of his mother, that is the country to 
which she belonged by birth. In a large number of cases this was the same 
as the country of his wife. In both cases, however, it seems to have meant 
no more than that a man was sure of a welcome in the country of his wife 
or his mother. (ibid., 147)
For Radcliffe-Brown, then, rights to country were a matter of descent, 
exclusive to the local group and vigorously enforceable. While his opening 
position was that local group membership had to be descent traced 
through patrifiliation (to the father and father’s father), he also recognised 
that a man had rights in his mother’s country and perhaps in his wife’s 
country too. Whether a man could be denied access to his mother’s 
country is not clear. Presumably in company with his wife he could 
freely visit her country. In any event, he reports constant free movement 
between estates, indicating that, while there were evident rules relating to 
how rights to country were obtained, there was flexibility in their exercise 
since the country was not as compartmentalised as he had first stated. 
Such flexibility would have been an important factor in sustaining the 
economy of a hunting and gathering society, as Radcliffe-Brown shows 
each estate to have been quite small. I return to the question of size below.
One difficulty with Radcliffe-Brown’s early analysis is that he conflated 
two social formations: the descent group and the residence group. This 
distinction was later shown to be critical to a proper understanding of 
Aboriginal local organisation (Berndt 1959, 95–96) and remains so 
today when writing native title reports. The descent group, as the name 
implies, was recruited according to principles of descent; the latter by 
choice, kinship ties, commensality and perhaps circumstances. The 
residence group, whose members moved round the countryside hunting 
and gathering (and were therefore visible within the countryside), 
would likely have been made up of a man and his wife (members of two 
descent groups), the man’s affinal relations and perhaps those who were 
not directly related through blood ties at all. There are records of the 
composition of these groups available in the ethnographic literature (e.g. 
Peterson and Long 1986; Palmer 2010a, 74–80). The descent group, on 
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the other hand, was not in evidence as a reality on the ground except in 
so far as a residence group might in part comprise a father, his sons and 
daughters and perhaps grandchildren.
In response to this difficulty Radcliffe-Brown was to revise but not 
substantially change his views based on his 1911 fieldwork with the 
Kariyarra and others of the Pilbara region. In 1931, he published 
a monograph that sought to define the social organisation of Australian 
tribes and examined many groups in addition to the Kariyarra (Radcliffe-
Brown 1930–3115). In this he generalised from the particular, attempting 
to set down a definitive account of Australian systems of social and local 
organisation. He introduced a new term, ‘horde’, to his account, which he 
hoped would clarify what he meant by use of the word ‘clan’:
The horde is a small group of persons owning a certain area of territory, the 
boundaries of which are known, and possessing in common proprietary 
rights over the land and its products – mineral, vegetable and animal. It is 
the primary land-owning or land-holding group. Membership of a horde 
is determined in the first place by descent, children belonging to  the 
horde of their father. (ibid., 35)
He sought to clarify membership in reality (‘an existing group at any 
moment’) by accommodating wives of local group members:
The horde, therefore, as an existing group at any moment, consists of 
(1) male members of all ages whose fathers and fathers’ fathers belonged 
to the horde, (2) unmarried girls who are the sisters or daughters or son’s 
daughters of the male members, (3) married women, all of whom, in some 
regions, and most of whom, in others, belonged originally to other hordes, 
and have become attached to the horde by marriage. (ibid., 35–36)
Later, and in the same article (ibid., 59), he attempted to distinguish the 
horde from the clan. His initial proposition was that, for the Kariyarra, 
‘all the men of any given horde belong to a single line of descent’ (ibid., 59). 
Since the horde is based on descent, ego’s16 father’s horde is different to 
ego’s mother’s horde. Recognising perhaps that the two hordes would 
15  Published as a monograph in 1931; parts were published in the journal Oceania the year before.
16  ‘Ego’ is the ‘I’ of a genealogical account. This is often the person from whom the genealogy has 
been collected or the person who defines the relationships set out in the genealogy or discussed in the 
accompanying account. See Sutton 2003, 186.
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then constitute a single social unit (the family or group that lived together 
on a daily basis), he suggests using the term ‘clan’ for the residential group. 
His conclusion in this regard is, however, not evident:
We can therefore say that in the Kariera tribe, connected with each 
horde there is a clan. I have defined a horde as consisting of all men 
born into the horde together with their wives and unmarried daughters. 
The clan connected with the horde consists of all persons born in the 
horde. The male members of the clan all remain in the horde from birth 
to death. The female members of the clan remain with the horde till they 
are married and then are transferred to other hordes. (ibid., 59)
Radcliffe-Brown adds a footnote to the end of this paragraph in which 
he seeks to clarify further his choice of the terms ‘horde’ and ‘clan’:
This distinction between the horde and the associated local clan is, I think, 
a very important one to make and to keep in mind. A horde changes its 
composition by the passing of women out of it and into it by marriage. 
At any given moment it consists of a body of people living together as 
a group of families. The clan has all its male members in one horde, but all 
its older female members are in other hordes. It changes its composition 
only by the birth and death of its members. (ibid., 59, footnote 8)
Radcliffe-Brown’s shifting terms do not make for clarity. He understood 
that there was a difference between the filiative relationships of the 
descent group whereby rights to country were transmitted and the ‘body 
of people living together as a group of families’. His lack of precision 
was to give rise to a substantial debate that has been discussed by others 
(Hiatt 1962, 1966; Stanner 1965). However, so it seems to me, despite 
the shortcomings of the account, Radcliffe-Brown was probably heading 
in the right direction. It was left to others to clarify the system, introduce 
better defined terminology and recognise that as hunters and gatherers 
residential groups were reliant on a sustainable economic base that was 
unlikely, except in the better watered areas of Australia, to  have been 
afforded by a single hermetic estate. Of direct relevance to native title 
and an understanding of the allocation of rights to country were his 
tantalising observations about what appear to be the ability of a man to 
exercise rights in his wife’s country and in the country of his own mother. 
While Radcliffe-Brown appears to suggest that these were either lesser 
rights, indulgencies or some sort of standing permission on the part of 
the relevant local descent group, this is not pursued. In his 1952 account 
Radcliffe-Brown elevated rights gained through matrifiliation, previously 
described in 1913 as ‘a sort of secondary right over the country of his 
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mother’, by stating, ‘in the Kariera tribe a man had certain quite important 
rights over his mother’s horde, over its individual members, and over its 
territory’ (1952, 36). From a practical point of view, right of access to 
several estates made sense. Radcliffe-Brown had produced a map of the 
19 estates of Kariyarra country (1913, 144), some of which lay in quite 
dry country and well away from the coast, which has a more temperate 
climate than the interior. In all, Radcliffe-Brown had estimated Kariyarra 
country to comprise between 3,500 and 4,000 square miles (ibid., 145). 
This computes to an average area for each estate of between 184 and 210 
square miles (477 to 544 square kilometres17). At its largest, then, an estate 
would be only some 23 km× 23 km. It seems unlikely that, in practice, 
exploitation limited to the country of a single descent group would be 
economically viable. 
Phyllis Kaberry
Phyllis Kaberry undertook fieldwork in the Kimberley region of Western 
Australia in the mid 1930s, so she came to her ethnography over two 
decades after Radcliffe-Brown. As a student based at the University of 
Sydney she was undoubtedly influenced by Radcliffe-Brown’s work, 
although her supervisor appears to have been A.P. Elkin.18 Kaberry’s 
principal interest was in the role of women in Aboriginal societies, so 
systems of land tenure were not her primary concern. However, she would 
have been aware that Radcliffe-Brown had adopted a somewhat male 
approach to his analyses of Aboriginal society, such that Sutton stated 
that his sexism was ‘a problem for his analysis’ (2003, 52). Kaberry was, 
then, ideally suited by virtue of her sex and research focus to provide 
a corrective. As a graduate anthropology student Kaberry was aware that 
Radcliffe-Brown had set down that the ‘normal’ method of recruitment 
to the horde (land-owning group) was patrifiliation (e.g. 1930–31, 44, 
55, 73; Kaberry 1939, 136–140). Kaberry questioned Radcliffe-Brown’s 
justification for accepting patrifiliation as a given, based on economic 
determinants (1939, 136–137). She cited other researchers (Stanner 
and Warner) to support her view that a man might live in his mother’s 
country, presumably as of right, as well as his father’s (ibid., 137). The real 
tie to patri-country, she argued, was a result of ritual and spiritual ties 
that develop as a result of a man’s relationship with his father (ibid., 138). 
17  Where 1 square mile = 2.58999 square kilometres.
18  Elkin 1939, xli.
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However, Kaberry also distinguished rights in at least two other countries: 
country (or area) of birth and mother’s country (ibid., 31, 137, 194–195). 
Accordingly, Kaberry wrote that the children of a marriage ‘inherit their 
father’s country and the right to participate in certain horde ceremonies, 
but the relationships with the mother’s group are retained and emphasised, 
as opposed to the view that the society is purely patrilineal’ (1939, 133). 
Kaberry, who undertook fieldwork across the Kimberley region, made 
a similar distinction between father’s and mother’s country for areas of the 
east Kimberley, recording different terms used for father’s and mother’s 
country, ‘a usage that points to different horde countries for the parents’ 
(1939, 125).
Like other writers at this time, Kaberry did not distinguish between the 
country group and the residence group, using the single term ‘horde’ 
to obfuscate any distinction. Kaberry defined the horde at one point as 
‘the patrilineal group of men and women who own a stretch of territory’ 
(ibid., 136). She added that ‘some of them [members of the patrilineal 
group] may be living elsewhere’ (ibid.) and thereby implied the distinction 
that she did not make: the horde or land-owning group was not always 
the same as the residence group.
Despite these points of variance with Radcliffe-Brown, Kaberry recorded 
that ‘over a strip of territory a patrilineal group exercises well-defined rights 
which are guarded and enforced by the headman. The body of totemic 
myth not only strengthens these, but provides a legal and religious charter 
for land tenure in these tribes’ (ibid., 140). For Kaberry, then, rights to 
country were about far more than a descent of rights, but relied upon 
totemic links, ritual and religious beliefs that together formed a system 
(she called it a charter) for land tenure. 
While undertaking her fieldwork, Kaberry had written to Elkin from 
the small town of Fitzroy Crossing in an early attempt to relate social 
categories to country, but this led her to consider how rights to country 
were gained.
All the subsections may belong to one horde country, and this is borne out 
by the fact that a person’s country is determined by his birth. Normally 
that would be his father’s country, but not necessarily so. The term for 
country is noa:ra:. If a man is born in another country than that of his 
father, then he still has a right to live in his father’s, but the latter is called 
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‘half-country’ or kamera. A man also calls his mother’s or his mother’s 
mother’s, or his father’s mother’s, or his father’s father’s country his 
Kamera [sic]. (Letter to Elkin, 22 March 1935, 1–2)
Writing from Moola Bulla, some 160 km east of Fitzroy Crossing, she 
noted later in the same year that, ‘sometimes a man gave as his country as 
the place where he was born, and laid claim to this, even if different from 
that of mother and father’ (letter to Elkin, 8 December 1935, 3).
Kaberry published a paper (1938) documenting the importance of 
a person’s relationship to country through a belief in spiritual conception 
and place of birth. Writing of data she had collected from the east and 
south Kimberley she reported the belief that spirits enter the prospective 
mother as a result of propinquity, while an animal association is established 
through some incident whereby the animal in question (usually as 
meat) causes illness to the mother (ibid., 278). The belief serves to link 
a person with a place and a natural species, founded upon a conviction 
in the pervasive spirituality of the great creative period of the Dreaming, 
when the spirits were ordained within the pools (ibid., 279; 1939, 
30, 195). Daisy Bates had recorded a similar belief for areas of the west 
Kimberley two decades before.19 Consistent with these accounts, Kaberry 
understood a person’s territory to comprise different sorts of ‘country’ – 
a  term she glossed as da:m that was used in the eastern Kimberly and 
was the equivalent of the term ngura that was used in the central parts 
of the region. These terms (da:m and ngura) could also be used to mean 
‘camp’. 
The comparison of the word for camp – da:m, with those for horde-
country – noera:m da:m, big camp, and spirit centre – wanyagoara da:m 
(little camp), can be taken up at this point. The repetition of da:m would 
seem to indicate a similar attitude adopted toward all three localities. 
They are places where a native makes his fire, sleeps and searches for food. 
This is borne out by the difficulty, frequently encountered, of discovering 
a man’s or a woman’s noera:m da:m. (Kaberry 1939, 30–31)
My reading of Kaberry is that when she asked people where their country 
was, the answer was not always a simple one that made reference to their 
ancestral (and presumably patrilineal) country. Rather, those with whom 
she worked might refer to one or more of the following: the country 
they occupied – presumably, as of right; ancestral country; or totemic 
19  Bates (1913, 389–391) wrote of spirit children for areas to the west of Nyikina country.
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country. In short, country (ngura, da:m) could comprise a suite of country 
gained through different customary means. She wrote that although the 
horde country had ‘well defined boundaries and is named’ (ibid., 31), her 
informants sometimes gave her the names of: 
half a dozen pools, i.e. places where he had camped and which offer 
a plentiful supply of game and food. They are vital points in his territory; 
in part they constitute its significance and value for him. Of these, one 
generally is more important than the others – his wanyegoara daam, 
the pool where his father found him as a spirit child. This he regards as 
peculiarly his own though others may camp by it. He visits it frequently, 
mentions it with pride and will be buried with his head pointing towards 
it. The tie is a spiritual rather than a purely economic one. Occasionally 
the spirit centre may lie outside his horde territory, in which case he is 
allowed to hunt there. (ibid., 31)
In summary, Kaberry presents a system of local organisation whereby 
rights are to areas of country, principally defined in relation to camping 
sites (or other significant places) within it, rather than to lineal boundaries. 
Some rights to country derive from the father. Father’s country is identified 
both by a generic term (ngura for the central Kimberley region) and an 
area name. A person also has rights in areas of land associated with that 
person’s spiritual conception, these being areas generally of smaller extent 
than the totality of what is conceived of as being a country area. Thirdly, 
a person has rights in their mother’s country, which she termed kamara. 
It is evident from her account of rights to country in the Kimberley that 
rights did not develop from a unilineal system to just one area, but were 
multiple and composite.
Kaberry provided detail as to the range of rights that people legitimately 
exercised in country. This included the right of access, hunting and 
camping (ibid., 30) and the right of exclusion or invitation (ibid., 31, 
139). She wrote that those with rights in country knew their country 
intimately (ibid., 136–137) and this included knowledge of the spiritual 
dangers of country and how to avoid them (ibid., 138–139, 203–204). 
Without such knowledge the exploitation of country was fraught with 
spiritual danger. Kaberry also reported that senior members of country 
groups (and their wives, should they have sufficient seniority) had the 
right and duty to conduct increase rituals20 at renewal sites in their 
20  Rituals performed to sustain and increase the fecundity of a particular plant, animal or natural 
phenomenon.
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country (ibid., 138, 203–206). Kaberry stated that ritual duties and 
responsibilities with respect to the country of a local group could only 
be exercised by members of the patrilineal group (ibid., 138–139). Later, 
when discussing ‘increase rituals’ she stated that totemic sites are ‘worked 
up’ by a ‘headman’ or his wife, if she was old enough – although she 
would presumably belong to another descent group (ibid., 205). Kaberry 
concludes that local group members had a duty to undertake the rite on 
behalf of all others and that this indicates the strength of the cultural 
interdependence of the hordes (ibid.). In this Kaberry was recognising 
that the system she recorded involved not only rights and duties but also 
rules about the exercise of rights and duties as well. 
A developing orthodoxy
There were other researchers from the Sydney University anthropology 
department who also reported a more complex situation. For example, 
M.  and R.  Piddington, who worked amongst the Karajari south of 
Broome in the 1930s, wrote of the coastal Nadja Karajari that Radcliffe-
Brown’s rule of exclusive ownership of the horde did not apply to their 
field data. They wrote:
this rule does not exist. Certain small exogamous groups exist, but they 
lack the solidarity which characterises the normal Australian horde; small 
parties composed of less than a dozen individuals from any horde may 
go on hunting expeditions lasting several months, over the territory of 
any other horde, without asking permission of the owners, who would 
not object. (Piddington and Piddington 1932, 351)21
Elkin disagreed with M. and R. Piddington, suggesting that since the 
Karajari had been ‘under white influence for some sixty years’ this 
made reconstruction ‘difficult’ (Elkin 1933, 279) and that failure to ask 
permission was due to the ‘decadent condition of this part of the tribe’ 
(ibid., 280). But Elkin’s own field data demonstrated, in fact, that while 
patrifiliation was an operative principle in the descent of rights to country, 
it was not the only pathway to gaining rights to country in Aboriginal 
Australia. Elkin recognised the importance of a totemic connection in 
this regard and the fact that there was no necessary or neat fit between 
an individual’s totemic affiliations and his or her father or father’s estate. 
This is a matter I have discussed in detail elsewhere (Palmer 2010a, 88).
21  See also R. Piddington 1950, 80.
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W.E.H. Stanner’s 1965 paper contributed to the debate about the 
correctness of Radcliffe-Brown’s anthropology. His paper is better 
remembered (and now widely quoted) because Stanner presented his 
views as to how groups of Aboriginal people used the land over which 
they claimed rights and how this determined the economic resources 
they exploited, which in turn was a product of the natural environment. 
Stanner, like Berndt before him, identified the local group or clan as the 
group with rights to the estates. Bands were the land-occupying group 
whose range included the estates of several local groups (1965, 2). He thus 
succinctly overcame the difficulty of the exclusive patrilineal band and its 
relationship to country by recognising the practical aspects of the use of 
country by a band and its constituent members. Stanner wrote:
Each territorial group was associated with both an estate and a range. 
The distinction is crucial. The estate was the traditionally recognised locus 
(‘country’, ‘home’, ‘ground’, ‘dreaming place’) of some kind of patrilineal 
descent group forming the core or nucleus of the territorial group. It seems 
usually to have been a more or less continuous stretch. The range was 
the tract or orbit over which the group, including its nucleus adherents, 
ordinarily hunted and foraged to maintain life. The  range normally 
included the estate: people did not usually belong here and live there, 
but, in some circumstances, the two could be practically dissociated. 
Estate and range together may be said to constitute a domain, which is an 
ecological life-space. (ibid., 2)
Stanner was of the view that a number of local groups, represented in 
the countryside as bands, together made up language speaking groups. 
In a way of speaking, ‘tribes’ were congeries of bands (ibid., 21). Stanner’s 
focus on bands comprising several local groups and the estate and range 
distinction meant that ‘“tribal” or language-divisions’ (ibid., 13) were not 
central to developing an understanding of how rights to country were 
articulated. 
There have been some modifications suggested to these ideas, as 
subsequent studies continue to confirm that patrilineal descent may not 
have been the only means of gaining rights to country. Evidence produced 
as a result of land claim research has shown that unilineal descent may not 
have been the case everywhere, particularly for the less well-watered areas.22 
Field research supported the conclusion that rights to country could be 
22  For views developed from land claim literature, see Hamilton 1982; Layton 1983; Maddock 
1981; Myers 1986. See also Peterson and Long 1986, 59–61 and Sutton 2003, 196–199.
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gained through a number of ways, patrifiliation being just one (Peterson 
1983, 137–138; Stanner 2001, 112–114). Myers, writing of the Pintupi 
of Central Australia, showed that rights in estates were multiple and 
perhaps differentiated as to degree rather than singular in relation to one 
patri-estate only (1986, 138–140). Cane (2002, 115–140) documented 
five ways by which rights to country could be gained, again for desert 
regions of southern Australia (ibid., 137). Sutton has shown there to be 
multiple ‘pathways’ whereby rights to country can be pressed, again for 
desert regions of Central Australia (2007, 178–187; 2015, 38ff.). In this 
regard, Hiatt wrote well before the advent of the native title era:
[S]tatements by anthropologists and Aborigines during land claim 
hearings, together with academic field research carried out during the 
last decade [i.e. prior to 1984] consolidate the case against Radcliffe-
Brown’s conception of the patrilineal patrilocal horde as the basic unit 
of Aboriginal local organization. But it is not only that patrilineality 
can no longer be regarded as a principle uniformly governing residential 
associations and access to resources; we must now ask, in the light of 
new evidence, whether patrifiliation was everywhere the basic principle of 
ownership. My own view is that throughout Australia it was an important 
credential, and probably in many areas the most important. But, in 
competing for scarce goods and social status, individuals (in traditional 
times as well as in contemporary land claims) appealed to various other 
recognized credentials, such as matrifiliation, birth-place, conception-
place, father’s burial-place, mythological links, long-term residence, and 
so on. (Hiatt 1984, 9)
The evidence supports the view that these researchers had found field 
data to support the conclusion that proprietary interests in country 
were multiple and complex, depending on a number of relationships. 
Permission and the exercise of rights were best understood in the context 
of the relationships that legitimated their expression. The operation 
of such a system may account for the fact that at least some of the 
earlier ethnography demonstrated that people exercised rights to access 
country well outside their patrilineal estate, perhaps legitimated by other 
attachments to country that were pressed into service to justify the use 
of a range of country for economic and social reasons. The ideal of the 
patrilineal descent group whose members exercised exclusive rights within 
a single estate was not a satisfactory or adequate representation of the 
ethnographic reality.
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Based on these accounts, it is evident that in arid regions, where maximum 
flexibility was required to ensure continuity of inheritance in an uncertain 
environment, more open systems were to be found, favouring multiple 
pathways of descent and the acquisition of rights to country through 
means other than descent (Keen 1997, 66). However, there appears to 
be much variation in the ethnography (cf. ibid., 73) and perhaps the best 
conclusion is that no model fits all. For the native title anthropologist, 
then, it is not a simple question of stating that the system was universally 
uniform. Rather, what is required is the provision of a view as to what 
was likely to have obtained at sovereignty and whether present laws and 
customs reflect a continuity of the same system. Above all, however, is the 
fact that in customary systems it is unlikely that rights were to be gained 
through descent alone. Other ways of gaining rights to country were also 
likely to have been important and a part of that customary system.
Consideration of the ethnography provided by Radcliffe-Brown and 
Kaberry shows that there has been some progress made over the decades 
with respect to our understanding of customary systems of rights to land 
in Aboriginal Australia. Radcliffe-Brown’s initial view was elementary 
and disarmingly simple: a man gained rights to the bounded estate of 
his father and so on from one generation to another. The estate was 
(like an English country estate) bounded and members of other groups 
had to seek permission before entering it. Kaberry and the Piddingtons 
were less sure of this ‘normal’ type of local organisation. Later writers and 
researchers have shown that generally in Aboriginal Australia rights may 
be gained by reference to several principles, while in many desert systems 
there are multiple pathways whereby rights can be asserted according to 
customary principles and beliefs. In addition to descent, then, place of 
spiritual conception or some other totemic link commonly yields rights to 
country. So, too, may ritual links to a Dreaming that traversed the country, 
particularly with respect to specific places or sites or command of ritual 
objects believed to embody the country in question. In my experience 
these are all quite common principles that provide legitimation for the 
assertion of customary rights to a range of country. Examples of the free 
use of a much wider range of country than a man’s single estate reflected 
the reality that, from a practical point of view, hunters and gatherers 
need a wider range of country than would have been afforded by a single 
estate, except perhaps in the richest tropical environments. Even if an 
estate provided an economically viable living space, social imperatives and 
bonds of kinship would have mandated a system that facilitated social 
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intercourse, free visiting and access rather than impeding it. This instructs 
that systems of rights to country are neither singular nor simple. They 
undoubtedly exhibit regional variation but common principles are found 
throughout. They are the product of social relationships just as much as 
of jurally endorsed title and are consequently flexible to changes in those 
relationships as families and groups wax and wane over time. 
Native title rights (and interests)
The native title anthropologist has as his or her primary task the job of 
seeking to explain the system whereby claimants assert rights to country 
and the extent to which this might demonstrate continuity with past 
systems. While a ‘right’ is fundamentally a legal concept, it has been 
variously understood by anthropologists, and unpacking the term, as 
I have done above, will assist in gaining a better understanding of what 
is meant by the use of the word. This, in turn, may assist in deciding 
whether something is a right or interest at all, as well as whether it is 
‘possessed’ under traditional laws and customs. Attempts to classify types 
of rights (determinative, contingent) are helpful to the extent that they will 
assist in coming to an understanding of the social interplay that defines 
and distinguishes rights. This is particularly important where there is 
competition or disagreement between claimants (or would-be claimants) 
as to the status of one sort of right over another. In bringing some social 
analysis to bear on these disagreements, anthropologists can perhaps 
proffer a view as to the customary bases of such assertions – should they 
have the need or be impelled to do so. 
While Australian anthropology has produced what I have termed above 
‘a developing orthodoxy’, the matter is not without contention, particularly 
with respect to the mode of descent that might most usually have been 
in evidence in Aboriginal Australia. However, I have discussed above how 
some more recent Australian anthropologists have taken a much broader 
view of the allocation of rights to country than some of the earlier writers 
and shown the richness and complexities of the system. These are all issues 
that must be treated in any native title inquiry. Assessment should be 
made of the system today (based on the empirical field data) and the 
likely system in operation at sovereignty where this can be deduced from 
the early literature or developed through inference from work undertaken 
elsewhere. Perhaps above all else, this chapter serves to demonstrate how 
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complex is the system of possessing, exercising and managing rights to 
country in customary arrangements. In my view, a proper explication of 
the complexity is a necessary part of advancing an expert view in relation 
to a customary system of rights to country.
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Exercise of native title rights
Modern anthropology is founded on observation – anthropologists 
should seek to study what goes on around them. In a native title inquiry 
the  focus of that observation should be the claimants’ relationships 
with their country and their activities and behaviour in relation to it. 
With respect to proprietary interests in land, rights are manifest through 
their exercise. Some customary actions then, performed in relation to 
country, are significant signals of the exercise of rights or duties and 
potentially, then, also to the continuity of that exercise and the system 
that underpins it over continuing generations. Consequently, doing the 
anthropology for a native title claim should ideally involve observation of 
the exercise of rights to country by the claimants. However, in practice 
it may only be possible to record how claimants assert that they exercise 
certain of their rights to country. Both sources of data provide a means 
whereby the anthropologist can create a representation of the social 
interactions and normative values and principles that determine how 
rights and their exercise are managed. It is from these data that the system 
of land tenure is explicated. 
Before I turn to an examination of these practical manifestations of the 
exercise of customary rights to country, there are a couple of preliminary 
matters that require attention. The first is definitional; the second 
a creature of native title law.
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Understanding the anthropology in a native 
title context
Groups local and residential
As studies of local organisation in Australia developed it became evident 
that there was a necessary differentiation to be made between the form 
and  structure of two quite different groups. One was the exogamous 
descent group (or ‘local descent group’, ‘local group’, and sometimes 
a ‘clan’ or ‘country group’). The other was an extended family group or 
those who recognise bonds of kinship (sometimes the ‘band’ or ‘horde’1 
or ‘residence group’). I noted above that Radcliffe-Brown’s account 
of local organisation resulted in some ambiguities and lack of lucidity. 
These developed from his failure to distinguish these two key components 
of customary Australian Indigenous local organisation. 
The distinction between the local group and the band was regarded as 
fundamental by R.M. Berndt (1959, 96) and L. Hiatt (1962, 284). 
Berndt concluded that it was the local group that was the land-owning 
group while the band was the land-occupying group (1959, 98, 103). 
Keen (acknowledging Sutton) called the descent group a ‘country group’ 
(2004, 277) in recognition of the fact that not all land-owning groups 
were strictly speaking descent groups – that is, recruited according to 
filiative links to forebears but members could be enlisted by means other 
than descent, as I have discussed in the previous chapter. Keen termed 
the band (ibid., 427) a ‘residence group’ in recognition of the fact that its 
membership was potentially impermanent and could change over time. 
The members of the residence group went about together hunting and 
gathering and are sometimes termed the ‘band’ or ‘horde’. The band was 
likely made up of two or more descent groups since the rule of descent 
group exogamy requires that spouses come from different descent groups. 
Based on this analysis it is evident that the country group and the 
residence  group are different types of social formation. While both 
are identified with respect to relationships of constituent members, 
country groups comprise those who recognise filiative, kinship or 
spiritual relationships with one another and with an area of land held in 
1  The term ‘horde’ was used by Radcliffe-Brown and other earlier writers, rather confusingly, 
for what later writers termed the local descent group. 
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common by country group members. Residence groups comprise those 
with lived social relationships engendered from daily economic activity 
and lived experience. The former is a description of how relationships are 
calculated and thought out. The latter is a description of how relationships 
are actuated.2 Early observers of Aboriginal Australia witnessed residence 
groups moving across the countryside as hunters and gatherers. While the 
residence groups comprised two or more country groups, it was the latter 
not the former that represented land-owning corporations by virtue of their 
members’ spiritual or filiative relationships to country. Thus, members of 
a residence group together as congeries of members of several country 
groups were likely to have claim to rights in more than one estate. To the 
extent that a member gained rights to different country through more 
than one pathway, members of the hunting and gathering residence group 
together were likely to claim rights to multiple estates. This arrangement 
would explain why the Piddingtons found that the exercise of rights to 
country was not effected with respect to singular hermetic estates.3 
Claim groups and local groups
In native title law, application for recognition of prior rights is generally 
made by a claim group whose laws and customs are the subject of 
examination by the court. In this it is the claim group that makes the 
application and, in the event that there is a subsequent determination in 
their favour, it is the group as a legal entity that will enjoy the native title 
rights that have been recognised. The relationship between the country 
groups and the claim group is oblique: the former is a product of the 
anthropology and our understandings of how customary systems worked. 
The latter is a product of the native title law. This means that while the 
anthropology may instruct that, according to customary systems, rights 
were (and are) not spread homogeneously across those who comprise 
the claim group, this is not a matter that the court needs to consider. 
The rights are allocated in native title law equally between those who made 
2  Sutton considered that country groups were ‘typological units’ defined in relation to types 
of relationship. Residence groups were ‘land-utilising aggregates’ (2003, 96).
3  Some years later Norman Tindale reported that, for the Yindjibarndi in the Pilbara region 
of Western Australia, ‘there are no separate family territories, all people may hunt over the whole of 
Indjibandi country. Adults may hunt unquestioned. Young men may hunt but there are restrictions 
on some foods they may eat’ (1953a, 333).
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application for recognition of native title. Thus, the court generally takes 
the view that the intra-mural allocation of rights within an application 
area is not a matter for its consideration.4 
This issue was raised in the Daniel claim where Nicholson J made 
comment on Professor K. Maddock’s, one of the experts, view:
[Maddock] was sceptical a language group had been regarded as having 
owned land although there would be some correlation with the area 
within which a language is spoken or mythologically identified. However, 
Professor Maddock was not prepared to start from a priori position 
of estate groups.5
His Honour continued:
I do not consider it is necessary to explore further these aspects of the 
anthropological evidence. Following the decisions in Ward HC and in 
Yorta Yorta it became apparent that the concentration on notions of 
composite community and estate groups, which had featured so heavily 
in the anthropological evidence given earlier in the trial, were not to be 
the central focus of the inquiry.6
The appeal judges did not find that the trial judge had erred in relation to 
the groups that held native title rights and that these were not held ‘at the 
estate group level’ (Moses v State of Western Australia [2007] FCAFC 78 
[344]). 
Sections 223 and 225 do not require the Court to search for an 
anthropologically identified form of community or group. The NTA 
[Native Title Act] makes clear the Court is to examine the evidence to see 
who holds native title, if anyone, and so whether there are communal, 
group or individual rights and interests. Anthropological theory and 
research may inform that examination but cannot determine it.7
This manner of treating customary systems does not mean that the proper 
characterisation of local organisation is unimportant. Understanding how 
Aboriginal systems of land tenure worked and how rights were transmitted 
through time is an essential driver to the process whereby native title can 
4  However, determinations also record that the rights are ‘exercisable subject to and in accordance 
with traditional laws and customs’ and courts may acknowledge that the rights are not shared equally. 
I thank Robert Blowes for this information.
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be proved. Establishing that the system remains substantially intact is 
a key component in any evidence of the continuity of laws and customs 
– as they relate to land and rights in country. Moreover, the intra-mural 
allocation of rights within the different constituent estates of the claim area 
will be significant in the post-native title administration of the country of 
a determined application – notwithstanding the court’s lack of interest in 
such matters when considering the application in the first place.
There is a related issue where the framing of a native title claim can perhaps 
too readily accommodate substantial changes in the system of gaining and 
asserting rights to country and so neglect the customary arrangements. 
In places where the estate system has more or less vanished, rights are 
often conceptualised by claimants and their advocates as being universally 
and evenly spread across all members of a claim group. Members of the 
claim group say that they recognise commonalities and so are a ‘society’ 
in native title terms. They comprise, then, an undifferentiated modern 
day ‘tribe’8 and may also be a language group. According to this view, 
all members of the claim group can freely exercise rights to the country 
of the former estates of the language group members in aggregation. 
There is reason to conclude that this is based on a customary system by 
reference to the multiple pathways I have discussed above. However, to 
be shown as a customary system, based on rules and principles, there can 
be no automatic right to the country of others simply because they share 
commonalities and are, for the purposes of a native title claim, a single 
society. In the system as I have described it in the previous chapter, the 
extent of a person’s range would be defined by reference to legitimating 
references as well as the rights of fellow residence group members who 
could bring their kinsfolk into country wherein they were, in fact, visitors 
not owners. Proof of native title requires continuity with the past. This 
means that the present-day arrangements must be shown to have some 
connection with the customary system such that it can reasonably be 
argued that the contemporary structure is based upon and rooted in past 
8  Sutton (2003, 133) wrote in this regard, ‘In regions heavily impacted by colonial and postcolonial 
developments, it is sometimes the case that some people maintain proximate entitlements to small 
areas such as classical estates as well as an identification with more widely-cast landed entities such as 
language groups, but at the same time others from the same region may maintain only the wider form 
of identification with land’. Sutton goes on to note that the neglect of a distinction between estate 
groups and a wider society or group may sometimes lead to disputes.
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practice. A substantial or total move away from country group ownership 
to claim group ownership, should the ethnography reveal such, would 
weaken the case for recognition of native title. 
Exercising and asserting rights in 
a customary system
Given the potential to benefit from a right to several different estates, 
by reference to a number of different governing principles, it is likely 
that there were in customary systems arrangements in place to order 
the acquisition of rights and their command. These worked to ensure 
governance and management of real assets in an orderly fashion. In short, 
it seems reasonable to assume that people knew where their country 
was and who commanded authority with respect to it as well as to all 
other areas known to them. Native title research needs to establish which 
principles are evident in the ethnography and how rights develop and 
are differentiated with respect to their originating belief and associated 
rules. Given this complexity, it is also essential to understand how the 
allocation and exercise of rights to country are a part of social process and 
the product of social relationships. It is important, then, to take a closer 
look at how rights to country were ordered in customary systems and gain 
an appreciation of the implications of this system for contemporary bids 
to gain recognition of customary title to land.
Descent, cognatic descent and the exercise 
of choice
What emerges from the Australian ethnography is that descent played 
a  central role in how rights to country were transmitted. As Hiatt 
pointed out, this may not have been the only way to gain rights to 
country, but it was probably, in most cases, ‘an important credential, 
and probably in many areas the most important’ (1984, 9). Systems of 
descent that recognise filiative links through both the mother and the 
father (patrifiliation and matrifiliation) are sometimes called ‘cognatic’. 
The implications of a cognatic system are that rights to country can be 
gained through both matri- as well as patri-filiative links, effectively giving 
ego the right to two countries gained from their parents – as Kaberry 
reported for the Kimberley. Potentially in a cognatic system ego gains 
rights in the country of four grandparents and eight great grandparents, 
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assuming each had a different country. With each ascending generation 
the number of possible estates increases exponentially. This means that ego 
could potentially claim rights to up to eight different countries over three 
ascending generations from ego. I have drawn a diagram to illustrate the 
theoretical descent of rights in a cognatic system over three generations 
(Figure 4.1). 
Figure 4.1: Cognatic descent over four generations
Note: ‘C’ denotes the country or estate wherein an individual gains rights through descent
source: diagram designed by author.
According to this account, then, a person potentially might claim rights in 
many countries through descent. Add to this a system that recognised that 
rights to country could be gained via other pathways and there develops, 
on the face of it, potential for a situation where there is no clear rule as to 
who was the principal owner of the country. Were such an open-ended 
system to be the ethnographic reality, claims to rights to country would 
have been open to a seemingly never-ending spectrum of individuals. This 
would have made the management of rights to country according to an 
ordered system next to impossible. Rather than a principled system there 
would be a seemingly random set of options and choices that might be 
selected without discrimination on the whim of the individual. Subject 
to no normative principles the arrangement would be no system at all. 
As such, it would run the danger of failing to qualify as a system of laws 
and customs, subject to normative values, and so would be incapable of 
being recognised in Australian native title law as a continuing system 
of native title.
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Radcliffe-Brown identified this as a difficulty for a cognatic system which 
he considered had the potential to become dysfunctional. He wrote:
If any society established a system of corporations on the basis of kinship 
– clans, joint families, incorporated lineages – it must necessarily adopt 
a system of unilineal reckoning of succession …
Thus the existence of unilineal (patrilineal or matrilineal) succession in 
the great majority of human societies can be traced to its sociological 
‘cause’ or ‘origin’ in certain fundamental social necessities. Chief amongst 
them, I have suggested, is the need of defining, with sufficient precisions 
to avoid unresolvable conflicts, the rights in rem9 over persons. The need 
of precise definition of rights in personam10 and of rights over things 
would seem to be secondary but still important factors. (Radcliffe-Brown 
1952, 46)
Radcliffe-Brown postulated that there had to be a normative system of laws 
that regulated the rights of a horde (country group) to its country and in 
relation to each other (ibid.). He considered such an arrangement to rely 
upon a principled system of succession that would avoid ‘unresolveable 
conflict’. He thus sought to establish that unilineal systems had a 
functional origin that if absent would have dysfunctional consequences.
In summary then, recognition of the fact that multiple pathways to 
country is a part of the Australian ethnography must be understood in the 
context of its operation and the social process whereby rights to country 
are gained and perpetuated. Accepting cognation and multiple pathways 
requires that the system in evidence exhibits some mechanism that would 
counter the potential for this ‘unresolveable conflict’. Generally in the 
Australian ethnography these mechanisms are evident as qualifiers to 
the exercise of rights, whether by reference to descent or other means. 
Meeting these qualifications is a necessary requirement before the rights 
can be exercised in practice. These operational requirements have the 
quality of a normative system of rules in that they are accepted within 
9  Radcliffe-Brown defines what he means by ‘rights in rem over a person’ earlier in his paper. 
He states, ‘rights over a person “as against the world”, i.e. imposing duties on all other persons in 
respect of that particular person. This is the jus in rem of Roman law in relation to persons’ (1952, 33). 
However, the definition provided by the Merriam-Webster online legal dictionary for jus in rem reads, 
‘a right enforceable against anyone in the world interfering with that right founded on some specific 
relationship, status, or particular property accorded legal protection from interference by anyone (as 
the right to be free from slander or to enjoy one’s property)’. www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
jus%20in%20rem, accessed 16 July 2014.
10  ‘Rights over a person imposing some duty or duties upon that person’ (ibid., 32).
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a population as being mandated by past practice and typically are believed 
to have been sanctioned by metaphysical forces in the distant past. They 
are, in the claimants’ parlance, matters of ‘the Law’. These are as much 
a part of the system of the acquisition of rights and their exercise as are the 
means whereby the rights are gained in the first place.
One fundamental example of a requirement to be in evidence before a right 
to country can be realised and so exercised according to customary belief 
is an acknowledgement of a spiritual relationship between a person and 
their country. This may be understood in terms of a totemic bond or the 
product of descent itself where a person is believed to be linked ‘through 
the blood’ to the ancestor and the country from time immemorial. 
In any event, rights to country are not exercised in a spiritual vacuum. 
Rights are seldom unqualified in their exercise and may require that other 
conditions be met before they can be put into effect. Additionally, and in 
the ethnographies with which I am familiar, not all rights are regarded as 
yielding the same degree of entitlement and their manner of acquisition is 
generally important in this regard. Not all who command a right are equal 
and the pressing of rights is a part of social process that is characterised by 
relationships between people. The manner whereby these relationships are 
socially constructed is an important factor in the way rights were (and are) 
asserted consistent with customary practices.
There is a danger that these aspects of the system whereby rights to land 
are allocated and perpetuated receive too little attention in native title 
claims. Indeed, it is perhaps a commonplace observation that many of the 
disputes that develop between native title claimants are the result of too 
many people making a claim over too few countries. In a number of areas 
where I have worked there is a common (and to my mind misplaced) 
assumption on the part of some claimants that all that has to be proved for 
a person to be a native title holder is descent from an ancestor. This may 
be sourced to Tindale, some other early genealogy, or simply be a product 
of the oral account. The claim is made regardless of the network of social 
relationships, acquisition of knowledge and the gaining of qualifications 
that I show below to be an essential part of the social process of gaining 
rights to country. One Native Title Representative Body with which I am 
familiar adopted the rule that a person could only be a claimant on one 
claim – thus attempting to obviate potential conflicts. However, the fact 
is that in customary arrangements, as far as we are able to discover, there 
were robust systems in place that yielded a relatively stable system of 
land tenure. This must have been sustained by the observance of rules 
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that rendered what is evidently quite a flexible system stable, reliable and 
predictable. It is important, then, for the native title anthropologist to 
understand how the system operated in customary terms to ensure that 
everyone knew whose country was whose.
It is to the ways that rights could be used in customary systems to articulate 
relationships between people and the control and use of resources that 
I now turn. In the following sections I examine some of the more common 
ways whereby relationships between people and country are characterised 
in customary systems. These may be used to assert a right in a particular 
country or give an avowed right greater weight than, say, those of others 
who also press rights to the same country.
Cognation plus?
An eminent Australian anthropologist coined the term ‘cognation plus’11 
with respect to the descent of rights in his review for a respondent party 
of an expert report I had written for a native title application. By this 
I took him to mean that the system of gaining rights to country (in the 
particular ethnography that we had both been commissioned to study) 
was cognatic, but it required an additional dimension. This was that 
a  person’s relationship to country was embedded within a totemic or 
spiritual environment that rendered the person a spiritual representation 
of the country and its metaphysical characteristics and potentialities. 
The implication of this was that descent (whether through matrifiliation 
or patrifiliation) was insufficient of itself to yield rights to country. 
Rather, there had to be evidence that there continued to be a spiritual 
correspondence between the person and that country, articulated by 
reference to a totemic principle, which had been documented, in this case, 
by the early ethnographer Daisy Bates, who had undertaken fieldwork 
in a neighbouring area (Palmer 2010a, 81–86). The argument put by 
the expert for the state in this matter was that there was an absence of 
the ‘plus’ factor, and consequently the descent of rights could not be 
considered to be based on customary principles. While ‘cognation plus’ 
was not a term used by the trial judge in his judgment,12 he concluded 
11  I acknowledge Professor Basil Sansom as the originator of this term.
12  Graham on behalf of the Ngadju People v State of Western Australia [2012] FCA 1455 [47–48].
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that there was evidence that there continued to be a spiritual relationship 
between the claimants of the application area13, and he found in favour 
of the applicants.
Establishing a spiritual link between people and country provides the 
basis for asserting a correspondence between a person and the land. This 
is a noumenal phenomenon but provides legitimation for the belief in 
the immanence of land-based spirituality inherent in those who assert 
rights to country. This has been a theme in the writings of Australian 
anthropology. T.G.H. Strehlow wrote in this regard:
The religious and totemic ties that united not merely whole groups with 
their group areas, but the individuals constituting each group with one 
or more defined mythological centres with each group area, were of the 
utmost importance. … The depth of this emotional attachment was 
a  result of the identification of the human beings born or conceived 
in a  certain totemic landscape with the supernatural beings who were 
believed to have created that landscape. (Strehlow 1965, 127)
R.M. Berndt wrote of Arnhem Land:
Where land was concerned, man’s relationship with it was not merely social, 
but socio-religious. In other words, while relationships between persons 
belonging to a particular stretch of country or to a site were expressed 
genealogically or otherwise, there was believed to be an additional quality 
which the bare social relationship itself did not define. Or, to put in another 
way, the social relationship was underpinned by a spiritual association which 
defined all relationships of that kind and no others. (Berndt 1970, 1; 
emphasis in original)
This spiritual dimension may not only be expressed in terms of a totemic 
link of the sort referred to by writers like Strehlow and Berndt and 
documented by Bates as noted above. Where it is believed that ancestors 
were autochthonous – that is, they originated from the very land that is 
subject to claim – their spirituality is believed to be a part of the same 
spirituality that informed the landscape. This metaphysical quality 
is believed to have been transmitted through the blood to subsequent 
generations and thus to the present-day claimants. While the belief 
in the spirituality derived from ancestors is not commonly asserted in 
my experience, it is usual for claimants to express a strong and abiding 
spiritual relationship with the country they claim as their own. The task 
13  ibid., [94].
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for the native title anthropologist is to provide a view, based on sound 
data, that such a belief has customary content. It is probably not likely 
to be argued that such spiritual connection was not a part of customary 
systems.14
Realising rights and dangerous places
In common with many other legal systems, Australian law requires 
that many rights must be realised before they can be acted upon. 
By this I mean that while the right exists, it cannot be exercised until 
certain conditions are met. For example, the right to drive a motor 
car in Australia is conditional upon the acquisition of a licence, itself 
dependent upon age and demonstrated competence and the payment of 
a fee. In Aboriginal Australia the exercise of the right to use country  is 
dependent upon detailed knowledge of that country. Such knowledge 
is not to be understood merely in terms of the geography, although that is 
important from a practical point of view. In my experience, the greater 
emphasis is placed amongst those with whom I have mostly worked on 
the metaphysical dimensions of the landscape. Some places are believed to 
be spiritually potent and thus actually physically dangerous.15 Examples 
include ritual grounds that may contain places forbidden to women or 
areas where sacred objects are stored. Generally, places where it is known 
that rituals were practised in times past are avoided since the details of 
the forbidden places (some for men and some for women) are no longer 
known. Consequently, it is judged wisest to avoid the area altogether 
rather than run the risk of inadvertent trespass on dangerous ground. 
Other examples of dangerous places are areas associated with malevolent 
or negative spirituality, including sites that are believed to cause sickness 
or a natural disaster. The presence of a mythic water snake in certain pools 
and reaches of rivers and creeks mandates particular attention, observance 
of protocols and ritual greetings. Without this knowledge practical use of 
the country remains impossible. Country that is redolent with powerful 
spirituality, some of it potentially dangerous, is like a minefield. Lack of 
knowledge of the location of danger might result in fatal consequences. 
Knowledge of country, whether it be practical, economic or spiritual is 
14  However, see Akiba on behalf of the Torres Strait Islanders of the Regional Seas Claim Group v State 
of Queensland (No. 2) [2010] FCA 643 [655]. It was submitted that ‘the absence of the spiritual 
element … is almost probably unique to this case’ (ibid., [172]).
15  To my mind, the classic Australian article written about safe and dangerous places is by Biernoff 
(1978). Kaberry also noted the significance of spiritual danger in country for different areas of 
Aboriginal Australia (e.g. 1939, 138–139, 203–204).
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then an essential component for the exercise of rights to country. The 
continuity of rights to country, however legitimated, requires possession 
of this qualification. Without it, so it might be argued, the exercise of 
rights remains potential. In those cases where there is now no longer 
anyone to teach and pass on this esoteric information, it would never be 
possible to achieve the exercise of rights to country according to customary 
principles, although the rights may remain all the same.
Given cases where ego has potential claim to several countries, there is 
likely to be a limit to his or her knowledge of the range of estates involved. 
This may be considered to be a reflection of place of residence, since 
familiarity with country implies at least a degree of physical presence. 
Thus, one or two (maybe more) countries may be privileged in that 
person’s dealings with country by virtue of the knowledge of the land 
concerned. Thus, country claimed via filiative links with a distant forebear 
that is little known might be classed as country wherein ego would choose 
to exercise rights to a very limited extent, perhaps under the guidance 
of a kinsman who knew the country better. To do otherwise would be to 
risk spiritual danger in unknown and potentially fatal country.
Ranking rights
In native title research the pressing of rights to a particular country by 
members of different groups may be an issue that gives rise to dispute 
or controversy. Typically perhaps members of one group might claim 
that their rights to the country should prevail over the rights asserted 
by another group to the same area. This may be argued on the basis that 
their rights are superior (stronger) or have greater customary legitimacy 
than the competing claims of others. The former argument gives rise 
to the question as to whether in customary systems some rights had 
greater weight within the community of rights holders than others. 
If  so, what was the system that regulated and legitimated the ranking 
of rights to country? In my experience, this is a complex and fraught 
matter. There is a small literature on the distinction between a primary 
and a secondary right that developed from the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 
where such a distinction was implicit in the legislation (see Peterson, Keen 
and Sansom 1977; Stanner 2001, 113–114). As I noted in the previous 
chapter, Radcliffe-Brown also differentiated rights in this manner. This 
distinction typically rests on the manner whereby the right in question 
was acquired (cf. Peterson 1983, 137–139). Kolig, writing of the central 
Kimberley region, distinguishes what he terms ‘secondary rights’ of 
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access and usufruct from ‘ownership’, by which, presumably, he meant 
a spiritually legitimated absolute connection with the country in question 
(1988, 83). He considered that members of the patriline had rights in the 
intellectual (or religious) knowledge of the patri-lodge (1978, 57; 1981, 
31). This included the rights to use (or sanction the use of ) knowledge of 
sites, narratives, songs and ritual performances associated with the lodge 
and its Dreaming attributes (1980c, 281). For Kolig, by my reading, the 
rights of the members of the patriline were superior to those who only had 
rights of access and usufruct. 
In a native title inquiry, then, it may be helpful to examine the field data 
collected to see if there is a clear system in evidence that stipulates that, 
say, rights gained via descent are somehow regarded as superior to those 
gained via totemic attachment occasioned through birth or conception. 
A difficulty is likely to be that rights that are articulated through social 
relationships and concomitant interaction are pressed in complex ways 
according to the manner whereby the relationship is negotiated. While 
some writers have suggested a dyadic distinction between primary and 
secondary rights (Kolig 1980b, 42; Peterson, Keen and Sansom 1977; 
Peterson 1983, 137–139; Stanner 2001, 113–114), my own view is that 
this does not adequately represent the social processes involved or the range 
of choices exercised in the assertion of rights to country. A distinction 
between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ rights, neat dyad though it may be, is 
unlikely to be evidenced in social practice. Understanding how rights are 
pressed and so ranked requires examination of the social process involved.
I have already set out what I regard as some of the important qualities 
and qualifications that may be required for rights to be realised through 
their exercise. The manner of this exercise and the rules that regulate it 
are important to an understanding of the process involved. For example, 
the degree to which the rights may be pressed in the face of competition 
for recognition of rights within social interplay that characterises 
contested environments will depend upon an individual’s status and 
eminence. This  is consistent with a system that generally honours the 
senior members of the community, placing value on age, experience and 
knowledge. In Aboriginal Australia, as a general rule, it is senior members 
who command respect and who through their command of sacred as well 
as mundane knowledge are regarded as decision-makers, the source of 
information, sage advice, comprehension and understanding, qualities that 
are highly esteemed (Berndt 1965). Being of a certain age is insufficient 
to obtain this status on its own since it must be accompanied by the 
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qualities enumerated above. Attainment of this status I call ‘standing’, 
recognising that it is a relative attribute so that one man may have greater 
standing than another depending on the accumulated knowledge and its 
manner of disposition. The category of person so qualified is often today 
referred to generically as ‘elders’. In areas of Aboriginal Australia where 
ritual practice continues, such men and women are sometimes referred to 
as ‘Law Bosses’ in recognition of their eminence in ritual matters.
According to customary systems in matters related to the pressing of rights 
to specific country, standing is recognised with respect to that country 
through the legitimating pathways discussed above, including knowledge 
of the country in question. According to this process standing is achieved 
through social and ritual maturity, as well as through the nature of the 
connection claimed to a specific area of country. In terms of personal 
predilection, it is a matter for an individual to negotiate the degree of 
standing claimed with respect to a particular country. A person with 
standing with respect to country that is not the subject in question would 
likely make clear that his or her interests lay elsewhere and that they had 
no intention of pressing a right to the country being discussed. In these 
cases, where a person decides that the country at issue is one in which they 
have filiative attachment but no standing, they can defer to another or 
others, saying, typically, that they ‘come behind’, ‘help them out’ or act as 
‘back stop’ to those whose rights they judged (and are judged by others) to 
be superior. This facilitates an exercise of choice in which area or areas of 
country rights will be pressed. The discriminations relating to the pressing 
of rights in country that develop from ‘standing’ operate as a means 
whereby individuals effectively exercise a choice over the articulation of 
rights. Given that there are multiple ways to attain rights, this exercise 
of choice is an important means of regulating the geographic extent of the 
effective exercise of rights to country. 
Permission, trespass and licence
Owning a right requires that those who do not own that right ask 
permission before seeking to share in the benefits derived from the exercise 
of the right. Acts of seeking or giving permission with respect to property 
signal the existence of a proprietary system where some own rights in 
a particular property while others do not. In native title inquiries, then, field 
data relating to a requirement that some seek permission with respect to 
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the use of country, while others have the power to grant it, is an important 
means whereby the normative system governing the allocation of rights to 
country is to be understood. The act of infringing a right in property is 
known as trespass and may incur censure or penalty and, in extreme cases, 
was punishable by death. Nancy Williams has written extensively about the 
nature of permission in Aboriginal Australia (1982, 1986 and 1999) and 
her work provides a detailed examination of the topic. 
Lawyers in particular are attracted to this aspect of a normative system 
and often seek out examples of permission when eliciting evidence. This 
is not always as straightforward as one might expect. Take the following 
examples from the transcripts of a native title hearing.
Example 1
Counsel: Now, what about if something happens on … Yanturi country 
… who, according to law way, who’s got to be asked about that?
Claimant:16 Me.
Counsel: And just you?
Claimant: Me and my brother, because we’re the eldest, and then we’re 
going to call up the other Nungali mob.17
Example 2
Counsel: What about if it’s your father’s mother’s country? Can you give 
permission for that one, your father’s mother’s country?
Claimant: Yes, I can give permission if old people not around here. They 
come to me and I’ll go there, and I’ll look around with them, and I’ll call 
a meeting, ask R H or D to come along to talk up.
Counsel: And why are R and D the ones who should be talking up?
Claimant: Because it’s their Kakung country.18
In the first exchange the female claimant told the court that she had 
the right to be asked in relation to any proposed action within a named 
area of country. However, she quickly added that this was not solely her 
responsibility. Permission would require participation of her brother 
16  I have removed the names of claimant and counsel.
17 Griffiths v Northern Territory & Anor. D6012, transcript of evidence, 335.
18  Father’s father’s country; ibid., 336.
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(because he and she were ‘the oldest’) but additionally members of 
a named language group would be called together as well. The evidence 
does not tell us what might happen if there was disagreement between the 
variously defined participants in this process. Permission is evidently the 
product of a group rather than an individual.
In the second exchange, which features the same claimant as witness, 
the rules for granting permission in ego’s father’s mother’s country are 
more circumspect. The witness considered she could give permission 
‘if old people not around here’, implying, by my reading, that these 
unnamed ‘old people’ had precedence in this matter. She then adds that 
she would accompany the prospective visitors and ‘look around with 
them’, presumably in the country, which I take to mean that she would 
escort them on their visit for reasons not there explained. Finally, she adds 
that she’d ‘call a meeting’, naming two individuals who she regarded as 
significant in relation to the granting of permission for this country. These 
two people had filiative links to the country in question through their 
father and father’s father.
These accounts are entirely consistent with a system where rights to 
country are not singular but are rather the product of a network of 
relationships and socially endorsed protocols and rule-based referents. 
These relationships may include an arrangement whereby a right of access 
is provided to another by some form of agreement or understanding. This 
has sometimes been called ‘standing permission’. Standing permission is 
not a right but a licence and may be revoked. In native title research 
it is  important to distinguish rights (determinative or contingent) from 
access or use offered on licence since the two are easily confused and can 
give rise to misunderstandings amongst claimants. One example, in some 
areas, is the privilege provided to a spouse over her husband’s (or his wife’s) 
country. Spousal unions seldom give rise to absolute rights to country 
in Aboriginal Australia, but there may be recognition that a wife gains 
a licence in her husband’s country (and vice versa). These arrangements, 
where evident in the ethnography, need to be carefully probed and subject 
to close scrutiny in terms of their likely antiquity. 
In my experience, the complexity of the way whereby rights to country 
are distributed throughout a given population means that answers to 
questions of permission are seldom simple. There is also another aspect 
to the ‘permission’ question, apparent from a close reading of the second 
extract set out above. It relates to duty and danger in country.
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Working with a group of senior male claimants when undertaking an 
inquiry for a native title claim, I sought to gain ethnography relevant to the 
different sorts of rights claimants might consider they could freely exercise 
in the land over which they sought recognition of native title. My success 
in this regard was limited because I found that these senior men found the 
concept of listing rights alien – it was, after all, in their view their country 
in which they could do what they pleased, consistent with customary 
practice. The qualifier is important. It was their exclusive property (their 
right) but nevertheless subject to rules that governed how this right was to 
be exercised. One principal consideration was the nature of the spiritual 
potentialities of the country and the danger inherent in access gained 
in ignorance of the totemic geography of the country. This reflected the 
complexity of the spiritual hazards of the country that I have outlined 
above (see ‘Realising rights and dangerous places’) and the need to possess 
knowledge of places and to know where it was safe to go and where it was 
wise to avoid. But the minefield that is spiritual country also imposes an 
obligation upon those who know in relation to those who are ignorant but 
who seek permission for access. These people who are ignorant of spiritual 
danger must be protected from spiritual harm. The best way to do this 
and ensure that nothing untoward occurs is to accompany them and ‘look 
around with them’. Given spiritual danger in country, trespass acquires a 
rather different complexion to that common in mainstream Australian 
thinking, where to trespass is simply to enter someone else’s land or 
property without permission. Trespass in customary Aboriginal dealings 
is an act of great folly and has potentially fatal consequences. There would, 
then, need to be good reason to take such risks. Owners of the country 
who also know its spiritual particularities have a duty to protect strangers 
and feel responsible if something untoward happens to them.19 Given the 
nature of country and entry upon it by the ignorant it is understandable 
that the senior men with whom I worked provided me with data relating 
to conditions of access and duty of care, rather than an enumeration of 
rights such as might be found in a native title application.
19  A well-known example of this duty of care is the request, issued by the traditional owners of 
Uluru, that visitors to the Rock do not climb it. ‘Anangu have a duty to safeguard visitors to their 
land. They feel great sadness if visitors to their land are killed or injured. As such, traditional owners 
would prefer that as guests to their land, visitors will respect Anangu law and culture by not climbing.’ 
www.ayersrockresort.com.au/uluru-and-kata-tjuta/uluru-and-kata-tjuta-national-park/can-i-climb-
uluru accessed 25 January 2017.
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This does not mean that trespass was unknown in times past. The early 
ethnographic literature indicates that trespass occurred, presumably by 
those who felt confident in their knowledge of country and perhaps their 
spiritual status to enter another’s country for gain or murderous intent 
(e.g. Radcliffe-Brown 1913, 146; Roth 1906, 8; see Sutton 2003, 23–24 
for a review). The lesson for native title work is to present a complete 
picture of how rights to country worked in practice, about how they 
are possessed and how rules govern their exercise, without confusing 
the two. The account will include consideration of the requirement to 
ask permission when seeking access to another person’s country and its 
resources. Permission and trespass need to be explained within the matrix 
of the complex set of relationships between people whose links to country 
are variously articulated. These relationships must be understood in terms 
of the special spiritual characteristics which are believed to inform country 
– land is fundamentally imbued with spiritual potency such that it can 
provide potentially fatal consequences if crossed.
A common manifestation of the duty of the owner of country to others 
who lacks rights in his estate is the act of welcoming or greeting country. 
I have come across many manifestations of this small ritual, ranging from 
simple ‘calling out’ to country to more elaborate head wetting, spraying 
water from the mouth across a pool or the use of body sweat. In areas 
where language remains more or less intact, there is often a requirement 
for the use of the local language in rituals of greeting on the ground that 
the spirits of a place will only understand the language of the country. 
Speaking in any other language, including English, will cause the greeting 
to fail. Words typically introduce the visitors (as well as the owners) and 
seek protection of the sprits, who are often characterised as the spirits 
of ‘the old people’ – that is, those who lived generations ago but whose 
presence continues to inform the spiritual environment of the place. Good 
luck may also be sought for fishing, hunting and gathering expeditions 
that are the occasion of the visit to country. In some instances, specific 
mythic beings may need to be placated – the water snake being notable 
in this regard. Water taken from a pool may be poured over the heads of 
visitors as a kind of ritual induction – a task which is usually done by one 
who exercises rights within the country. Sometimes, owners take water 
from a pool and blow it in a fine spray across a pool. One explanation 
for this given to me was that the spirit of a mythic being20 in the pool 
20  The term ‘mythic’ is discussed in Chapter 5 of this book – see footnote 5.
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recognises the saliva of the visiting countryman and so accepts their 
presence along with those who accompany him. Much the same applies 
to the use of body sweat; the smell from an owner being transferred to 
the visitor as a form of assimilation, so spirits and mythic beings are not 
offended or disturbed by exotic sweat.
Native title research that yields examples of these ritual greetings 
provides good evidence of customary behaviour since rituals of greeting 
have been recorded in the early literature and are likely to have been a part 
of past practice (Biernoff 1978, 103–104; Roth 1897, 160; Williams 
1986, 85). While they demonstrate that owners of country have the right 
to bring others into their estates, they also show that there is a duty to 
protect visitors which, as I have noted above, is in my experience more 
often in evidence in the ethnography than a preoccupation with actual 
trespass. 
Rights and process
Applications for the recognition of native title must necessarily be 
supported by strong ethnographic evidence that there is a customary 
system whereby the title to country is sustained. Appreciating how this 
continuity is substantiated to the present cannot be found solely in an 
account of the system that was likely to have been in place at sovereignty. 
What is required is data that supports the contemporary observance of 
the laws and customs that sustain rights to country and their orderly 
exercise. In this chapter I have set out a number of topics that I consider 
may be helpful when attempting to accomplish this. While rights may be 
understood to reside in proof of descent from apical ancestors (or other 
customary system), the complex of rules about how they are to be exercised 
(and so realised in action) requires much more. The exercise of rights is 
subject to social process where group status, standing and seniority are 
essential markers of an ability to command rights before others. Within 
this complex social process, an understanding of which I argue is needful 
in any native title report, lies the fundamental relationship between 
a person and country. This is a relationship that attributes sentience to 
country. It consequently prescribes the manner whereby engagement 
is had with the country: the laws, customs and normative values that 
define customary dealings with the land. Thus, the exercise of rights, the 
granting of permission, the idea of trespass and the exercise of duty are 
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best understood in this ethnography in terms of the management of the 
relationship between people and sentient country. These are all important 
matters for anthropological consideration in any native title inquiry.
This discussion about the exercise of rights also provides a useful 
analytical  distinction between the possession of a right itself and the 
rules and normative referents evoked to govern their exercise. Native 
title law, as  I understand it, seeks to inquire whether there are rights 
that are possessed under traditional laws and customs. The manner of 
their exercise is a separate but obviously related issue – although one that 
had undoubted relevance to the continuity of the observance of laws 




Aboriginal religion and native title
A popular and sustained view of Aboriginal society and culture has been 
and remains that it is essentially spiritual. Concepts like the ‘Dreaming’ or 
‘Dreamtime’, stories relating to localised supernatural beings (the Wagurl in 
Western Australia, the bunyip in eastern or south-eastern Australia and the 
Djanggawul of northeast Arnhem Land to mention just a few) are known 
and appreciated by informed Australians. Indigenous relationships to land 
are commonly represented in spiritual terms. For example, until recently, 
the official Australian Government website, informed the world that ‘For 
Indigenous Australians, the land is the core of all spirituality and this 
relationship and the spirit of “country” is [sic] central to the issues that are 
important to Indigenous people today’.1 Accounts of Aboriginal religion, 
beliefs and practices are common in the anthropological literature, both 
as classic ethnographies as well as shorter accounts in edited volumes and 
academic journals. Tourist bookstalls carry popular accounts of ‘Aboriginal 
Dreamtime stories’, children’s picture books and illustrated narratives, 
many of which are authored by Indigenous Australians. In short, across the 
spectrum of popular and academic publication (digital, as well as hard copy) 
1  The quotation came from the Australian Government’s website (www.australia.gov.au/about-
australia/australian-story/austn-indigenous-cultural-heritage, accessed 9 December 2016), which 
has since been removed and replaced by a short catalogue of services and general information about 
‘Indigenous culture and history’ (see www.australia.gov.au/information-and-services/culture-and-arts/
indigenous-culture-and-history). The website of the Australian Human Rights Commission, on the 
other hand, states that ‘Native title is a property right which reflects a relationship to land which is 
the very foundation of Indigenous religion, culture and well-being’ (see www.humanrights.gov.au/our-
work/aboriginal-and-torres-strait-islander-social-justice/projects/native-title, accessed 13 March 2018).
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Aboriginal religious beliefs and practices are as much in evidence as the 
koala and the kangaroo, while the iconic Uluru is commonly represented 
as the embodiment of Indigenous spirituality and belief.2
This apparent privileging of Aboriginal belief and practice has its 
downsides. Beyond the academic work produced by both Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal scholars, popular culture has commoditised Aboriginal 
spirituality and has often shown a scant regard for authenticity or 
accuracy.  This has led to misunderstandings and even trivialisation 
of some aspects of belief and practice. In turn, the classic ethnographies 
of Aboriginal ritual practices3 provide ready examples of the richness and 
diversity of ritual practices in some remote areas of Aboriginal Australia. 
This wealth of ritual and belief is not reflected in the ethnography of many 
native title claimant groups whose ritual practices are either substantially 
diminished or, as is the case in many rural and urban areas, no longer 
a part of contemporary practice. In a native title business that requires 
proof of traditionality, such comparisons are odious.
Given the centrality of religious belief and practice to Indigenous 
Australian culture, it is self-evident that the subject should be discussed 
in any report written in relation to a native title application. However, 
as with  all other ethnography discussed in this book, the account has 
to be relevant to native title questions. In writing a native title report, 
an account of the claimants’ religious beliefs and practices will not, 
of itself, provide a basis for the provision of an expert view as to the 
continuity of law and customs that relate to rights to country. Moreover, 
the prominence afforded to Aboriginal spirituality and the manner of 
its representation, particularly in the popular media, may require that 
the account clarifies issues and that it provides a corrective to popular 
misconceptions. Treatment of the field data may also require accepting 
and admitting that the ethnography relied upon reveals a religious life 
somewhat diminished in scope and content when compared with the 
earlier accounts of customary mytho-ritual performance as witnessed and 
recounted by mid-century anthropologists. This may have the potential 
to weaken the claims of right, but is a matter that cannot be neglected.
2  See, for example, uluru-australia.com/about-uluru/uluru-and-aboriginal-culture – along with 
advertisements for Kangaroo Island, Broome’s Cable Beach and women’s fashion garments. Accessed 
9 December 2016.
3  For example, Berndt’s Kunapipi (1951), Djanggawul (1952); and Meggitt’s Gadjari (1966). 
Many other examples could be cited. 
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Making it relevant
Some dos and don’ts
The content of an expert or connection report will, of course, depend 
upon the ethnography available. No two reports, then, will be the same. 
The comparative process, whereby present practice and belief is compared 
with documented past practice will also be determined by the availability 
of materials in the early literature. In some cases such accounts will be 
very limited or perhaps altogether absent. In these cases the writer will 
have to rely on early accounts from a neighbouring area (if available) or 
from the scholarly literature for comparable areas of Aboriginal Australia. 
Claimant testimony that beliefs and practices have been a part of their 
culture ‘for ever’ may have some value in supporting the continuity 
argument. However, a discerning critic of the application is likely to evoke 
views relating to the shallowness of the oral tradition and its potential for 
transmutation, as I discuss in the next chapter of this book (see Chapter 6, 
‘Native title research and oral testimony’). As with other aspects of the 
laws and customs of the claimants, an expert view supporting their 
continuity through time really does need to rely, at least in part, on 
independent archival or ethnographic data. This process may attract its 
own problems. When reviewing the early literature in relation to a practice 
or belief that is known now to be entirely absent, there is little point in 
providing a detailed account of the practice if the conclusion will be that 
it is no longer a part of the contemporary account. Better to note its 
past occurrence and then state that its absence today is an evident loss of 
customary practice. I have read reports that detail past practices at length, 
only to conclude that the ritual is long gone, so rendering the historical 
account redundant. In native title writing, cultural losses require neither 
explanation nor excuse, but should, nonetheless, be openly and clearly 
admitted without requiring the reader to labour through descriptions 
of practices long abandoned.
The Dreaming, the secret, the sacred and the Law
Given the comments I have set down in the preceding paragraphs, it is 
essential that the writer of a native title report makes clear exactly what 
is meant by words or phrases that may commonly occur in the popular 
literature or might otherwise be subject to uncertainty or possible 
misunderstanding. This serves to anchor the ensuing account to key 
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concepts evident in the ethnography, as well as helping to demonstrate 
that the beliefs and practices constitute a system with normative content 
and a structured form and process. This may also serve to counter the 
perception common in early accounts that Aboriginal belief and practice 
did not constitute a proper religion, but was magic or superstition – 
a perception that is not altogether absent in some circles today.
Australian Indigenous languages often have a term that roughly translates 
to ‘the creative period of the Dreaming’. Jukurpa is common in areas 
of the  Western Desert, but bugarigara, ngaranggani and munguny are 
common further west. I have recorded the term mura in northeast South 
Australia and southwest Queensland and ularaka from the Lake Eyre 
Basin.4 In  the Yindjibarndi language (central Pilbara region of Western 
Australia) a phrase is employed that can be translated as ‘when the 
world was soft’, being descriptive of the state of the country as it was 
believed to have been in this creative time. These terms (and many others 
besides) carry a range of meanings depending on the context of their use 
but all provide a foundation concept for Aboriginal religious belief that 
underpin a range of spiritual beliefs, practices and concepts. Dreaming, as 
represented by the Indigenous term is, in part, regarded as a period of time 
in the far distant past. During this time extraordinary events took place at 
certain locations typically effected by mythic5 beings with extraordinary 
capabilities. These events fashioned aspects of the claimants’ physical, 
social and cultural world, providing an explanation and mandate for 
a particular cultural practice (like a ritual, prescribed behaviour between 
classes of kin or way of gutting an animal) or natural phenomenon (like a 
hill, rock, river or plain) today. Anyone who has worked with Aboriginal 
people in Australia in remote as well as rural and urban areas is likely to be 
familiar with these aspects of belief as they are found commonly in daily 
discourse. Notable in this regard is the idea that country was first allocated 
to human groups in the Dreaming and has subsequently been ‘handed 
down’ through the generations to the present Indigenous owners. 
4  Cf. Elkin 1934, 176, 181.
5  As far as I know, the term ‘mythic’ was introduced into the literature by Ronald and Catherine 
Berndt (see, for example, R.M. Berndt 1970, 218, 219; Berndt and Berndt 1993, 223ff.) but was 
not used in their earlier work where ‘mythical’ seems to have been preferred (e.g. Berndt and Berndt 
1964, 189). While ‘mythic’ suffers from the same imperfections as ‘myth’, its substitution for the 
more common ‘mythical’ may serve to alleviate the pejorative connotations of the latter. In lectures 
Ronald Berndt used to speak of ‘my-thick’ beings, so the word had little resemblance to the cognate 
‘mythical’.
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Dreaming is dynamically manifest in the present and its spirituality 
traverses the temporal dimension such that it is neither solely of the past 
nor the present. As a reference to potent spirituality, the term may be 
used to denote a manifestation of contemporary sanctity derived from 
the creative era. Spirituality evident within place is attributed to events 
of the distant past but is elementally contemporary and a part of present 
experience. Consistent with this concept, Dreaming (or its Indigenous 
equivalent) can also be used to denote a particular relationship between 
a person and the natural world (a place or a natural species), which is 
readily understood as a totemic association. 
These preliminary comments relating to the concept of ‘the Dreaming’ 
should serve to illustrate that the popular view of the Dreaming as some 
quasi-romantic period steeped in myth and legend and being the stuff 
of  children’s stories egregiously misrepresents the ethnographic reality. 
I have worked with some claimants who refuse to use the term ‘Dreamtime’ 
for this very reason. The word Dreaming is probably the better choice than 
‘Dreamtime’ as the former at least represents the sense of the recent and 
continuous aspects of the belief. Terms from the claimants’ own language 
may also have advantages when used in native title discourse, but if this 
choice is adopted the word chosen must be accurately defined.
The spiritual power of the Dreaming is neither passive nor benevolent. 
Common to all Aboriginal groups with which I have worked is the belief 
that there is a potent spiritual force present within the countryside or 
evoked in ritual practice. Things of the Dreaming are sacred and their 
substance sacrosanct. A place, then, that is believed to have been created 
in the Dreaming and has continuing Dreaming characteristics is sacred 
and is generally subject to rules that govern visitation or use. In writing of 
such things, care needs to be taken to distinguish the idea of sanctity from 
the ideal of the secret as the two terms are sometimes conflated in popular 
use, yielding a sort of hybrid ‘secret–sacred’ notion that obfuscates the 
system of belief and action that characterises Aboriginal religious belief 
in this regard. While all aspects of the Dreaming are ‘sacred’, not all 
are ‘secret’.
Terms from the claimants’ own language are helpful in any analysis of 
these concepts. In parts of the northwest of Western Australia and east 
into the desert areas, potent Dreaming spirituality is identified by the term 
ngurlu, a term used to refer to phenomena that are potentially spiritually 
dangerous to those not qualified to encounter them. In parts of the Western 
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Desert, the concept is expressed by use of the term milmilpa while other 
languages have their own terms. Such words carry the meaning of being 
restricted and not open to some people (usually women and children), and 
content so characterised is thus esoteric. Spiritual danger within country 
(a manifestation of the Dreaming) is a determinant of how country can 
be accessed, exploited and managed. The term for spiritual danger is also 
used to refer to a place associated with esoteric and restricted activities like 
a ritual ground where gender-specific activities are known to take place 
and it is also used to refer to ritual items, knowledge of which is restricted 
to senior ritually qualified men. The term is thus a means of referring to 
such items without making a direct reference to them and so functions as 
a euphemism. Since these matters are so sensitive, however, no mention 
is made of ngurlu (meaning objects) in the presence of women. Esoteric 
and highly restricted objects are manifestations of Dreaming and may also 
articulate a spiritual relationship between a person and a place.
The usefulness of such data in the native title context may be limited 
by the need for strict confidentiality when discussing such material. It is 
essential that the management of these data be discussed at the outset of 
the research with senior male claimants (or senior female claimants if the 
material is restricted to women) and a decision made as to whether it will 
be collected and included in some form in the anthropologist’s report. 
One possible solution is to place these restricted materials into a separate 
report and have the court make orders as to its subsequent distribution 
and use. This is not uncommon and the court may also choose to hold 
certain sessions in camera, limiting attendance to males or females and 
imposing restrictions on the subsequent dissemination of the transcript. 
However, this may result in procedural difficulties. In a recent case that 
was appealed to the Full Bench of the Federal Court, restricted materials 
were demanded by the appellant to be discovered since the appeal court 
needed to review all the evidence considered by the trial judge. The 
question then arose as to what would be the outcome if one of the appeal 
judges was a  woman. Court orders are only secure for as long as they 
endure: they can be overturned.
In some areas the original Aboriginal language words for such concepts 
as Dreaming, ‘sacred’ and ‘secret’ are now not remembered. However, it 
has been my experience that beliefs in these concepts endures and can 
provide helpful insights to any native title inquiry. Dreaming and the 
related aspects of potent spirituality within the countryside comprise 
a significant reference within customary Aboriginal belief. Manifestation 
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within place potentially makes it a part of any daily encounter with the 
countryside. This is significant in the native title context as it is a belief that 
serves to link people with country through the conviction that Dreaming 
spirituality imbues the country and so is a part of the contemporary 
relationship a person has with their country. The affiliation a person has 
with his (or her) land is one that comprises a relationship constructed of 
spiritual interconnectedness, mediated by places and the spiritually potent 
attributes of those places. Consequently, rights to country are legitimated 
by reference to the supernatural ordination of the creative period of the 
Dreaming that continues to the present. The identification of the location 
of sacred ritual items reflects the belief that the spirituality of the country 
is immanent in paraphernalia. These beliefs and concepts are pertinent to 
any native title report that seeks to explore the contemporary relationship 
between people and country. The rules that are believed to have been set 
down in the Dreaming and that are now cited as comprising expected 
and regulating behaviour are important to native title analyses as they 
serve to demonstrate the existence of a normative system that underpins 
the claimants’ relationship to country. Native title reports generally 
require careful consideration and analyses of these beliefs, concepts and 
social dealings in order to show the customary relationship between the 
claimants and their asserted rights to country.
Both the period of the Dreaming and its principal actors are believed 
to be  responsible for the institution of laws and customs. ‘The Law’, 
commonly a term for customary practices and ritual observances, is 
believed to have its origins within the Dreaming. In many Aboriginal 
groups, the term ‘law’ is used with a range of meanings depending on 
the context. A common use of the term ‘law’ is to refer to rules of social 
behaviour, particularly those governing marriage and kin obligations as 
well as rules that determine access to country and the asking of permission. 
So, for example, visiting places that are regarded as prohibited to certain 
categories of person is also a matter of the exercise of law. The term ‘law’ is 
also used in context to refer to any one of several of ritual activities, each 
having its own particular signature or style (songs, body markings) as well 
as associated paraphernalia and teaching. Used in this sense and in part 
to distinguish its use from the more general ‘law’, meaning rules, axioms 
and required behaviour, some writers represent it with initial upper case 
(‘Law’). Commonly, a person who has submitted to the ritual of induction 
(commonly ‘initiation’) is referred to as having ‘been through the Law’. 
The time when rituals are performed may be known as ‘Law time’, the 
ground where ritual action takes place as the ‘Law ground’ and a man who 
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is regarded as having status and authority in ritual matters referred to as 
a ‘Law man’ and a woman as ‘Law woman’ or ‘Law boss’. Collection of 
these vernacular (Aboriginal English terms) helps define the structure and 
underlying system of Aboriginal belief and practice. Credible exegesis of 
this sort does, however, require that the terms are carefully and accurately 
explained at the outset.
Religious beliefs
It may be helpful in writing for a native title audience to separate out the 
claimants’ religious beliefs from practices. This is a pragmatic choice that 
may assist in the presentation of data for what is ultimately a legal readership 
where an assessment of data is made in relation to specific criteria – for 
example, the continuity of customary belief relating to the application 
area. Care needs to be taken when following what might be understood 
as a reductionist process that belief and practice are not dissociated, for 
the two are a part of the whole. The dichotomising that characterises this 
discourse highlights the problem of writing about complex spiritual and 
metaphysical matters in a native title report. Data must be applied to 
the native title questions, otherwise it will be redundant. While beliefs 
and practices are two sides of the same coin, clarification of beliefs and 
significant concepts (see previous section) paves the way for an account 
of practice since the latter can be understood to be the manifestation and 
realisation of the former.
Each ethnography will yield examples of different religious convictions 
so  the content of the text will vary on a case-by-case basis. In what 
follows I set down some of the beliefs I have found to occur widely across 
Aboriginal Australia in my native title research, noting that they are not 
restricted to remote or northern areas, but with patient and thorough 
inquiry may be recorded within rural and urban groups as well. 
Totemism
The early literature on Aboriginal religion instructs that totemism was 
a significant feature of belief and practice in times gone by. Consideration of 
this aspect of belief is, then, a necessary part of any contemporary account 
of the claimants’ religious beliefs. The terms ‘totem’ and ‘totemism’ are 
not without their problems. They have a long history in anthropological 
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writing that is well beyond the scope of this book to review. Spencer 
and Gillen wrote at the end of the nineteenth century that every person 
belonging to the groups they studied in Central Australia was:
born into some totem – that is, he or she belongs to a group of persons 
each one of whom bears the name of, and is especially associated with, 
some natural object. The latter is usually an animal or plant; but in 
addition to those of living things, there are also such totem names as 
wind, sun, water, or cloud. (Spencer and Gillen 1899, 112)
R.M. and C.H. Berndt (1988, 231) cite Durkheim (1915), Spencer and 
Gillen (1899), Radcliffe-Brown (1945 and 1952), Warner (1937), Elkin 
(1933 and 1945), Strehlow (1947), Stanner (1958 and 1959–61) as well 
as R.M. Berndt (1951 and 1952) as examples of those who have provided 
comprehensive accounts of totemism in Aboriginal belief. They remark 
that, ‘all have suggested … that a major focus was on totemism. In fact, 
Aboriginal religion has been labelled as totemic, and a great deal has been 
written, at second hand, on this subject’ (ibid.). The ‘second hand’ nature 
of so many of these early accounts is identified by R.M. and C.H. Berndt 
as a principal problem with the early anthropological literature, observing 
that ‘Totemism is a confusing term, because it has been used in so many 
different ways’ (ibid.). Nevertheless, they conclude that the term is now 
so ‘well-entrenched’ that adoption of a different term would ‘only add to 
the confusion’ and counsel that it be used with careful attention to what 
is meant by the writer. They cite Elkin as providing the ‘best’ description 
in this regard:
a view of nature and life, of the universe and man, which colours and 
influences the Aborigines’ social groupings and unites them with nature’s 
activities and species in a bond of mutual life-giving and imparts 
confidence amidst the vicissitudes of life. (Elkin 1945, 126, cited in 
Berndt and Berndt 1988, 231)
Elsewhere, and earlier, Elkin defined ‘totemism’ as:
a relationship between an individual or group of individuals on the one 
hand and a natural object or species on the other – a relationship which 
is denoted by the application of the name of the latter, the totem, to the 
human individual or group concerned. (Elkin 1933, 257)
Elkin went on to caution against applying the definition without a proper 
understanding of the implications and consequences of the relationship 
between totem and person or group, since he understood this relationship 
to influence and perhaps even determine social action (ibid.).
AusTRAlIAN NATIvE TITlE ANThRopoloGy
116
R.M. and C.H. Berndt echo these definitions by adding that they 
understand totemism to be, very broadly, about:
a view of the world in which man is an integral part of nature, not sharply 
distinct or differing in quality from other natural species, but sharing with 
them the same life essence. (Berndt and Berndt 1988, 231)
Elkin sought to bring clarity to his analyses by dividing totemism into 
seven different types that he called ‘forms’ (individual, sex, moiety, 
section/subsection, clan, local and multiple) (1945, 129–133). 
This  categorisation is expanded by R.M. and C.H. Berndt into 10 
(individual, sex, moiety, section/subsection, clan, local, conception, birth, 
dream and multiple). They also identified two classes of totemism (social 
totemism and ritual or cult totemism), all categories belonging to one or 
other of the classes (1988, 231). Elkin’s further classification, however, 
was based on ‘function and meaning’ (1945, 133–148), identifying types 
of totemism that R.M. and C.H. Berndt included as categories. While 
this may be represented as sound analysis and certainly explores different 
manifestations of totemism, it may prove of limited assistance in a native 
title report because of its evident rigidity and conspicuous complexity.
The lists furnished by Elkin and the Berndts may provide a useful 
checklist  for native title researchers to explore with claimants regarding 
their totemic beliefs. While I do not for one minute suggest that 
researchers list these categories as a kind of questionnaire (‘Do you have 
birth totemism? Do you have subsection totemism?’), exploration of the 
concepts that inform the categories may provide a basis for the collection 
of helpful data. That said, totemism, as the term might best be employed 
in native title writing, is better understood as a relationship. Classification 
is not as important as developing an understanding of how the relationship 
is articulated and how it works to link a person to the natural world 
through a spiritual correspondence that renders a person correlative with 
the natural world, either a place or a species or both. Understanding 
totemism as a relationship rather than a thing, which is sometimes 
a consequence of categorisation, positions and so helps define the belief 
within social action and personal credo. Typically, the relationship is 
manifest as a personal bond between an individual and a place or between 
an individual and a natural species, many cultures exhibiting examples 
of both. In a native title account, such an understanding may assist the 
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reader in gaining an appreciation of how people relate to country through 
spiritual affiliations that are a part of their day-to-day lived experience and 
their social interactions with others.6 
In my own experience, I have found that discovering terms from the 
language of the claimants that identify spiritual relationships between 
an individual and the natural world is a helpful first step. For example, 
in areas of the central and western Kimberley I have recorded the terms 
ray and jarin that identify the existence of a relationship between an 
individual and a place and an individual and a natural species respectively. 
Ray is a term used for a spirit that enlivens the foetus of the unborn child. 
It is identified by an adult (not always the father) through the dream 
of natural sleep or through a metaphysical experience. Its revelation 
is rehearsed as a subsequent narrative in which the particulars of the 
imbuement are told and the place whence the ray originated identified 
(Glaskin 2017, 64–65). In many cultures (although not invariably), the 
totemic link between the resultant individual and the ray and its place of 
origin (sometimes referred to as ungurr) yields rights for the individual 
within the locale of the ray – the locale being known as that person’s 
‘ungurr place’. Such place-specific links between people and country 
provide data that is helpful when developing expert views on the existence 
of contemporary links between a person and an application area.7
Jarin is a word used to identify an animal or natural species associated 
with an individual in areas of north-western Australia. Typically, this is 
explained through the reporting of an incident that occurred immediately 
prior to a mother’s realisation that she was pregnant. The details of 
a person’s jarin are generally explained by means of a short narrative 
that describes the relevant circumstances. Subsequently, the person is 
understood to have a particular relationship with that animal or natural 
species, such that the jarin is ‘special for them’ or that they feel a particular 
affinity toward it. In some cases, the jarin is forbidden food, although 
this is not always so. The jarin may also be identified with an individual 
through some physical mark or distinguishing feature. This characteristic 
is understood by claimants to be the result of the circumstances that led 
to the spiritual relationship being created. Thus, if the jarin was an animal 
that was hunted or a fish that was speared, the individual is shown to have 
6  See Palmer 2016, 130–132 for totemic data drawn from a rural and urban population.
7  See Kaberry 1936, 1938; Kolig 1981, 31–35; Palmer 1981, 336–342 for examples of how 
a totemic relationship endorses rights to country.
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a birthmark or other physical blemish that represents the act of capture or 
killing. Totemic beliefs of the jarin type are widespread across Aboriginal 
Australia and are not usually linked to a place or locale, although the 
location where the jarin originated may be regarded as significant to 
the individual.
These two examples serve to illustrate common aspects of totemic belief 
that  may be found in native title ethnographies. There are, of course, 
others, as the texts I discussed above clearly illustrate. Totems may be 
passed down through filiation, from either mother or father, or may 
be associated with a social category (moiety, section, or subsection). 
A totemic relationship may also develop through ritual practice where an 
individual (usually a man) experiences induction into an esoteric mytho-
ritual tradition such that he is believed to have gained a spiritual affiliation 
with a particular Dreaming being identified with a place or string of 
places across the countryside. This belief, or variations of it, has been 
called ‘cult totemism’ (Berndt and Berndt 1988, 238–239; Elkin 1945, 
136–144; Kolig 1981, 158–176). One difficulty with consideration of 
such data, should it be available for a native title researcher, is that much 
of the content may be restricted in its allowable dissemination. This raises 
difficulties for its use in a native title report that is most usefully an open 
account available to all parties who have an interest in the application. 
As  I have noted above, restricted materials need to be discussed at the 
outset of the research and a policy adopted as to how such ethnography 
will be used, if at all (cf. Glaskin 2017, 132–134).
Myth and narrative
A native title report should include examples of the claimants’ oral 
literature. Some of those with whom I have worked dislike the term 
‘myth’, regarding it as pejorative as it may be understood to imply 
falsehood or untruth. Notwithstanding that the term ‘myth’ has 
a technical anthropological meaning (a sacred tale held to be true), the 
word is open to misunderstanding, particularly when used for a non-
specialist readership. The more neutral term ‘narrative’ may be the wiser 
choice. Some oral literature comprises narratives that tell of domestic 
and social events situated within the context of the Dreaming. These are 
generally narratives of place and are often publically rehearsed while some 
are regarded as mostly suitable for children. This should not diminish 
their importance to an ethnography that seeks to demonstrate the 
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continuing nature of cultural traditions and, provided they are a part of 
the field data, they have a place in a native title report. Care should be 
taken, however, to ensure that narratives have been passed on in an oral 
tradition as there are undoubtedly examples where narratives have been 
lost to the oral account while being preserved in print as ‘Dreamtime 
stories’ only to re-emerge again as an oral account that has been learnt 
from the printed version. Over a generation or two the interruption to 
the oral account is not remembered. Asking claimants where they learnt 
the narrative is sometimes helpful and is an essential part of the research 
process. Becoming acquainted with materials that have been produced by 
the relevant community over the last few decades at schools and resource 
centres is also important as this may provide an indication of the likely 
history and origins of an oral account. Given that narratives were only ever 
oral accounts in customary arrangements, an absence of the oral account 
for a period of time would signal a lack of continuity of this aspect of 
Aboriginal culture. Its resurrection would not alleviate this loss – although 
this is a legal matter that might find support from other arguments that 
are not my concern here. 
Narratives of the Dreaming that tell of the actions of mythic beings 
at known locations across the countryside and particularly within 
the application area provide useful data for those who seek to provide 
a view as to the claimants’ continuing connections with the countryside. 
Consistent with the discussion above relating to the inherent spirituality 
of the Dreaming, such narratives serve to show how claimants continue 
to esteem and value the country and particular places and areas within it. 
Narratives can attest to the belief that there is a manifest deep spirituality 
that is the continuing and contemporary representation of the actions 
of the Dreaming being or beings. Accompanying song as well as artistic 
representations may be of assistance to an understanding of how place 
and narratives enshrine spirituality that is linked to people through 
a perceived equivalence between a person and his or her country – yet 
another form of totemism. Travels of mythic beings also lend themselves 
well to graphic representation as lines across a map (see, for example, Cane 
2002, 84; Hawke and Gallagher 1989, 114). Many narratives of this sort 
are restricted in their dissemination – or have confidential segments or 
versions. Again, proper management of such data, and indeed whether 
it be collected at all, is a matter that needs to be discussed with senior 
claimants, who are themselves privy to these materials, before the research 
is undertaken.
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The reproduction of narratives in a native title report can be helpful in 
demonstrating the continuity of the oral tradition. This counsels that the 
accounts be summary rather than effusive, providing only such detail as 
is necessary for the subsequent provision of an opinion as to the likely 
continuity of the tradition since times prior to sovereignty. Some narratives 
in the oral tradition are quite lengthy and have performative aspects that 
are best omitted from the field data as presented. However engaging the 
narrative, if it has no bearing on the native title questions its telling will 
be at best redundant, at worst irritating.
Sites, locales and place
Many narratives relate to country and named places that were typically 
spiritually ordained and modified or transformed during the Dreaming. 
The idea of the ‘sacred site’ has a long and troubled history in the latter 
part of the twentieth century in Australia that continues to this day. 
The  phrase was brought to academic prominence by R.M. Berndt in 
the early 1970s in his monograph, The sacred site: the western Arnhem 
Land example (1970). State legislation to protect ‘sites’ was enacted about 
this time.8 Difficulties developed in Western Australia when the local 
community at Noonkanbah on the Fitzroy River (west Kimberley) sought 
to prevent drilling on country they regarded as spiritually significant. 
The  state government took the view that the area concerned was not 
a ‘sacred site’ as it lay well beyond the compass of the geographic feature 
that had, apparently, previously signified the site and so could, according 
to this logic, be drilled with impunity (Hawke and Gallagher 1989). This 
raised a fundamental problem with legislation that regarded land-based 
spirituality as essentially contained within the parameters of a definable 
‘site’. Beyond the boundary, the spirituality and associated cultural and 
religious significance was absent. 
The Native Title Act is not sites-based legislation but seeks to recognise 
rights to country as a whole. However, in writing of ‘sites’ in a native title 
report, the researcher needs to be mindful of the baggage the term carries. 
Indeed, it might be better to avoid the word altogether and substitute 
a word like ‘area’ or ‘locale’ (as I have done above). To avoid subsequent 
misunderstanding, some discussion of the nature of land-based spirituality 
and its pervasiveness and absence of evident and convenient containment 
8  See Williams and McGrath 2014 for multiple references.
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is required. Generally, according to Aboriginal customary understandings 
and belief, named places are not ‘sites’ in the sense that they can be readily 
bounded. Typically when mapping country on the ground it is evident 
that there is a zone of transition between one named area and another with 
an intermediate region separating them. The spirituality believed to reside 
at a place is not contained within a bounded site. Rather, it is pervasive 
and sometimes extensive. Individual named places (‘sites’) may comprise 
a complex of significant places that in aggregate constitute an area of 
spiritual significance having component parts that cannot be separated 
since they rely on and express common spirituality. In the Pilbara region 
of the northwest of Western Australia, I recorded a totemic association of 
an area as being fog. The spirituality of the area was understood to be no 
more contained as a bounded site as is the very fog that constituted its 
visual manifestation. A question along the lines of, ‘Well, how far does 
the Fog Dreaming site go?’ is, then, incontrovertibly foolish. The same 
understanding could be applied to any area wherein spirituality is believed 
to reside.
Sites and areas of importance should be identified by a unique number 
and  listed with summary details, including approximate geographic 
location, the Indigenous name, the map name, an indication of the type 
of site (artefacts, ritual, historical and so on) along with a brief description 
of the place and the source of the information and field note reference. 
Sites  gathered from earlier researchers or extracted from state sites’ 
databases, if presented in the report, should be clearly differentiated from 
the field data collected in preparation for writing the native title report 
as the former may not represent contemporary knowledge. Sites should 
also be shown on a large format map by number so they can be identified 
by the reader or, should the matter go to trial, by the court and other 
interested parties. I have found that by sorting the UTM grid references 
of the sites I can order the sites roughly top to bottom and left to right 
across the map. While this is unsophisticated, it aids identification of sites 
when there are many dozens of them. An alternative is to provide an index 
like a street directory with the map divided into sectors (‘A1’, ‘A2’ and 
so on) so any site can be found on the map. A ‘site map’ provides a ready 
and graphic representation of the claimants’ knowledge of their country 
and can be a telling if crude indicator of the continuity of connection. 
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Beliefs and practices of daily living
Aboriginal religious beliefs penetrate the surrounding natural 
environment, bringing the metaphysical to the physical world with 
which Aboriginal people interact in the course of their daily lives. This 
results in a complex system of belief that circumscribes many aspects of 
the claimants’ quotidian activities through observance of customary ways 
of dealing with the spiritual world that readily translates to a normative 
system of laws that prescribe correct action. These aspects of customary 
observance and the rules that underpin them are founded upon spiritual 
beliefs but are not set apart like major ritual action or indeed evidently 
separate from daily life. They are, then, sacred in the sense that they 
belong to the spiritual world but mundane in the sense that they are a part 
of the routine of the commonplace and humdrum everyday tasks. For this 
reason, too, they may be missed in a native title inquiry or considered by 
the claimants to be of no consequence. However, what might be called 
beliefs and practices of daily living are an important part of Aboriginal 
religious belief and should be included in any account of the continuity 
of those beliefs over time and examined to determine what they can tell us 
about the claimants’ relationship with country. They may also reflect rules 
about the rights exercised by the claimants within the application area.
Spirits figure prominently in Indigenous cultures. These are manifest as 
a pantheon of different forms and characteristics. Some are mischievous, 
some benign and helpful, some elementally dangerous. Spirits are 
typically present within the countryside and so must be managed when 
the places they are known to inhabit are visited – reflecting ritual practices 
of greeting country that I have considered in the previous chapter of this 
book (see ‘Realising rights and dangerous places’, and ‘Permission, trespass 
and licence’). In many instances I have found that claimants consider 
that only those with customary rights to the country can manage these 
spiritual encounters. This is because it is believed that it is the owners of 
the land who hold a spiritual commonality with both the country and 
its metaphysical manifestations. In similar vein, the spirits of deceased 
ancestors (another important aspect of Aboriginal religious belief ) 
recognise their descendants as those who are, like them, of the country.
Another example of beliefs and practices of daily living are protocols that 
govern the taking and processing of food. Goannas may have to be gutted 
in a particular way, kangaroo, turtle and dugong prepared according to 
normative prescriptions while some meat is forbidden to certain categories 
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of person while others are privileged in its distribution. These customary 
ways of doing things are well reported in the general Aboriginal studies 
literature, as any student of the subject will know. Understood as an 
expression of the abiding relationship that an Aboriginal person has with 
the natural world through supernatural agency, they may serve to illustrate 
the continuity of customary action and the deep correlation believed to 
exist between people and country and much that is within it.
Domestic encounters with birds, dogs and other animals may also 
carry with them a range of beliefs. Common to many ethnographies 
with which  I have worked is the belief in messenger birds – omens of 
good (or more often bad) news, visitors and death. The countryside as 
observed by a keen and knowing eye may also provide information about 
the availability of natural species, the weather or the wind. While these 
examples of the beliefs of daily living are more in the nature of a natural 
history than of a credo, on being pressed claimants are likely to explain 
that the relationship of one part of the natural world with another is 
a product of the spirituality of the Dreaming. During this creative time, 
so is the widely held belief, all things were ordained and the present order 
and the rules that regulate interaction with the natural world were set in 
place. Such data is helpful to any native title account since it goes to both 
normative values and continuity and should not be overlooked in the 
research process.
Religious practices
Accounts of ritual in a native title report need to be presented in the 
context of their relationship to the possession of rights by the claimants. 
If  the data available in this regard is either not evident or cannot be 
provided in a convenient and accessible form, care must be exercised to 
ensure that the account is not irrelevant. That stated, ritual performance 
generally signals a vibrant continuity of laws and customs and so finds 
a rightful place in the ethnography. Ritual is a complex and challenging 
area to write about in any native title report. Ritual action can be both 
the most public and spectacular of a researcher’s fieldwork data as well 
as the most private and sensitive. Before lifting the lid on the claimants’ 
ritual lives, great thought, planning and close consultation needs to be 
undertaken, while the practicalities and resources required to record 
properly events that occur only periodically and may last for many days 
will have substantial resource implications for the organisation funding 
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the research. Those of us who have been lucky and privileged to take part 
in one or more of the major mytho-ritual practices of Aboriginal Australia 
understand the intensity and all-consuming emotional commitment 
required of ritual practitioners. This is not an undertaking that should be 
embarked upon lightly, nor should the velocity of the moment obscure the 
end goal of the research. To be helpful to the court and others who assess 
native title applications, ritual data need to be accessible and available. 
Much ritual action is gender restricted while some claimants may consider 
that practices that are not so restricted are, nevertheless, not matters that 
should be made public, even within the limited audience of a native title 
claim. 
While the practicalities of providing a first-hand account of ritual 
activities may not be possible given the severe restraints imposed by court 
deadlines and the commissioning agency’s budgets, other means can be 
utilised to provide data on ritual practices where these are a continuing 
part of  the claimants’ laws and customs. Anthropologists who have 
worked at least quite recently with the claimants may have published 
their own independent accounts of ritual to which the native title research 
can refer. Obviously, such accounts need to be verified by the claimants 
and confirmation provided that such accounts continue to reflect current 
practice. Claimant accounts of their ritual practices may also serve to 
provide useful field data, again with the proviso that it is evident that what 
is related refers to contemporary practice. As with all field data, lawyers 
who manage and finally present the case at trial (if that is the outcome) 
will wish to lead claimant testimony to support the anthropologist’s data.
Major rituals of induction are not practised in many areas of settled and 
southern Australia. Relevant early literature may attest to this absence 
in the contemporary account or reveal that the rituals that are practised 
are either substantially changed or diminished. I have been asked on 
a number of occasions by prospective claimants whether people can gain 
recognition of their native title rights if the major life-stage rituals are 
no longer practised. Based on my knowledge of claims that have been 
determined, it is evident that ritual, like language, can be lost without 
jeopardising recognition of native title9 – although its continued practice 
9  Examples that come to mind are the Single Noongar Claim in southwest Western Australia 
(Bennell v State of WA), Dempsey on behalf of the Bularnu, Waluwarra and Wangkayujuru People and 
the Juru People (Parts A and B (Prior on behalf of the Juru People and Lampton on behalf of the Juru 
People)), but there are any number of other examples that could be drawn from the determined claims 
listed on the NNTT website: www.nntt.gov.au/searchRegApps/NativeTitleClaims/Pages/default.aspx.
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undoubtedly makes claims stronger. While historically anthropologists 
have made the focus of their research and recording the great initiatory 
or life-stage rituals as well as the post-initiatory ceremonies that inform 
classic texts of the sort I have cited at the beginning of this chapter, 
ritual practice may also be in evidence in less spectacular forms, such as 
greeting country, hunting evocations and increase rituals. Such practices, 
particularly when performed in what might seem to the uninformed to 
be in a rather perfunctory or low-key manner, are easily overlooked in 
the research process. In my experience rituals that show the continuing 
relationships between people and their country may sometimes be 
performed in a disarmingly ‘modern’ manner, all too easily overlooked 
during the research process.
Kinds of ritual practice
Studies of ritual have long been a significant topic for anthropological 
inquiry and it has been subject to extensive review, analysis and theoretical 
constructs. Trained anthropologists learn of these things during their 
courses of study and should bring this knowledge to their subsequent 
presentation and analyses of their data. In this regard the classic work 
of Arnold van Gennep (1960) and later work by Victor Turner (1968, 
1974) are important points of departure. Lloyd Warner’s classic A black 
civilisation reveals the complexity and detail of recording ritual practice 
and furnishing exegesis (1937, 234–401). The challenge for anyone 
undertaking a native title inquiry is that of relevance. Rituals are often by 
their very nature protracted affairs, containing complex and sometimes 
intricate details while ceremonial activity invites a range of possible 
interpretations, some of which have been in times past speculative and 
farfetched.10 To be helpful to those who adjudicate on an application for 
the recognition of native title, ritual data needs to bear on the question of 
the continuity of law and custom, particularly as that relates to people’s 
relationship to country and the perdurance of their rights within it.
Ritual practice in Aboriginal Australia is generally directed toward 
a specific goal and is characterised by unique form, style and content. 
Different sorts of ritual are named and are not conflated in practice – 
indeed, to do so would be to break the ordaining rules that are believed 
10  For a review of some of the problems of interpretation of narrative and ritual, see John Morton’s 
introduction to Geza Roheim’s Children of the desert II (Morton 1988, vii–xxx). 
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to have been set down by mythic beings of the Dreaming who first 
established the way a ritual should be conducted. Emic classifications 
of ritual practice are useful in any presentation of data since they allow 
for an orderly presentation of materials that reflects the claimants’ beliefs 
and understandings. In what follows I consider just some of the principal 
types of ritual that might inform a native title inquiry.
Initiation
Common in ethnographies of northern and remote Aboriginal Australia 
is the practice of rituals of induction for youths, typically males. This 
usually (although not invariably) involves the physical operation of 
circumcision, although an alternative in some areas may include ritual 
arm tying.11 The practice is often referred to generally as ‘the Law’ or 
‘Law time’ and the process as ‘going through the Law’. The ritual often 
involves not only members of the initiates’ own community but members 
of others across the region as well, while several boys may be initiated 
at the same time, together involving several hundred participants. These 
rituals are major regional community events, having substantial non-
restricted segments, may continue for a week or more and are a significant 
event in the Indigenous calendar. In some places where I have worked, 
dedicated ritual grounds have been set up complete with ablution facilities 
and semi-permanent bough sheds to cater for those attending. European 
Australians are often invited and welcome to attend, take photographs 
and participate in the dancing and ritual adornment (‘dressing up’). There 
are, however, restricted episodes, including the actual circumcision, from 
which women, children and generally European Australians are excluded.
‘Going through the Law’ by ritual induction and circumcision is 
a necessary first step for the social transition from youth to manhood. 
However, while it makes ‘a man of a boy’, senior men with whom I have 
worked all agree that it is merely a first stage of a social and ritual education, 
rather like completing primary school. Being a man (wati in many 
Western Desert languages) requires much more than this. A fundamental 
feature of Aboriginal religious practice is that it is progressively revelatory. 
Knowledge of the Dreaming, the narratives and associated beliefs, customs 
and practices, evocation of spirituality and its renewal and comprehension 
11  A number of other male initiatory rites are recorded across Aboriginal Australia by R.M. and 
C.H. Berndt (1988, 166–175). Initiation rites for girls are also recorded in the literature (e.g. ibid., 
180–185), but this is a matter that I feel unqualified to comment upon. It has been explored by other 
writers – see Bell 1983 and 2005 for a discussion, review and additional references.
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of the sacra that may link people to country are sequences in a life-long 
ritual journey. While the juvenile initiate may hear songs and observe 
dances and performance that relate to the countryside, he is unlikely to 
gain much knowledge of them. Moreover, a boy can be circumcised at 
a community quite far removed from his own ancestral country, so the 
relationship between the ritual practice and activating rights to ancestral 
country may not be evident. The observation of the ritual is likely to 
demonstrate that there is a continuity of laws and customs in this regard. 
However, the relevance of this practice to the assertion of rights to the 
country of the application may not be evident.
Higher rituals
Post-circumcision rituals are, in my experience, often replete with 
restricted  episodes, furnishing significant challenges as to how such 
material might be managed in a native title application. These revelatory 
ritual practices are sometimes euphemistically referred to as ‘higher Law’, 
‘bush business’ or simply ‘men’s business’, although they have specific names 
that are often themselves restricted. For obvious reasons I can write very 
little about these rituals except to observe that it is these that often relate 
to what might broadly be called the totemic relationship between people 
and their country. In those communities where such rituals continue to 
form a part of customary practice, lifetime exposure to the rituals yields 
status and a depth of arcane knowledge that legitimates eminence and 
standing and so are an important feature of the social organisation of the 
claimant group and its governance. Progressive revelation and rehearsals 
of ritual, narrative, song and performance is also a means to ensure the 
continuity of this knowledge through time and facilitates the preservation 
of its content. These matters go to the normative system whereby 
claimants manage their social relationships, structure their quotidian 
exchanges, manage disputes and impose discipline. Consequently, they 
are relevant to any native title inquiry. In this sense it may be sufficient 
simply to note that such higher rituals are a part of contemporary practice, 
without any need to go into any detail beyond the sort I have provided 
here. However, in an open report at least it will not be possible to provide 
a fine-grained explanation of how higher rituals function to link people to 
country through spiritual evocations.
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Entertainment and ‘corroborees’
Native title research may reveal a genre of oral literature that comprises 
single songs believed to have been composed by a named individual. Such 
songs are generally believed to have come to the composer in the dream 
of natural sleep and may be associated with a particular place within that 
person’s country, either because of the content of the song or because it was 
conceived at a particular location.12 These songs are sung informally for 
entertainment or for the edification of the researcher and some individuals 
may have a repertoire of several dozen pieces. These songs are the property 
of the composer and pass to his or her heirs on the originator’s death. 
They can be helpful in a native title inquiry in so far as they demonstrate 
a continuing relationship between a person and country. 
Some groups retain knowledge of more complex song sequences, 
sometimes with dance and ritual paraphernalia, including some restricted 
intervals. These ‘corroborees’13 may also serve to demonstrate continuity 
of customary practice – and may also articulate a relationship, born of 
the Dreaming whence the song poetry originates, with the country 
of the claim.
Some other rituals that might come to notice
Mortuary rituals were a notable feature of the early ethnographies.14 
However, for one reason or another these complex rituals have now been 
largely replaced by Christian services and interment.15 Nevertheless, funerals 
are significant events across Aboriginal Australia and native title research 
should not neglect these sad but important events that demonstrate the 
magnitude of social relationships, kin ties and concomitant duties and 
responsibilities. I have found burial practices to include the use of grave 
goods, steps taken to avoid the escape of the deceased’s spirit and post-
mortuary smoking rites. There is often a declared preference for being 
buried in one’s ancestral country, based on the belief that the spirit of the 
deceased returns to the land whence it is believed to have also originated. 
12  Common terms from the north of Western Australia are jawi, jabi and nurlu. In South Australia 
they are commonly referred to as yinma.
13  From garaabara, a word of the Dharuk language of the Sydney area, first recorded by Europeans 
in about 1790 (The Australian National Dictionary, ‘corroboree’). While the term is not much 
used in standard English now, its use by Aboriginal people to identify particular forms of public 
entertainments is common.
14  For example, Dawson 1881, 62–67; Howitt 1904, 426–508; Roth 1907; Spencer and Gillen 
1899, 497–511; Warner 1937, 402–440.
15  But mortuary rituals remain a significant part of ritual practices in parts of Arnhem Land.
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In one area of north Queensland, where return to ancestral country for 
burial was impractical, I recorded that sand taken from that remote 
location was buried with the deceased so the spirit would be able to be 
absorbed by the elements of ancestral country within the grave. I have also 
observed how the news of a death is disseminated according to custom, 
ritualised visits to the deceased family and communal weeping. All of 
these are likely to have had parallels in customary practice and can be used 
to demonstrate to the respondents of an application for the recognition of 
native title that aspects of customary belief and practice endure to this day. 
I have noted above that rituals of greeting the country are helpful in 
a  native title context since they demonstrate the spiritual relationship 
between a person and their land occasioned by physical visitation. While 
rituals of increase (again well documented in the literature16) may now 
be uncommon as rites, I have noted how claimants sometimes speak 
out to the country when visiting to fish or hunt, expecting that such an 
exhortation will facilitate their success at securing a good catch. If such 
observations are a part of the researcher’s field data, they are helpful to 
a native title report and should not be overlooked.
Bringing the data to a proof of native title
In writing about Aboriginal religion in the native title context the 
anthropologist faces two challenges. The first is common to all native title 
writing: the requirement that the data provided brings to a focus the nature 
of the relationship a claimant has with his or her land and how this may 
serve to perpetuate and legitimate rights to that country. The continuity 
of laws and customs that are otherwise a part of the claimants’ cultural 
experiences are not without a place in a native title report as these serve to 
demonstrate that there is a continuance of a society whose members share 
commonalities. However, aspects of these laws and customs need to have 
a bearing on the core business of native title: how rights to country were 
held pre-sovereignty and how they have endured to the present. Graham 
Hiley, then a native title lawyer, wrote:
16  For example, Elkin 1933, 284–296; Piddington 1932; Spencer and Gillen 1899, 167–211.
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The relevant laws and customs … are those that, inter alia, define and 
regulate rights and interests in land (and or waters). Thus, the relevant 
‘society’ for the purposes of native title jurisprudence is the society that 
gives rise to and is defined by the body of laws and customs which includes 
that important element. 
It is not sufficient just to identify any body of laws and customs. For 
example the identification of a body of laws and customs regarding 
matters totally unrelated to rights and interests in land – for example, 
regarding social discourse or behaviour -- will not without more identify 
the relevant society for native title purposes. (Hiley 2008, 146)
Given the essentially land-based spirituality that informs Aboriginal 
religious belief and practice, consideration of this aspect of Indigenous 
culture should provide fertile ground to further an understanding of 
the intense and enduring relationship which Aboriginal Australians 
have with their country and their age-old proprietorship of it. However, 
the problem of relevance and focus is exacerbated in any account of 
Aboriginal religious belief and practices. This is a result of the richness, 
complexity, diversity and multidimensional nature of the subject that 
comprises in a  very real sense the totality of Aboriginal cultural space. 
The temptation is to become absorbed in presenting ritual descriptions, 
enumerating beliefs and then embarking on lengthy explanation or 
exegesis. In this extravaganza the application of the data to the native title 
questions is easily overlooked. Native title writing seeks not to provide the 
definitive account of the claimants’ beliefs and ritual practices, but rather 
to articulate how they encompass relationships to country and articulate 
the exercise of customary rights within it.
The second problem relates to secrecy and sacrilege. Writing well before 
the native title era, Eric Kolig commenced his study of the ‘modernisation’ 
of Aboriginal religion in the central Kimberley region by writing:
An enormous stumbling block faces anyone who wants to write about 
traditional Aboriginal religion – the strict secrecy of its most sacred 
aspects. … the most treasured parts are shrouded in deep secrecy and 
access to them requires special and formal training not readily granted 
… and any breach of secrecy has traditionally been considered a heinous 
crime, the gravest possible sacrilege, for which nothing but the most 
severe punishment is adequate response. (Kolig 1981, vii)
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I have watched senior Aboriginal men agonise about whether or not to 
disclose restricted materials to the court, sometimes (but not always) 
encouraged by their lawyers or enthused by the researcher who want the 
best case made without perhaps paying enough attention to the longer-
term consequences for the claimants. Fatal car accidents have been blamed 
on the perceived betrayal of sacred lore, terminal cases of cancer linked 
to statements made in court – albeit during a restricted session. The fear 
of supernatural consequences and of social opprobrium for betraying 
a sacred trust is a very real and present one. Researchers and lawyers need 
to consider such matters with great care before exhorting claimants to tell 
all, particularly if such matters are not critical to an understanding of the 
possession of rights. It should be evident from the content of this chapter 
that there is much that can be written that relates to Aboriginal religious 
belief that does not compromise the secrecy of the esoteric. My opening 
position has always been that there should be no restricted materials 
included either in my field note book or in the evidence: my report, the 
viva voce evidence or the claimant affidavits. The case for the recognition 
of native title can with skill and industry be put without the need to reveal 
the most personal and secret aspects of an Indigenous culture. It seems to 
me that Aboriginal people are asked to subject enough of their cultural 
heritage to close scrutiny in the process of making a native title claim 
without having to give away their deepest secrets and feel themselves 
potentially at least to be liable to suffer direly as a consequence.
This said, I have been involved in a number of claims that have seen 
the presentation of restricted materials. In some cases this has been as 
a result of the inextricable nature of esoteric belief and practice and the 
articulation of rights to country. Sometimes, a proper understanding 
of these matters must include the restricted dimensions of belief and 
practice, otherwise it cannot be fully comprehended – which is why, of 
course, it is senior ritual leaders who take the lead in matters relating to 
the use and management of country. In other cases I have witnessed the 
claimants taking action on their own account to reveal restricted materials 
to the court because they have felt that this will serve their interests best 
in the long run. In such circumstances one can but hope that the outcome 




Native title research 
and oral testimony1
Do we tell it like it is?
In applying ourselves to native title inquiries, we face two methodological 
obstacles. The first relates to resources, including time. The second relates 
to the type of data that is required for the proof of native title. Both 
have implications for how we do our fieldwork, assemble our data and 
the reliance that may need to be placed on oral testimony rather than 
first-hand observation.
Time, money and the oral account
What might best be called ‘classical anthropology’ involved long periods 
of time in the field – perhaps a year or more – during which knowledge of 
the language was acquired, familiarity with the people gained, trust and 
respect earned and often deeply forged personal relationships developed 
with informants who became, in time, life-long friends, confidants and 
perhaps colleagues. This participant observation, bred from many months 
in the field, living with those studied, had the advantage of yielding insights 
and knowledge impossible to gain over shorter, more intense periods of 
1  This chapter builds on my paper, ‘Piety, fact and the oral account in native title claims’ (Palmer 
2011a). In order to contextualise my account, I have included some short pieces from this paper 
in this chapter to facilitate presentation of additional materials relevant to the uses of oral tradition in 
native title anthropology.
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fieldwork. It also had the advantage of providing a ready testing ground 
to evaluate statements made by informants. So developed the important 
distinction for anthropology between what people actually do and what 
they say they do. Recording the former requires observation, often over 
a prolonged period of time. Recording of the latter requires only the right 
questions and the opportunity to ask them.
The reality of the situation for native title research is that time and 
resources are unlikely to stretch to permit prolonged periods of time in 
the field. The Native Title Representative Bodies have limited funding 
available for claims. Research has to be focused, intensive and strategically 
organised so as to maximise opportunities for participant observation, 
particularly during visits to the claim area. Other techniques are also 
employed including in-depth interviews and group discussions that may 
produce good field data and, on occasions, copious ethnography. Properly 
documented fieldwork undertaken over a period of several weeks that 
includes return visits and trips to the country of the claim can provide 
a  reliable and detailed account of relevant aspects of the claimants’ 
customary laws, customs, beliefs and practices. This fieldwork method 
relies to at least some considerable extent on oral testimony. It is not 
possible to observe at first hand every reported activity. For anthropologists 
researching a native title claim, then, substantial reliance must then be 
placed on the oral account.
The type of data – establishing continuity
Proof of native title relies upon a relationship being established between 
past customary practice and present practice. The evaluation can then 
be made as to whether there is continuity of laws and custom over time 
and, ideally, since the time of sovereignty. As a consequence, native title 
anthropologists need to ascertain from those with whom they work 
whether a practice or a belief is of some antiquity. Questions that relate to 
identity or the language of a forebear, their place of birth or country and the 
family genealogy are all significant in this process. For an anthropologist 
researching a native title claim it is not possible to observe past events, 
interrogate the asserted identities or genealogical relationships of those 
now long dead. Primary data, in the absence of any archival record, 
must be derived solely from the oral testimony of those who advance the 
propositions today.
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The anthropologist who seeks to provide an expert view as to the continuity 
of customary beliefs, practices, identities and relationships for a native 
title claim has little choice but to place substantial reliance on the oral 
account of claimants. Given the limits imposed on undertaking extensive 
empirical fieldwork, this reliance is somewhat increased. On both counts, 
then, the use of oral tradition in native title proceedings is a significant 
factor in the research process when undertaking a native title inquiry. The 
native title anthropologist needs both to appreciate this fact and ensure 
that his or her use and analyses of oral materials is based on a proper 
appreciation of the nature of the data considered.
Oral tradition, reliability, anthropology 
and the courts
Oral testimony and the court
The bulk of the evidence in any native title claim that goes to trial is 
the oral evidence of the claimants. In addition, affidavits and witness 
statements may be provided to the court as part of the evidentiary process 
and they too usually rely on the oral testimony of the claimants. The use 
of oral testimony is commonplace in many legal proceedings. However, 
witnesses in, say, a criminal or a road traffic accident trial, usually only give 
evidence about the events they actually witnessed (otherwise, it may be 
disallowed). Further, the events witnessed are likely to have occurred not 
long before the trial. This may not be so in a native title trial where people 
are asked about relationships to forebears, language identity and places of 
birth and residence that they have only been told about. Evidence may 
also be given about the antiquity of practices and beliefs based on what 
the witness recalls being told about the matter by parents or grandparents, 
sometimes decades ago. My observation in trials is that counsel for the 
respondent parties may object to some evidence of this sort.2 I also think 
it reasonable to assume that judges make up their own minds as to the 
2  For example, ‘The State discounted the Aboriginal testimony about societal unity at the second 
trial with the broad proposition that “… in the absence of traditional methods of recording social 
history, Aboriginal historical memory is notoriously shallow, infrequently extending beyond two 
generations”. The basis for this contention was not stated and I do not accept it as a global proposition 
which has any part to play in my decision. My assessment of the Aboriginal evidence is based upon 
ordinary processes of inference and assessment of probabilities and credibility that apply to the 
testimony of any witness.’ Sampi v State of Western Australia [2005] FCA 777 [981].
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reliability or weight of the evidence they hear.3 However, the fact remains 
that the proof of native title requires consideration of some issues that 
cannot have been observed by the witness and may rely on an oral recall 
extending back many decades.
The legal problem develops from the jurisprudential principle that 
some forms of testimony may be what is called ‘hearsay’ and cannot be 
afforded the same weight as other evidence and, indeed, may be ruled 
out of consideration altogether by a judge. The ‘hearsay rule’4 prohibits 
most statements made outside a courtroom from being used as evidence 
in court. Thus, oral accounts that rely on statements that report what 
others have said may be judged as constituting hearsay. Oral traditions 
are, by their very nature, dependent upon a verbal transmission over time 
where authority for a belief or practice is usually cited as an ancestor or 
deceased forebear, neither of whom would be available to give evidence. 
Customary Aboriginal systems place heavy reliance on the oral account, 
imputing a gravitas and authority that stems from the very aspect 
that European Australian law finds at fault. According to customary 
Aboriginal principles, the past enunciates authority. Traditional values 
and beliefs transmitted through the oral account are afforded the quality 
of unchallengeable inviolable Law and are often regarded as having a 
sacred quality. Yet, in an Australian courtroom such pronouncements may 
potentially be categorised as ‘hearsay’ and may be challenged.5
This is a thorny legal issue that has exercised the courts and jurists for 
many years now. Peter Gray6 is a distinguished former judge of the Federal 
Court with a long interest in cross-cultural communication, particularly 
in the legal system as it has impacted on Indigenous Australians. Gray 
has provided some helpful insights into the legal background to this 
3  See, for example, ‘However, Mr Nathan’s oral evidence in this proceeding has cast some doubt 
on the reliability of what he recounted to Dr Palmer and, indeed, the reliability of his recollections 
generally. By saying this I mean no disrespect to Mr Nathan: he is clearly held in affectionate and 
important regard by many people inside and outside the claim area and is a Pitta Pitta elder. However, 
his evidence was somewhat confused and contradictory’. In fact, I (Dr Palmer) did not work with 
Mr Nathan but relied on the research conducted by another expert who did. Dempsey on behalf of the 
Bularnu, Waluwarra and Wangkayujuru People v State of Queensland (No. 2) [2014] FCA 528 [261]. 
See also Aplin on behalf of the Waanyi Peoples v State of Queensland [2010] FCA 625 [234]. 
4  Evidence Act 1995, section 59.
5  There are provisions in the Evidence Act that provide exceptions to the rule against hearsay 
evidence with respect to traditional laws and customs (section 72). Robert Blowes SC, pers. comm.
6  Hon. Professor Peter R.A. Gray AM. Now Adjunct Professor, Monash Law School. See www.
monash.edu/law/current-students/resources/course-unit-information/postgraduate/sess-peter-gray 
accessed 26 January 2016.
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issue (2000). Gray noted that the reliability (perhaps ‘truthfulness’) of 
oral accounts was a matter of debate amongst social scientists (ibid., 6). 
In relation to claims made by Indigenous Australians to have rights to 
country, this matter was first examined by Blackburn J in the Gove 
case.7 Gray (ibid., 8) cites his Honour as ruling that ‘No question of 
hearsay is at this stage involved; what is in question is only the personal 
experience and recollection of individuals. The substance of this evidence 
had to be proved, in some manner, as an indispensable preliminary to 
the exposition and understanding of the system of “native title” asserted 
by the plaintiffs’.8 Evidence of a witness was then admissible provided 
he (or she) ‘spoke from his own recollection and experience’. Gray notes 
that the difficulty of some oral accounts being regarded as ‘hearsay’ and 
potentially not admissible was a feature of the Mabo trial.9 The evidence 
included testimony based on what Torres Strait Islanders had been told 
by their forebears and this evidence gave rise to hundreds of objections 
(ibid., 8). Gray observed:
Moynihan J admitted much of this evidence, such as statements made 
by Eddie Mabo’s grandfather relating to boundaries of land, but stated 
that further evidence would be needed for it to be accepted as truth. 
His Honour said:
‘I have little difficulty in accepting that the fact of assertions being made 
by persons other than a witness may be relevant and hence admissible. 
The evidence is not, without more, however necessarily admissible as to 
the truth of the matters asserted.’ (ibid., 8)10
Gray reports that other jurisdictions, notably the Supreme Court of 
Canada, have shown more acceptance of the importance of oral tradition 
as evidence in cases relating to indigenous rights to land (ibid., 6). Gray 
cites Lee J of the Australian Federal Court in Ward v Western Australia,11 
who himself cited a Canadian case. Lee J identified the disadvantage 
faced by Aboriginal people should they not be able to ‘depend upon 
oral histories and accounts, often localised in nature’ and found there 
to be ‘no suggestion of unfairness in a trial process in which Aboriginal 
applicants are permitted to present their case through use of oral histories 
7  Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141.
8  Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141 [153].
9  Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1.
10  Mabo v Queensland [1992] 1 Qd R 78, per Moynihan J [87].
11  Ward on behalf of the Miriuwung and Gajerrong People v Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483.
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and by reference to received knowledge’.12 Gray considered that Lee J’s 
comments might ‘lay the foundation for a more liberal attitude by 
Australian courts to the admissibility of oral records of Aboriginal people’ 
(ibid., 7). 
Some trial judges have shown themselves willing to accommodate oral 
testimony based on what witnesses were told by their grandparents. 
Weinberg J stated in this regard:
Of course what they were told will be hearsay, but it is hearsay of a kind 
that has been readily admitted in native title cases. In Gumana,13 the 
relevant date for sovereignty was 1788, and not 1825. Selway J concluded 
that the evidence tendered by the applicants of genealogies and linguistics 
was sufficient to establish that some of the ancestors of persons who were 
currently claimants were members of Yolngu society in 1788 and, indeed, 
well before then. 
His Honour wrote (at [194]): 
‘Ultimately the evidence of the existence of the relevant Aboriginal 
tradition and custom as at 1788, and of the rights held by the particular 
clans in 1788 and thereafter pursuant to that tradition and custom, is 
based upon evidence derived from what the Yolngu claimants currently 
do and from what they have observed their parents and elders do and 
from what they were told by their parents and elders …’
His Honour continued (at [195]): 
‘As already discussed, there is nothing peculiar or unique about this sort of 
evidence. It is oral evidence of a custom. It is evidence of fact, not opinion. 
To the extent that it consists of what Mr Gumana was told by his father and 
by other old people it constitutes a recognised exception to the rule against 
hearsay.’14
Gray was also cognisant of substantial changes to the Native Title Act 
that did not auger well for the adoption of a more liberal attitude:
The resolution of the relationship between the rules of evidence and 
Aboriginal traditions in Australia will be particularly important now that 
amendments to the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) have come into operation. 
12  Ward on behalf of the Miriuwung and Gajerrong People v Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483 
[504].
13  Gawirrin Gumana v Northern Territory of Australia [No. 2] [2005] FCA 1425.
14 Griffiths v Northern Territory of Australia [2006] FCA 903 [574] to [576].
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These amendments make the rules of evidence applicable to the hearing 
of applications for determination of native title, unless the Court otherwise 
orders. The rules of evidence, so far as applications for determination of 
native title are concerned, are now to be found in the Evidence Act 1995 
(Cth). An introductory note to Chapter 1 of that Act states ‘This Act sets 
out the federal rules of evidence’. The provisions of that Act with respect 
to hearsay are more liberal than the common law rules, but are potentially 
restrictive of any attempt to create new exceptions. Perhaps the solution 
lies in a recognition of oral traditions as a category of real evidence, not 
hearsay at all. (Gray 2000, 9)15
The admissibility or otherwise of evidence is firstly a matter for the 
lawyers who must consider the proper form of the evidence, both of 
the Aboriginal and expert witnesses. Ultimately, the matter if challenged 
is a question for the courts. It is also a matter for the court to decide 
what weight (creditable proof ) to place on the oral evidence. However, 
the questions raised by an evaluation of the reliability of oral tradition, 
recall and evidence based on non-witnessed events are not confined to 
legal proceedings. Anthropologists are also aware of the limitations of the 
oral account and some of the difficulties it raises for understanding and 
making sense of past action.
Professor Sansom and Timber Creek
In the Timber Creek native title determination, Weinberg J16 had cause to 
consider the evidence provided by claimants as oral testimony, as this had 
been the subject of debate between the experts – the author (Dr Palmer, 
called by the applicant) and Professor Sansom (called by a respondent, 
the Northern Territory Government). As I have noted above, his Honour 
was sympathetic to the oral accounts provided by the applicant and 
concluded that reliance on an oral account was not unique to native 
title law. He also found that there was evidence from claims under the 
Aboriginal Land Rights Act (NT) that supported genealogical connection 
with the application area to a period at or about the time of sovereignty. 
His Honour stated that there was ‘Evidence given in the Timber Creek 
Land Claim in 1985, and also in the other land claims involving adjacent 
areas’ (Griffiths FCA 903 [572]) that established ‘a direct connection 
between the claimants, and their direct ancestors’ in relation to the claim 
15  Footnotes excluded.
16  Griffiths v Northern Territory of Australia [2006] FCA 903 (Griffiths).
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area (Griffiths FCA 903 [572]). By this logic, then, the oral account was 
not without support from independent legal findings, notwithstanding 
the fact that these very findings had themselves been founded on oral 
testimony. In addition, based upon the same reasoning, his Honour was 
prepared to accept that there was evidence of a continuity of laws and 
customs (Griffiths FCA 903 [572] to [583]). He therefore concluded 
that ‘It would be wrong, in my view, to approach the issue of connection 
by turning a blind eye to these historical realities’ (Griffiths FCA 903 
[583]). He was able to determine that ‘the rights and interests’ that were 
enjoyed by the forebears of the claimants had ‘passed on through this 
system of descent’. They were rights and interests that were ‘in my view, 
recognised by the common law of Australia, and are therefore properly to 
be characterised as native title’ (Griffiths FCA 903 [584]).
The judge’s comments were in part a response to Professor Sansom’s 
assertion that ‘In the absence of total and reliable outside documentation 
of the history of a local group since sovereignty, it is not possible to say of 
any contemporary local group that it was represented by the antecedents 
of present members in 1825’ (cited in Griffiths FCA 903 [431]). 
His  Honour’s comment was, ‘Of course, if this statement were taken 
literally, no native title claim could ever succeed in the Northern Territory, 
or perhaps in any other part of Australia’ (Griffiths FCA 903 [432]). 
His Honour did accept, however, that Sansom’s opinions regarding some 
‘particular dangers associated with historical recall’ were perhaps relevant 
to the understanding of oral testimony. He cited, by way of example, the 
customary ban on calling the names of the dead, the shallowness of oral 
recall and the practice that ‘proscribes the telling of stories about a person 
or persons that one has never met’ (Griffiths FCA 903 [433]).
These apparent impediments to the free flow of an oral account were, 
I think, not quite what Professor Sansom had in mind when, as the judge 
wrote, Sansom consigned ‘oral history to the periphery’ (Griffiths FCA 
903 [431]). Subsequently, Professor Sansom developed his views regarding 
oral testimony at Timber Creek and elsewhere (2006). In this paper, 
Professor Sansom noted the propensity for judges to place substantial 
reliance on the evidence of the Aboriginal claimants.17 He was of the view 
that such reliance showed a misunderstanding of the nature of the oral 
account. He argued:
17  Citing Sackville in Yulara (FCA [288]) and other related references.
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Of itself, widespread Aboriginal tradition limits recall of traditional 
practice. Emplaced traditions work, furthermore, to eliminate all memory 
of any historical departures from once-established norms. The consequence 
is that credible information about anything but the personally witnessed 
past cannot be rendered up by the Aboriginal testator who has not had 
recourse to records. If proof of the continuity or discontinuity of tradition 
from the time of sovereignty is to be supplied, the court has no choice but 
to rely on those devices for the remembering, preserving or retrieving the 
past that have been imported into Australia since settlement. Proof (if any 
proof there be) is to be gained by recourse to records and/or expert opinion. 
(ibid., 150–151)
Sansom is not alone in his views regarding the shallowness of historical 
recall. Morphy (1993, 236) is of the view that, in Yolngu ontology, 
‘landscape and myth are … machines for the suppression of history’ 
(see also Samson 2006, 153–154). A lack of written history means that 
changes in the groups that occupied country were ‘masked’ (Morphy 
1993, 236). On Groote Eylandt, I collected narratives about migration 
and settlement. These purport to identify members of a third ascending 
generation (for example, a great grandfather), but in fact evoke individuals 
who belong to higher generations, a truth that can be recovered by the use 
of names in the genealogies collected some decades ago, supporting the 
view that the oral account can work to truncate or telescope historical 
events. Chronology is not, however, entirely absent. My experience in 
other areas of Aboriginal Australia supports the view that Aboriginal 
history does reveal some sense of limited depth. I have collected stories 
of Captain Cook in the Victoria River District of the Northern Territory, 
as has Rose (1992, 187–191). These narratives place him in the distant 
past, but not in the primordial Dreaming. Stories of Noah’s Ark, which 
I have collected from the Kimberley, are narratives synthesising customary 
content with Biblical content (Kolig 1980a) while the events related are 
assigned to the Dreaming and an indefinite period in the past. Rose (1992, 
206–207) writes that events within the Dreaming had a chronology, again 
something that I have encountered many times in my own fieldwork. 
While the case for concluding that Aboriginal history is lacking 
chronology is not altogether made out, from an anthropological point 
of view oral accounts are shown sometimes to lack depth and may be 
unreliable. Given that native title requires a demonstration of a continuity 
of social formation, laws, customs and ancestral connection to land that 
spans more than the compass of witnesses’ lived experience, the uses and 
reliability of oral traditions is a significant consideration for native title 
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anthropology. Consequently, for both the court considering a native 
title application as well as for the native title anthropologist, the reliability 
of oral tradition is an important issue. 
In a paper I published in 2011 I have set out a detailed critique of Sansom’s 
position (Palmer 2011a, 272–285). I was of the view that Sansom, while 
identifying some important issues relating to oral tradition, had rather 
thrown ‘the baby out with the bath water’ (ibid., 269). It is one thing 
to understand the context of an oral tradition and exercise care and 
qualification as to how it should be used or interpreted. It is quite another 
to discard Aboriginal oral tradition altogether on the ground that it is 
somehow ‘untrue’, not to be trusted and that sole reliance must be placed 
on ‘records and/or expert opinion’ (Sansom 2006, 151). Some sorts of 
oral tradition that relate to the domain of religious beliefs and practices 
are innately conservative because they are creatures of a fundamentally 
conservative culture. I have argued elsewhere that this conservativism 
works to limit change in oral transmission (Palmer 2011a, 281–284). 
In assessing the validity and veracity of an oral account, these factors that 
work to limit change may be relevant and I discuss some aspects of this 
matter in what follows.
Factors that affect continuity
Conservative societies?
Ronald and Catherine Berndt characterised Aboriginal society prior to 
European settlement as ‘conservative’, although they did note exceptions 
(1988, 492). They considered that this was a consequence of geographic 
isolation, small populations and limited resource exploitation (ibid.). 
The social and religious systems were sustained by rules and sanctions 
that discouraged nonconformity, ‘their members emphasising the 
unchanging quality of life, the importance of tradition, rather than the 
desirability of change as such’ (ibid., 493). The Berndts were writing of 
pre-contact Aboriginal society in the context of an examination of the 
impacts of European settlement and invasion. However, these researchers 
were not alone in understanding Aboriginal society to be innately 
conservative, a feature that endures to the present in at least some areas 
where native title research is currently undertaken. Meggitt, writing of 
the Walbiri of Central Australia, commented that ‘regularity, frequency, 
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efficiency, and propriety are all expressions of normality – behaviour is 
predictable because it should be’ (Meggitt 1962, 253). Walbiri belief was 
then ‘inevitably moral, conservative and circular’ (ibid.). Nor did this 
change fundamentally with the innovations that came with European 
settlement. Rather, while ways of behaving may have changed, the rules 
that govern these changed circumstances ‘have altered little’ (ibid., 254). 
Kolig explains this conservative tendency by reference to what he terms 
‘mental continuity’ (1977, 51), represented in an ‘elaborate ideological 
superstructure’ that could ‘exist undisturbed in their basically traditional 
and highly intellectually oriented milieu’ despite harsh environmental 
conditions and, more latterly, the changes wrought by European 
settlement (ibid.). Morphy sees the beliefs and oral traditions as providing 
fixed and structured forms, where ‘the untrammelled creativity of the 
ancestral beings is lost precisely because they created the world in a form 
that could be passed on from generation to generation as the order of 
the world’ (1995, 189). Theirs were ‘frozen experiences’, left behind to 
be significant to the lives of others (ibid.). For the Yolngu, Morphy was 
of the view that ‘the most conservative part of the system is the totemic 
division of the landscape and certainly in the case of place names there is 
remarkable continuity at least since the 1880s when we first have evidence’ 
(1993, 236).
Myers, writing of the Pintupi of Central Australia, remarked that part of 
the idea of the Dreaming for the Pintupi is that it ‘implies continuity and 
permanence’ (1986, 52). According to this understanding and belief, ‘the 
cosmos has always been as it is and that, indeed, it cannot be different’ 
(ibid., 52–53). Change and alteration is not absent from Pintupi thinking, 
for ‘the evidence of new customs and new cults is unassailable; life is not 
static’ (ibid., 53). However, the Pintupi apply the concept of the Dreaming 
in such as way so as to present the changes as though the experiences of 
them ‘appears to be continuous and permanent’ (ibid., 53). This resonates 
with Morphy’s observation of the Yolngu that while change is all apparent, 
‘the mythic screen that covers landscape makes the relationship appear 
unchanging’ (1995, 204). 
These writers were not arguing for an unchanging society, far less one that 
was incapable of adaptation. The common theme is an appreciation of 
the conservative nature of Aboriginal societies and their inherent stability 
and adherence to the forces of tradition. So, where changes did occur, 
as indeed they must, it was on the understanding that the fundamentals 
of the system had remained intact and only the circumstances or 
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relationships had become modified. The ideology of stasis and a fixedness 
of rules and their determining progenitors could not have been sustained 
in the face of blatant alteration – the ‘mythic screen’ and the appearance 
of an unchanging world had to be based on the conservative and change-
resistant structures that the Berndts first identified. These provided for 
a  stability and continuity of belief and practice such as Sutton noted 
for the Western Desert:
In fact as a basis of tenure interests such knowledge perhaps reaches its 
greatest prominence in that region. The Dreamings (Tjukurrpa) and their 
sites and tracks seem to be the most stable elements of the system, one 
that was demographically porous as individuals came and went over long 
periods. (Sutton 2003, 159)
The Law and the Dreaming
In an earlier chapter of this book, I discussed the Aboriginal metaphysical 
construct of the Dreaming (see Chapter 5). The Dreaming unites past and 
present. It is believed to be the source of all spirituality and supplies an 
explanation and justification for present action, ritual belief and practice. 
The customary way to do things is believed to have been ordained in 
the Dreaming, which is considered to be the spiritual originator and 
perpetuator of consuetudinary practice that comprises the normative 
system. The Dreaming and its constructs are important to native title as 
they provide the legitimation and justification for the view that these ways 
of doing things are unchanging and unchangeable.18 The codification 
of these principles is often enunciated by the use of the English term 
‘Law’, reflecting the jural and mandatory nature of the rules, which 
are understood to be evoked by the use of the term. The choice of the 
Aboriginal English term ‘Law’ reflects the authority of its precepts and 
the imperative that its tenets be obeyed – just as European Australians 
respect and observe Australian law, showing deference for the gravitas that 
its institutions represent and understanding that penalties may apply to 
acts that contravene its regulations and edicts. The Dreaming, and the 
Law it is believed to have engendered and continues to sustain, is a matter 
of high seriousness in customary dealings. These concepts are implicit in 
any understanding of how Aboriginal belief systems operate and both, 
in their separate ways, are a means to emphasise the stability, unchanging 
character and thus the authority of customary belief and practice.
18  Meggitt 1962, 251–252; Myers 1986, 53; Sutton 2003, 83.
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In the Aboriginal cultures with which I am familiar, a key aspect of belief 
and dogma articulated though beliefs in the Dreaming and its mandated 
rules for action is that a person does not meddle with a Dreaming or 
willingly contravene a Law without fear of dire consequences. This is 
not only a matter of fear of human physical reprisal or opprobrium. 
Contravention of Law is a matter for the spirit world. Grave consequences 
will follow, so it is believed, whether there is a human prosecutor or not. 
These strictures apply to accounts of the beings of the Dreaming and 
the names, languages and marks they left behind them and the laws 
and customs they ordained. One example of this is the canonical lists 
of place names that a senior ritual leader may rehearse when discussing 
a narrative string in which a Dreaming protagonist visits numerous places 
in a traverse of country. Such strings and associated adventures may follow 
lines of hills, lakes, coast or a river.19 During the many years I have worked 
in Aboriginal Australia where oral traditions remain vibrant, I have 
collected many such accounts that demonstrate the detailed knowledge 
a person has of country and the activities of the Dreaming beings. I have 
set out one example of this form of oral tradition in a paper I published 
(Palmer 2011a, 282) and there are plenty of additional examples to be 
found in the literature. Narratives, song and ritual performances are all 
subject to the imperatives of the Dreaming and the demands of the Law. 
Thus, correctness of word and action in the rehearsal of these traditions is 
essential. One way whereby people ensure that there can be no suggestion 
of wrong action relating to oral traditions is to make their performance 
and commemoration group activities. This works as a kind of insurance, 
safeguarding practitioners from making mistakes, as well as ensuring that 
all relevant people knew how a particular business had been conducted. 
These oral traditions are practised, then, in the company of others who 
usually have senior status, either in the same country that was being 
celebrated, or in a neighbouring area. 
Individuals are generally unwilling to talk about country without 
others being present to witness the account. These discussions are often 
accompanied by an interplay between individuals, which provide a means 
of ensuring that accounts are correct; that is, consistent with corporate 
memory. In ritual performance, such commensality is a significant feature 
of interactions. Without the presence of others, ritual performance could 
19  See, for example, von Brandenstein (1973, 97) who related such a list collected from the Pilbara 
region of Western Australia.
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not take place. In such an exchange, oral knowledge is not individuated. 
Its presentation is subject to group correction and validation. Performance 
and transmission is regulated by a jural public, ensuring continuity 
of content. Ritual instruction is characterised as vigorous and attention 
is paid to ensuring that an initiate learns fully and correctly. ‘Getting it 
wrong’ is subject to sanction and is not tolerated.
Such a process of oral tradition works toward the maintenance of 
continuity  of accounts and limits the possibility for revisionism 
or innovation. While oral accounts will, inevitably, suffer transmutation 
over time, transformation is not facilitated by the process I have outlined 
here. These examples are, of course, taken from a particular genre of 
customary belief and are more likely than not to be found in ethnographies 
where customary beliefs and practices remain quite vibrant. 
While the texture of Aboriginal belief and practice in such contexts favours 
conservativism over radical transmutation in the oral account, a common 
difficulty arises when oral accounts must provide the basis for claimant 
family history and the related topic of country and language of origin. 
In making inquiry into these matters, the anthropologist may need to seek 
independent verification from other sources, should these be available.
Using oral accounts in native title claims
The task for the native title anthropologist is to comprehend oral tradition 
as a social exchange replete with meaning and bring these understandings 
to both the method employed and the subsequent analysis from which 
expert opinion is derived. For my present purpose I focus on two subjects 
that recur in native title research. The first is oral family histories which 
include genealogical knowledge. The second is what can be broadly 
called ‘oral tradition’, being the compendium of oral accounts relating to 
a forebear’s place of origin, country of affiliation or language group identity. 
These two aspects of the oral account have in common a reliance on 
recall and often involve comments or statements regarding relationships, 
events or customary belief and practice that are remembered as a part 
of a continuing oral tradition. What I seek to explore here is how these 
data can be comprehended in anthropological analysis, making allowance 
for transmutation or other changes to the original. In this way we can 
admit oral accounts to our analysis based on a proper understanding of 
the materials we present and upon which we ultimately rely.
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Genealogies and family history
The fact that genealogies are typically limited in generational depth is 
well documented in Aboriginal Australia (see Barnes 1967, 119; Sansom 
2006, 157–59). Given sole reliance on the oral account, a person generally 
commands knowledge of two or occasionally three ascending generations 
from his or her own. Rarely, unless documentary and archival materials are 
relied upon, will oral recall extend to the great great grandparental generation 
(that is, ego’s FFFF or mmmm20). In some cultures learned canonical listings 
of genealogies are themselves a part of oral tradition21 but this is nowhere 
a feature of Indigenous Australian cultures where genealogical knowledge 
generally extends only as far as ego’s own lived experience or that of his or 
her parents, passed down through the oral account. 
Most of those with whom I have worked in native title inquiries have 
genealogical recall of two ascending generations. If ego is a man or woman 
of middle to late middle age, then it is also likely that they will have 
knowledge of two descending generations. Thus, typically, genealogical 
recall covers five generations, including ego’s own. This means that if 
ego was, say, 70 years old in 2015, and allowing for a gap of between 
20 and 25 years per generation,22 then ego’s grandfather is likely to have 
been born between 1895 and 1900.23 While it may be possible to find 
claimants older than this, it is an unfortunate fact that this is unusual and 
many are younger.
In terms of continuity of ancestral connection, a date of 1895 (allowing 
for the older of the calculated dates) does not match sovereignty anywhere 
on mainland Australia.24 However, in many remote places the frontier 
did not advance much more than two or three decades before this date. 
Prior to this, it might be reasonably inferred, customary systems would 
have remained intact.25 Thus, the date of what I call ‘effective sovereignty’ 
20  Kinship abbreviations are explained in Chapter 9 under the subheading, ‘Some methodological 
and procedural issues’.
21  For example, the Maori whakapapa, recited as part of an oral tradition describing a line of 
descent from ancestors down to the present day.
22  Peterson and Long have calculated an average generation gap for Aboriginal women as 15 years 
minimum and for men 30 years, as men traditionally married later (1986, 149–150).
23  Ego was born in 1945, his father in 1920–25 and his grandfather in 1895–1900.
24  Parts of the Torres Strait have a date of sovereignty as late as 1879 (Queensland Government 
2003, 23).
25  This is accepted by the Queensland Government ‘for the purposes of mediation’ (2003, 5) and 
has been used in a number of native title cases.
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will often be some decades after actual sovereignty. In this reasoning, 
genealogical recall to two ascending generations is useful, if not conclusive, 
to supporting arguments about ancestral connection. 
One way to remedy this shortfall in attaining the date of effective 
sovereignty is to rely on archival genealogical materials in order to trace 
the family tree back several additional generations to the required date. 
I examine some of the practical matters that develop from the use of 
archival materials generally in native title work and the problems and 
difficulties attendant upon this task in Chapter 7 of this book. In Chapter 
9 I examine the uses of genealogies including aspects of what I there term 
‘genealogical truth’. Here I am concerned to explore how genealogical 
accounts recorded by earlier researchers may be brought to bear on the 
oral account of the claimants, which may serve to bring credibility to 
the latter. Alternatively, bringing the oral account to bear on the archival 
account may render the latter more meaningful to the native title inquiry.
There is a range of archival genealogical materials available to researchers 
in native title claims. Two of the most commonly referred to are 
genealogies collected by Daisy Bates and Norman Tindale, although 
there are many others available depending on the location of the research, 
including Radcliffe-Brown, Elkin and Kaberry. Bates’s genealogies 
were collected comparatively early, generally dating to the first decade 
of the last century, although some are later. Radcliffe-Brown collected 
some of his genealogies in company with Daisy Bates and others from 
the Pilbara region in 1911. I have also used Elkin’s genealogies collected 
from the Dampier Peninsula, western Kimberley region, which date from 
the period 1927–28, and Kaberry’s Kimberley genealogies collected in 
the period 1934–36. Norman Tindale’s work is a common source for 
genealogical material. He collected his data somewhat later than Bates, 
although he did take some genealogies as early as 1928 in South Australia 
(at Koonibba Mission) and carried on this work in many places round 
Australia until the 1960s. Some of Tindale’s genealogies are complex, 
tracing back three generations from ego with multiple co-lateral branches 
that can make them difficult to follow. Tindale sometimes complemented 
his genealogical data with social information entered onto cards, as well as 
anthropomorphic measurements.
The archival account may itself present challenges for interpretation 
and should not be uncritically regarded. In this respect, both Bates and 
Tindale present some difficulties. Bates’s genealogies are sometimes hard 
to follow and the meanings of her many annotations are often unexplained 
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while actual relationships are not always apparent (see Palmer 2011a, 
273–274). Bates used Aboriginal personal names for the most part so 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to trace English names to her account 
without the knowledge of claimants who recall those Aboriginal names. 
Tindale’s ‘tribal’ ascriptions make assumptions about how these identities 
were formed and the implications of their use (see Palmer 2009). These 
reservations must be borne in mind when attempting to interpret the 
archival record. While the written account may command a certain 
authority by virtue of its being rendered as text, documentation does not 
mean that it is either unambiguously intelligible or factually correct. Such 
a qualification should be applied to all archival sources. Thus, reliance 
on the archival record is no magic cure for the inaccuracies of reported 
history.26
These archival sources are of no assistance to a native title inquiry unless 
they can be convincingly identified as being the record of a claimant family. 
The archival record will generally cease at the date of its collection and 
without the oral account of the claimants there is often no way of linking 
the written record with claimants today. European names, Aboriginal 
names and sometimes nicknames may all be helpful in identifying the 
forebears of a claimant family in a genealogy. Names of offspring and 
other family members may be helpful in providing some evidence that the 
genealogy in question does indeed have as its subject the claimant family 
being discussed. However, care has to be exercised when common names 
occur in the genealogy, such as ‘Polly’ or ‘Topsy’, lest the name is the sole 
basis for identification and, in fact, the genealogy has no relationship with 
the subject family. Given consistency between the archival document and 
the oral account, the latter, limited though it may be to several ascending 
generations, provides the means to make sense of the archival account. 
Without the informants’ knowledge of their forebears, contained in the 
oral histories, the archival documents would be of no relevance since 
there would be no way to link claimants with those represented in the 
genealogies.
Archival accounts, then, complement and supplement the Aboriginal 
evidence and provide a useful source when trying to reconstruct genealogical 
connection. The data they contain may provide ground for interpretations 
26  See Rose’s (2002) analysis of the use of European texts such as Curr (1883), which she argues 
must be read with caution. I discuss the problems of the use of archival materials elsewhere (see Palmer 
2010a) and examine the issue in greater detail in the following Chapter 7.
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as to people’s country of origin and language-group affiliations, which 
may assist a native title inquiry. The archival evidence supports the oral 
evidence. This does not render the oral account compromised through 
processes of its transmission, but rather recommends it as the logical 
starting point for any genealogical account. The two sources complement 
each other and resolve the problem for native title work which requires 
genealogical knowledge that extends beyond the range of oral recall.
From the point of view of anthropology, the implications of this 
understanding are important as they instruct that identifying native 
title ancestors back as far as the date of sovereignty or even effective 
sovereignty through oral tradition alone is limited to the shallow depth of 
oral genealogical recall. Consequently, it is desirable to subject to analysis 
archival genealogical data where these are available. Consequently, the 
use of genealogical materials collected by earlier researchers provides 
confirmatory data that will support the oral account and may also 
provide a corrective.
History
An oral history account is of the present, notwithstanding the fact that 
it details past events. Since it is of the here and now, it is possible (perhaps 
likely) that it will be influenced by the present, including the context of its 
performance and the objectives of the teller. In a contested environment, 
oral accounts may provide legitimation for pressing a particular suit or 
point of view so their substance is shaped by contemporary aspiration. 
This inherent flexibility of an oral history may eventually result in the 
transmutation of the original ‘fact’. Historian Patrick O’Farrell, in an 
attack on the privileging of oral sources over other data in his discipline, 
was scathing in his criticism of such singular reliance:
The basic problem with oral testimony about the past is that its truth 
(when it is true) is not primarily about what happened or how things 
were, but about how the past has been recollected. That being said –
hardly a startling revelation – at once all the claims made for oral history 
– accuracy, immediacy, reality – come under most serious suspicion, and 
we move straight away into the world of image, selective memory, later 
overlays and utter subjectivity. (O’Farrell 1979, 4)
O’Farrell does not suggest that the oral account of history has no place – 
only that it requires other sources to bolster its incompleteness or provide 
a corrective to the oral testimony, which, being a recollection, is vulnerable 
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to inaccuracy (ibid., 4). This is not to say that such flexibility is conscious 
manipulation or eventual transmutation is deliberate on the part of the 
teller. Views of past events may be held with almost religious conviction by 
claimants in native title claims and expounded to the court with passion.27 
The challenge for a native title anthropologist is how to evaluate the field 
data collected from claimants, taking into account the nature of oral 
tradition. In tackling the likely nature and extent of such, the anthropologist 
is faced with a forensic task, which is commonplace enough. It is reasonable 
to expect the researcher to apply checks and balances to the field data. 
Typically, these may be in the form of archival references, prior accounts 
or other independent contemporary versions of the same set of incidents. 
However, these may not always be available and a good deal of the data we 
collect in the course of our research into native title matters relies on the 
oral account of the claimants, based on their recollections of what they were 
told. This means that at times oral history must stand as the field data and 
the sole basis for an expert view. In these cases the degree of concordance 
in oral accounts may be significant. Unanimity amongst those who relate 
events through an oral history account is an important pointer to its 
possible verity because there is a commonality of recall in the oral memory. 
Methodologically, then, the absence of a dispute relating to an account of 
oral history, provided the field has been thoroughly canvassed, places less 
demand on a need for verification, although where this can be supplied the 
oral account will have greater weight. This does not mean that uncontested 
oral histories are uncritically accepted, but it does mean that they should be 
subject to different methodological procedures than those that are clearly in 
contention between claimants or claimants and respondents. In cases where 
there is a contest between Aboriginal parties, inconsistent accounts may 
flag changes or ruptures to the oral history. Disagreement may be a sign of 
error in one of the accounts. Assessing which is most probably wrong can 
only be done in conjunction with the other tools outlined here – archival 
documents and prior statements.
In practice the application of these methodological principles may be 
accompanied by some pain when there is contestation between Indigenous 
participants. Potentially, then, the anthropologist will be required to give 
an opinion as to the validity or otherwise of an oral history, which may be 
27  See Sutton 2017 for examples and analyses of innovation in an oral account.
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uncomfortable in a public hearing. Discomfort will not only develop from 
those whose views are brought into question, but may also be subject to 
criticism by the courts if the process followed is not properly understood.
Commonly in native title matters the question at issue will relate 
to avowed facts given as oral history that might provide evidence of 
connection to the claim area or rights in it of a particular person. Such 
facts might relate to the asserted place of birth of an individual, typically 
an ancestor of a set of claimants or those represented by an Indigenous 
respondent. More generally they might relate to an individual’s country 
or place of origin or affiliation. Common, too, are claims relating to 
an ancestor’s language group identity, which in turn is identified with 
particular parts of an application area. Evidence relating to such matters 
is often adduced in court in the form of statements like ‘I was always told 
this was so by the old people’ or ‘I’ve always known this was so. It was just 
something we were always brought up to know’. This is common in field 
data too – there being no authority greater than the oral tradition carried 
by remembered forebears. Where these assertions are advocated by the 
applicant, the anthropologist may be asked whether there is documentary 
evidence to support the contention, this usually being done in the expert 
report. Where these assertions are challenged, the means to support such 
a challenge is also likely to rely on one or more independent evidentiary 
items that can be argued to call the oral account into question. In short 
it is not uncommon in my experience for an assertion that relies on oral 
history to be subject to scrutiny by the anthropologist whether supported 
or brought into question, so permitting the court to evaluate the weight 
that might be placed on the oral evidence.
While documentary evidence that might illuminate the validity of oral 
history is not always available, where it is it is likely to comprise three 
broad categories of materials: archival documents; prior statements 
made in previous native title or land rights claims; and the comments, 
views and perhaps testimony of others. Each brings its own particular 
problems, and the path to validation or testing oral history is strewn with 
obstacles and potholes for the unwary.
Archival documents typically include birth, marriage and death certificates, 
Native Welfare reports or records and the genealogies collected by earlier 
researchers where these included comments or annotations relevant to 
the matter in question. With respect to the last-named source, Tindale 
is of particular note since he was in the habit of annotating his personal 
names with a language group designation and sometimes a place name. 
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The specific problems relating to the use of these documents is a matter 
I address in the following chapter of this book, so I will not dwell on it 
here. I note only that interpreting these documents is often a challenge 
and while they have the authority of the written word, this does not mean 
they are necessarily accurate.
The surrounding noise
It is sometimes the case that Indigenous claimants or respondents have 
been involved in court hearings relating to land claims made under state 
or territory Acts. These include claims heard under the Aboriginal Land 
Rights Act (NT) or state Acts like the Queensland Aboriginal Land Act 
(1991). There are also cases where claimants or Indigenous respondents 
have featured in earlier native title claims. The transcripts of these and the 
reports of commissioners and the determinations of judges may contain 
evidence relevant to an oral account offered up in a later case. The Bularnu, 
Waluwarra and Wangkayujuru native title claim in which I was involved28 
illustrates the use of evidence and findings of a prior court case, as well as 
the role that the competing claims of Indigenous testators may have in the 
evaluation of the oral traditions upon which the evidence is based. 
In the Bularnu, Waluwarra and Wangkayujuru claim, the applicant had 
rejected the inclusion of the descendants of a woman known as Bunny or 
Bonny. The family in question, descendants of Bunny, sought and were 
granted leave to be joined as respondent to the claim. The Indigenous 
respondent, who was self-represented, asserted that her ancestor held 
rights to and affiliations with country and language identified with the 
application area. The experts in the case had identified for the court 
that the same ancestor had featured in an earlier claim made under the 
Queensland Aboriginal Land Act.29 The commissioners who adjudicated 
the claim determined both the language group name and the country 
of affiliation of Bunny and her descendants (Land Tribunal, Queensland 
1994, para 380). This was different to that now pressed by the respondent. 
The findings of this prior inquiry were a significant factor in the experts’ 
evaluation of the conflicting oral accounts gained from the claimants and 
the Indigenous respondent.
28  Dempsey on behalf of the Bularnu, Waluwarra and Wangkayujuru People v State of Queensland 
(No. 2) [2014] FCA 528 (Dempsey).
29  Dempsey, [311].
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The native title trial judge, Mortimer J, noted the findings of the 
commissioners at some length.30 Her Honour went on to rule that 
she was not ‘satisfied on the balance of probabilities that Bunny Craigie 
[the ancestor in question] had rights and interests acquired through 
traditional law and custom in the land around Roxborough within the 
claim area’.31 Her Honour was of the view that the ‘most likely hypothesis 
on the evidence as it is before the Court’ was that the ancestor in question 
belonged to a language group and had affiliation to country well to the 
south of the claim area, but that lack of evidence meant that her place of 
birth could not be determined.32 The ‘hypothesis’ was drawn from the 
findings of the hearing held under the Queensland Aboriginal Land Act 
and the reports of the experts who had evaluated these and other archival 
materials. The ‘hypothesis’ was in accord with the opinions advanced by 
the experts and was also based on the evidence provided to a former land 
claim hearing that had been subject to analysis by these experts.33
During the trial the Indigenous respondent’s witnesses had given evidence 
that Bunny was born in or came from the claim area34 while some additional 
evidence was either unclear or contradictory.35 The applicant submitted 
that Bunny ‘was not a person who was, under traditional law and custom, 
capable of transmitting rights in Wangkayujuru country’.36 The applicant 
argued that her country was likely to have been south of the claim area, 
although its location was, according to the experts’ views, uncertain.37 
The state submitted that Bunny probably did not have traditional country 
in the claim area,38 noting ‘the general absence of any evidence by the 
claimants about Bunny’s connection to the claim area’.39
My assessment of the oral tradition that supported these contradictory 
propositions had situated them in the context of other materials I had 
considered as relevant, including the findings under the Aboriginal 
30  Dempsey, [311], [319] to [336].
31  ibid., [844].
32  ibid., [848].
33  ibid., [849].
34  For example, QUD6115/98 24.10.13 p. 405 Rhonda Pagura, xxn Mr Blowes SC; p. 457 
Ms Bogdanek, xn Ms Bogdanek; 29.10.13, p. 885, Alfred Nathan, fxxn Mr Blowes SC.
35  Dempsey, [266], [778].
36  ibid., [776].
37  ibid., [778] to [780].
38  ibid., [786].
39  ibid., [787].
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Land Act and the family’s former espousing of a language identity at odds 
with that advanced in this trial. I called this (too cryptically perhaps) 
‘surrounding noise’. I told the court:
So, assessing the data as best I can in relation to these disciplinary 
notions which flow from my understanding of how the world works as 
an anthropologist, I then have to look around me at the surrounding 
noise, if you like, that’s been generated about the Craigie family over the 
years. And there’s no doubt that within the evidence, or the data which 
has been presented, there are points of variation about the origin of – of 
the ancestor including from the family itself who has strongly in the past 
espoused a Wangkamadhla language identity. 40
My consideration of the oral account was then informed by the land 
claim case. My conclusions, like that of the judge, admitted prior 
documentation  to my conclusion that Bunny was probably not in 
command of any part of the claim area according to the customary 
system in operation. Despite this consensus, I was criticised by the 
judge for my evaluation of the oral account that was advanced by the 
Indigenous respondent. I had found that presented by the applicants 
more convincing. The judge wrote that in weighing the data available 
to me I was demanding that the respondent and her witnesses should 
be ‘held to a higher standard’ than, presumably (although this is not 
made clear), the other witnesses, particularly those for the applicant. 
Moreover, with respect to my apparent non-acceptance of the evidence 
from the respondents that Bunny was born at Roxborough (as opposed to 
‘information sourced to the applicant’s witnesses’) that this was ‘difficult 
to explain other than by some kind of unstated preference’ for it as being 
‘inherently more reliable’.41 My ‘inexplicable reluctance on this issue’ and 
my unwillingness to accept the verity of the oral histories presented by the 
respondent and her witness, so her Honour concluded, ‘undermine[d] 
the weight I am prepared to give to his opinion about where Bunny may 
have been “from”, or, indeed, where she may have been born. I give more 
weight to other sources.’42
40 Dempsey on behalf of the Bularnu, Waluwarra and Wangkayujuru People v State of Queensland (No. 
2) [2014] FCA 528 [819].
41  Dempsey, [820].
42  ibid., [821].
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The lesson to be drawn from this less than mild rebuke is to make it clear 
how we evaluate differing and contradicting oral accounts. The conclusions 
I  had drawn were not those that favoured one sort of field data over 
another,  nor was I egregiously inclined to doubt the sincerity of the 
statements made by the respondent, as her Honour suggested.43 Rather, 
they were conclusions that evaluated the oral account within the context 
of prior materials and (in this case) evidence given before a judicial body. 
This was not a matter of any appraisal of individual witnesses and their 
characters. I was speaking of an assessment of oral history in relation to 
the additional materials considered which threw doubt on the reliability of 
the oral history of the respondent. It was a matter of anthropological analysis 
of these materials taken together, rather than some unstated preference to 
believe one set of persons rather than another. Evidently, I did not explain 
this process with sufficient clarity at the time. It highlights a fundamental 
difference between the legal and anthropological process: the former deals 
with proofs and standards of proof; the latter with the comprehension 
of social process and how this is represented by protagonists. As I noted 
above, Mortimer J found against the claims of the respondent, a judgment 
that was consistent with my expert evidence and the other materials I and 
the other experts had considered.
Native title research and oral tradition
In this chapter I have shown that the conservativeness and continuity 
in customary Aboriginal belief and practice, encapsulated in the Law 
and the Dreaming, works to limit change through oral tradition. The 
innate conservative nature of Aboriginal societies is a quality found 
across many areas of Aboriginal Australia. This includes those that are 
sometimes regarded as being situated in ‘settled Australia’ – parts of 
southeast Queensland, the southwest of Western Australia, to name 
but two. Consequently, oral traditions can be argued to exhibit in their 
telling compliance with a system of belief and action that militates against 
too much change. In native title this understanding may prove helpful 
when considering the degree to which contemporary beliefs and practices 
represent past observance and credo. When claimants have told me 
that a belief or practice has ‘always’ been a part of their culture, or that 
43  ibid., [819].
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a connection to land can be traced to ancestors beyond reckoning because 
that is what the ‘old people’ told them, I think these comments should be 
given some credibility, unless, of course, there are grounds for concluding 
otherwise. 
Oral testimony is central to any native title case, whether it be the oral 
evidence of the claimants as given to the court or their written affidavits. 
When provided to the court, these accounts can be subjected to mechanisms 
to test their reliability. During a trial this generally takes the form of 
cross-examination, questions from the judge and an assessment of the 
consistency of accounts across the witnesses. Given that an anthropologist 
relies on data provided by claimants as oral accounts when writing his or 
her report, they, too, should assess the reliability of the spoken account. 
An appreciation of the limitations of Aboriginal oral tradition is an 
important quality of good native title research. Oral accounts relating to 
genealogical relationships or an ancestor’s identity and country can be 
tested against archival materials or the findings of prior claims, where 
these are available. Claims that ‘this is our country, from the old people, 
that’s what we were always told’ or that a particular observance was 
‘always’ a part of customary practice because this is what ‘the old people’ 
had said, which are common in native title research, can be tested against 
early ethnographic accounts – again, where these are available. However, 
in those instances where authenticating materials are unavailable or their 
usefulness is limited by the circumstances, methodologies or prejudices 
of their collection, an oral account constitutes the data upon which we 
must found our anthropological view. This may not be a problem for the 
court, given consistency in the accounts and general agreement between 
Indigenous witnesses. The issues that develop from unsubstantiated oral 
accounts are exacerbated and become extremely vexed in circumstances 
when there is a dispute between Indigenous parties to a native title claim, 
resulting in a stark difference of opinion and contradictory testimony. 
It seems to me very likely that such disputes will not lessen in time and the 
difficulties of competing oral histories will exercise the anthropologists as 
well as the court with increasing frequency. This argues for a more rigorous 
application of testing and verification of the oral account and, perhaps, 





Early texts and other sources
Introduction
In order to demonstrate that native title has survived, the court will require 
that the laws and customs of the claimant society be shown not only 
to have survived substantially uninterrupted but also to have remained 
‘traditional’1 in their content. What exactly is to be understood by the use 
of the term ‘traditional’ has been subject to extensive debate.2 Most, if not 
all, of the ethnography relevant to a native title inquiry will demonstrate the 
fact of some form of change. This is unsurprising since few anthropologists 
would argue for an unchanging society. It is the degree and measure of the 
change against customary systems that is subject to contestation. In short, 
1  ‘A traditional law or custom is one which has been passed from generation to generation of 
a society, usually by word of mouth and common practice. But in the context of the Native Title Act, 
“traditional” carries with it two other elements in its meaning. First, it conveys an understanding of 
the age of the traditions: the origins of the content of the law or custom concerned are to be found 
in the normative rules of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander societies that existed before the 
assertion of sovereignty by the British Crown. It is only those normative rules that are “traditional” 
laws and customs. 
Second, and no less important, the reference to rights or interests in land or waters being possessed 
under traditional laws acknowledged and traditional customs observed by the peoples concerned, 
requires that the normative system under which the rights and interests are possessed (the traditional 
laws and customs) is a system that has had a continuous existence and vitality since sovereignty. If that 
normative system has not existed throughout that period, the rights and interests which owe their 
existence to that system will have ceased to exist. And any later attempt to revive adherence to the 
tenets of that former system cannot and will not reconstitute the traditional laws and customs out of 
which rights and interests must spring if they are to fall within the definition of native title.’ Members 
of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422 [46–47].
2  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422 [63–65, 78–86].
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How much change is too much change for the court to decide that the 
law or custom in question is still ‘traditional’? Setting this thorny issue 
to one side, generally, the anthropologist’s task is to provide an opinion 
as to whether the laws and customs of the claimant society can be shown 
to have endured mostly intact or at least clearly developed from those 
customary practices likely to have characterised the society at the time 
of  sovereignty. The duration of this continuity is that period from the 
date of sovereignty by the British Crown over the application area to 
the present. The date of sovereignty varies across Australia but can be as 
far back as 1788. One state at least has accepted that laws and customs are 
likely to have changed little between the date of legal sovereignty and the 
date of the settlement of the land by Europeans (Queensland Government 
2003, 5). Such acceptance of a difference between legal sovereignty and 
what I term ‘effective sovereignty’ is helpful in that it advances the date, 
sometimes by many decades, of that time judged to be the benchmark 
of the incidence of a customary system. 
Early texts and later difficulties
Reconstruction of an ethnography from early texts (sometimes labelled 
as a ‘sovereignty report’) can provide a basis for assessing how much the 
contemporary claimant society has changed. Thus, contemporary laws 
and customs can be compared with those recorded at some earlier time 
– perhaps relatively close to sovereignty. If the accounts are congruent, 
at least to some extent or in relation to some laws and practices, this 
may provide support for the conclusion that enough of the society’s laws 
and customs have survived to enable the court to recognise the existence 
of native title. The laws and customs can then be said to be ‘radicular’; 
that is, they are rooted in or founded upon consuetude or the customary 
ways that things were done or beliefs held at or about sovereignty.3 This 
‘before and after’ equation and the legal calculations and judgments made 
in this regard are complex and sometimes obscure and are not a matter for 
anthropology or anthropologists. But, however regarded, the examination 
of the foundation ethnography remains a central component in the native 
title process.
3  ‘For the reasons given earlier, “traditional” does not mean only that which is transferred by word 
of mouth from generation to generation, it reflects the fundamental nature of the native title rights 
and interests with which the Act deals as rights and interests rooted in pre-sovereignty traditional laws 
and customs.’ Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria [2002] HCA 58 [79].
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Establishing the likely system of laws and customs relevant to claimants 
is hedged about with many difficulties. One of the reasons for this is that 
the quality and reliability of the early accounts is immensely variable. 
The manner whereby the data were collected, the selectivity exercised by 
those who did so, their preoccupations, predilections and perhaps, most 
importantly, their prejudices and assumptions, make the data difficult 
to judge in terms of its overall reliability. Many of the early accounts 
are impossible to assess with respect to specific issues that might affect 
their reliability because there is no account of the collectors, or of their 
preoccupations, assumptions and prejudices. 
Generally, there are no ethnographic records dating from a time prior to 
the date of effective sovereignty. Consequently, the only way to proceed 
is to extrapolate and make an inference back in time from the records of 
early colonial writers. These include diarists and settlers or correspondents 
who provided data from the frontier to collectors such as Curr and 
Howitt. The reports from the Cambridge expedition to the Torres Strait 
(1898–99) provide one of the earliest sources of ethnography, although 
Haddon first undertook scientific research in the region in 1888 (Haddon 
1901–35; also Haddon 1890). In the absence of early writers, later writers 
have to be relied upon. These may comprise representatives of some of the 
first professional anthropologists who collected ethnographic accounts in 
Australia, often dating from the late 1920s on. However, there are earlier 
accounts by professional researchers. Radcliffe-Brown, for example, 
collected Australian materials at the very beginning of the second decade 
of the twentieth century.
The materials drawn from Radcliffe-Brown, Kaberry and others reviewed 
in Chapter 3 serve two purposes. First, they demonstrate how early texts 
may be used to characterise customary systems. These can then be used for 
comparative purposes as a basis for expert opinions as to the continuity 
of systems of title to property. Data sourced from early texts have evident 
limitations, as the discussion in Chapter 3 illustrates. The material drawn 
from Radcliffe-Brown shows that his account lacked detail, was evidently 
incomplete and relied upon assumptions that have subsequently been 
shown to be defective. Consequently, the use of comparative ethnography 
must be a process subject to qualification and extrapolated by reference 
to other ethnographies that might provide a corrective to what (in terms 
of customary tenure) might now be regarded as the anthropological 
orthodoxy. A further limitation relates to applicability. Early, reliable, 
professional and relevant fieldwork was carried out in relatively few 
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locations. For areas where pertinent early ethnography is lacking, reliance 
must be placed on materials drawn from elsewhere to provide the basis 
for the expert view as to the perdurance of customary systems. Aboriginal 
societies were not all the same across the continent, although there were 
many similarities and commonalities. Given that there is likely to have 
been some variation across Aboriginal Australia, selection of material for 
comparison has to be undertaken with a view as to its defensibility on 
grounds of relevance to the area of the inquiry. For example, ethnographies 
of desert areas (e.g. Cane 2002; Myers 1986) are probably less defensible 
if applied to areas of coastal tropical country than if they are used for 
native title inquiries that relate to the more arid parts of Australia. The 
same would hold true for ethnographies of tropical or coastal areas that 
were used for comparative purposes for claims made in arid Australia. 
However, the researcher may have little choice if material is not readily 
available for the study area.
Earliest is best?
Joseph Birdsell, whose collaboration with Norman Tindale extended from 
1938 for nearly 50 years, was of the view that after 1930 there were only two 
small areas of Australia that were untouched by ‘the expanding frontier of 
colonial occupancy’ that converted ‘the Aborigines into dependent, second 
class human beings’ (1970, 115). Consequently, he dismissed the accounts 
of anthropologists studying Aboriginal Australian local organisation whose 
data were collected after 1930. A similar argument was made by Basil 
Sansom who argued that at least some later texts reflected post-sovereignty 
changes and no longer mirrored the system likely to have been found at the 
time of either sovereignty or effective sovereignty (2007, 74). He argued 
in relation to the Yulara case4 that when judging early texts the rule was 
‘earliest sources are best’ (ibid., 79). He then catalogued what he judged to 
be a ‘formidable’ list of ‘authorities’ who were ‘pioneer scholars of Western 
Desert ethnography’ whose findings allegedly contradicted the applicants’ 
position, as advanced by their expert anthropologist Peter Sutton (ibid., 
74). It seems the judge preferred the ‘formidable authorities’ rather than 
the applicant’s evidence, a fact that Sansom suggests may have been a 
determining factor in the failure of the claim.5
4  A claim made for compensation under the Native Title Act in relation to the Yulara area (Ayres 
Rock) of Central Australia. The case is often referred to as ‘Yulara’ after the area involved or ‘Jango’ 
after the name of the application. See Jango v Northern Territory of Australia (2006) 152 FCR 150.
5  Jango v Northern Territory of Australia [2006] FCA 318, [11(2)]; [223] to [224]; [258] to [259] 
and [499].
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The ensuing anthropological debate (e.g. Burke 2007, 164; Glaskin 2007; 
Sackett 2007) showed that the interpretation of the pioneer scholars was 
not quite as straightforward as has been suggested (e.g. Glaskin 2007, 
167; Sackett 2007, 173–175; Sutton 2015). It was argued that earlier 
writers were not answering native title questions or necessarily addressing 
issues that are now of significance to an adjudication of native title. 
While earlier accounts were written closer in time to the way things 
were at sovereignty, their authors may have been at some distance from 
the culture and world view of those they studied. As time has passed, 
the accumulated findings of scholars of Aboriginal Australia has added 
enormously to our understanding of laws, cultural practices and 
systems. Comprehension of systems of land ownership, for example, has 
become more sophisticated as concepts have broadened and research 
data has become more comprehensive. Judging early texts must, then, 
be undertaken with due regard not only to their relative position in 
the time-line between sovereignty and the present, but also in terms of the 
then prevailing orthodoxy these authors then embraced (perhaps quite 
uncritically), the inconsistencies in their accounts and the amount of field 
data they actually collected. Overall, applying these and other qualifiers to 
ethnography renders simple rules like ‘earliest sources are best’ particularly 
unhelpful and subverts the fundamental methodological rules: exercise 
caution, recognise context and take due account of the likely paradigms, 
assumptions and preconceptions of the author.
Using early texts
In a paper I wrote that examined aspects and associated problems 
in relation to the use of early texts, I provided three examples of 
ethnography used in  native title contexts (Palmer 2010a). I showed 
through my examination of these examples some of the difficulties and 
considerations that needed to be kept in mind when reconstructing 
foundation ethnography for native title reports. These case studies were 
drawn from a range of  materials: accounts of the early settlers in the 
Swan Valley in Western Australia, Daisy Bates’s materials collected from 
Eucla on the Western Australian–South Australian border and Elkin’s 
account of totemism that was the product of his fieldwork in the west 
Kimberley. I found that it was  the  preconceptions of the writers that 
were largely determinative of their analyses, rather than the quality of 
their data or the collectors’ proximity to effective sovereignty. So, while 
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the earliest account was in fact the most helpful in outlining aspects of 
the foundation  ethnography, this was largely due to the fact that the 
recorder and author called it as he saw it (Palmer 2010a, 89–90). Most 
importantly, I was also of the view that the lesson to be learnt from 
any reconstruction founded on early texts is that it is best understood 
as provisional, interpretative and in some circumstances speculative. It is 
usually not possible to render an account of the foundation ethnography 
as an unqualified representation of the laws and customs of the claimant 
society at sovereignty.
In order to explore these issues further, I now examine the work of two 
researchers whose writing and field data are sometimes used in native title 
research. The first is the anthropologist Phyllis Kaberry, who was one of 
Elkin’s students and who worked in the Kimberley region of Western 
Australia in the period 1934 to 1936. The second is Norman Tindale, 
who is frequently cited in native title research as a consequence of his 
extensive fieldwork in many different areas of Australia over a period 
of many decades. Tindale has provided extensive genealogical accounts 
relevant to many areas of Australia, as well as ethnographic observations 
on a wide range of customary practices. As I will show in the latter part 
of this chapter, Tindale’s ‘tribal’ legacy is not always easy to accommodate 
in native title matters. I delay a consideration of Tindale’s genealogical 
records and their attendant problems for a later chapter of this book 
(see Chapter 9).
It is important to remember that when researching a native title claim 
it would be unusual to rely on just one early source. So, for example, in 
the case of the Kaberry materials considered below, a number of other 
researchers also produced data relevant to the central and south-eastern 
Kimberley region, including R.H. Mathews, Daisy Bates, Elkin, Tindale 
as well as the linguists Arthur Capell and more recently Tasaku Tsunoda. 
A good native title report would consult all the sources available and 
provide an indication of the likely foundation ethnography based on 
a synthesis of the materials considered. Moreover, in cases where there was 
an apparent inconsistency between the accounts of different authorities, 
these would need to be fully canvassed and, to the extent that it was 
possible, reconciled.6
6  In Jango this was an important point as the applicant’s anthropologist, Professor Sutton, advanced 
a different model of land ownership than Tindale had done based in part on his fieldwork undertaken 
in 1933. Jango v Northern Territory of Australia [2006] FCA 318 [476]. See also Sutton 2015.
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Phyllis Kaberry
Phyllis Kaberry made a significant contribution to the development of 
modern Australian Aboriginal anthropology. She carried out in-depth 
research over a period of many months as a participant with, and observer 
of, those with whom she worked. She subjected her data to the theoretical 
lens that developed a view as to the role of women in Aboriginal society, 
their relationships to men and their status as individuals. In this she 
sought to provide a corrective to male scholars, including Malinowski, 
Roheim and Warner, who had argued that women were excluded from 
the religious life (Toussaint 2004, xiii). In this, then, Kaberry advanced 
our understandings of Aboriginal society in general and of the role of 
women in it in particular.
Kaberry carried out her fieldwork in the Kimberley region in 1934 and 
then again in 1935 to 1936 (Kaberry 1939, xix).7 Her first field trip 
included visits to Forrest River (four months), Wyndham and Beagle Bay 
in the west Kimberley (ibid.). In the following year she spent six months 
with a number of different groups in the east and central Kimberley 
(ibid., xix). 
Kaberry observed that those with whom she worked had been in 
contact with Europeans ‘for over forty years’ (ibid., xx). However, all 
the older women with whom she worked would have been born prior to 
European settlement of the region, and some may have spent periods of 
their young adulthood in pre-contact conditions. While Kaberry wrote 
as though the beliefs and customs she recorded were a part of current 
practice (ibid., 215), she did report that working on pastoral properties 
had resulted in some changes to ‘timetables’ (ibid., 246, footnote 1), that 
European goods had changed the availability of traded items (ibid., 166, 
170) and that there was greater freedom of choice over marriage partners 
than in pre-contact times (ibid., 111). While the impact of European 
settlement and the imposition of European ways was not a matter that 
Kaberry specifically addressed, her account stands as the best we have of 
7  Kaberry’s 1939 publication Aboriginal women: sacred and profane was republished in 2004. 
It is, for the most part, a facsimile edition (see Toussaint 2004, xv, footnote 5). However, the page 
numbering of the Prefaces, Foreword and Introduction are different to the first edition, while 
the balance of the page numbering appears to be the same. I here cite the work as ‘Kaberry 1939’, 
but the page references are to the 2004 edition, which is the one I used.
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the likely composition of pre-contact cultural practices for this region. 
It is, then, a useful and indeed essential starting point for foundation 
ethnography for the east and central Kimberley.8
Reading Kaberry’s published and unpublished works allows aspects of 
the laws and customs of those with whom she worked to be described. 
The fact that she had worked closely with those who had lived in 
pre-contact times, as well as her scholarly credentials, provides a sound 
basis for advancing the argument that her accounts are a reliable source 
for determining the nature of those laws and customs relevant to a native 
title inquiry. For the purposes of this account, these can be summarised 
as comprising data that reveal the significance of language and identity, 
customary systems of rights to country, social organisation, governance, 
religious beliefs and practices, and totemism. These may not necessarily 
be found as individual chapters or papers in Kaberry’s corpus as these 
are headings useful for a native title report and not necessarily a focus 
of her anthropology. Consequently, it is necessary to work through 
Kaberry’s published and (if available) her unpublished materials to garner 
data relevant to the topics selected for consideration. In what follows 
I examine Kaberry’s account of the first of these topics (‘tribes’; language 
and identity) in order to provide a working example of the sorts of content 
that might be useful when drafting foundation ethnography, as well as the 
conclusions and possible conundrums that might be drawn from it.
Kaberry on ‘tribes’ and language groups
Kaberry uses the term ‘tribe’ throughout her writing, apparently regarding 
it as a term of some utility for the numerous language groups present 
in the areas wherein she worked: Lunga (or Kidja), Djaru, Walmanjari 
(Wolmeri), Kunian, Malngin and Nyikina being some of the ones that 
figure in her accounts. She defined the tribe as ‘a territorial, linguistic, 
and cultural unit’ (1939, 184) but qualified the definition by adding that 
‘affinities with neighbouring people are recognised to exist in language, 
kinship, totemism and local organisation’ (ibid.). Thus, its integrity as 
a unit was, by this account, limited to matters of territory. Consistent with 
this view, Kaberry published a ‘language map’ in an article (1937, 94) 
showing her understanding of how the speakers of different languages 
were distributed across the landscape. Kaberry’s field data did not reveal 
8  Toussaint notes that Kaberry has been used in ‘several Kimberley native title claims’ and has been 
important as providing a ‘contextual threshold on how rights in land existed in the past’ (2004, xiv).
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that the ‘tribe’ had any political structure (Kaberry 1939, 178), which 
calls into question how it was in any sense a corporate land-holding body. 
Kaberry’s anthropology had not at this date benefitted from the work of 
later writers who understood the local group to be the territorial unit – 
although members of local groups spoke and identified with a principal 
language and as a consequence the country wherein they exercised rights 
was also identified with that language (see discussion in Chapter 2).
Kaberry considered that ‘tribal’ areas were bounded, but noted that 
knowledge of these boundaries was the inverse of distance (1937, 92). 
However, she also found that the names of these ‘territorial units’ varied 
and were not exclusive. Names used appeared sometimes to depend upon 
the identity of the speaker. In this regard she wrote:
Many of the tribes are known by two or more names. The Wolmeri of 
Christmas Creek are called Wolmadjer by the Nyul-Nyul and Kunian; 
the Mulbera are also called Wandjira, and the Waneiga of Tanami are 
called the Ngambudjugara. The general term for the tribe at Moola Bulla 
is Lunga, whilst the alternative– Kidja– is more frequently heard at Violet 
Valley and Bedford, ninety miles to the north. The Punaba on the west, 
and the Djaru on the east, sometimes refer to the Lunga as Burnana 
or Baiambal. The Lunga themselves often say: ‘We got him Djerag’ 
translated as ‘We got him language.’… Finally, the Kidja word ‘to talk’ is 
djerag. With tribal egoism they identify their own language with language 
in general. (ibid., 92)
Despite Kaberry’s resolution of the origins of the term Djerag, she was 
unable with confidence to articulate the difference between Djerag, 
Kidja, Lunga and Kuluwarin (see McGregor 1988, 97), except to imply, 
perhaps, that they were all dialects of Kidja. 
Now Professor Elkin has referred to the tribe at Turkey Creek and to the 
north of it as the Djerag, and from evidence I collected I am inclined 
to think that it is only a dialect of the Lunga. The Kidja at Bedford said 
that the natives at Violet Valley and Turkey Creek spoke Djerag, and that 
Djerag, Kidja, and Lunga ‘all box up together.’ Actually Violet Valley and 
Turkey Creek are strongholds of the Kidja natives. Again, the Ivanhoe 
natives to the east told me that at Alice Downs, Lyssadel and at Goose Hill 
(just out of Wyndham) the natives spoke Djerag or Kuluwarin. I collected 
genealogies from Kuluwarin men and women at Ivanhoe, and the kinship 
terms and totems were all Kidja words. (Kaberry 1937, 92)
Kaberry also recorded that sometimes a single name ‘embraces a group 
of tribes’ (ibid., 93).
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Kaberry was interested to understand how the Aboriginal people with 
whom she worked understood language difference. While some languages 
were regarded as being similar or mutually intelligible, in other cases 
she found there to be a substantial difference between language groups. 
She thought that this might have been based on the degree of intelligibility 
(or lack of intelligibility) of their respective languages. In this regard she 
wrote in a paper:
The Blacks themselves tend to group certain languages together. The 
Lunga at Moola Bulla say of the Djaru language: ‘We talk-talk him little 
bit, we “hear” him,’ using ‘hear’ more or less as a synonym for ‘understand.’ 
Even when they cannot speak the language, they can sometimes understand 
the gist of what is being said at an intertribal meeting. Speaking of more 
distantly situated tribes the Lunga declare with finality: ‘We can’t hear 
him.’ Probably the chief factors there are contiguity and familiarity, due 
both to intermarriage and frequent meetings for initiation rites. (ibid., 91)
However, Kaberry found that ‘contiguity’ (that is, being in contact or 
proximate) was not always a determinant of mutual intelligibility between 
members of neighbouring language groups:
But there are at least two examples of neighbouring tribes who both 
recognize a complete cleavage between their respective languages. This is 
true of the Lunga or Kidja tribe which extends from Moola Bulla north to 
the east side of the Durack Range and of the Wula tribe, whose territory 
extends from the western side of the Durack Range out towards the coast 
north of the Leopolds. (ibid., 91)
She remarked that people were proud of their language and country, 
having  some contempt for those who had a different kinship system 
(1939, 184–185). But while Kaberry found language to provide a basis 
for recognition of social difference or similarity, she also found that the 
manner whereby identity was asserted and commonalities pressed to 
depend on factors other than language and consequently to be complex 
and at times ambiguous. For example, she notes that the Wula and the 
Lunga, although having a ‘complete cleavage between their respective 
languages’, attended initiation rituals together, while the Lunga were 
in the process of adopting the Wula subsection system (Kaberry 1937, 
91). Yet the Wula were ‘formerly linked culturally with the Forrest 
River tribes; and in fact the more western branch of the Wula still have 
moieties without subsections’ (ibid.). Similarly, Kaberry distinguished 
the Kunian and Nyikina linguistically and considered their different 
kinship systems as a basis for their being considered as quite separate 
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(ibid.). In contradistinction she then added that another language group, 
the Punaba, were considered by members of the Walmanjari group to 
have commonalities with the Wula, ‘though actually the social system 
differs’ (ibid.).
Kaberry also provides a more generalised statement of the relationship 
between five language groups:
The Wolmeri, Djaru, Kunian, Lunga and Malngin tribes form a group, 
where comprehension seems to be due to contiguity and a gradual 
infiltration of words from one tribe into the other. The Djaru and Lunga 
hold certain terms in common, and frequently meet in the region of Halls 
Creek, which is a melting pot for both tribes. (ibid., 91)
Extracted data from Kaberry’s writing regarding the social, cultural and 
linguistic commonalities of ‘tribes’ are summarised in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1: Kimberley ‘tribes’ and cultural groups
‘Tribes’ Relationship Reference
1 lunga and djaru understand each other’s 
language. participate in ritual 
together.
Kaberry 1937, 91
2 lunga (Kidja) and Wula languages quite different. 
participate in ritual together.
share aspects of social 
organisation.
Kaberry 1937, 91
3 Nyikina and Wula ‘stand outside the rest 
of the group’.
Kaberry 1939, 184
4 bunaba and Wula ‘Associated’. different social 
organisation.
Kaberry 1937, 91
5 Forrest River tribes and Wula ‘Formerly’ linked culturally. Kaberry 1937, 91
6 Kunian and Nyikina different language. different 
social organisation.
Kaberry 1937, 91
7 Wolmeri, Kunian, djaru, 
lunga, djerag and malngin
‘Form a group’ through use 
of shared vocabulary.
Kaberry 1937, 91
This grouping of ‘tribes’ is reflected in part in the map noted earlier 
found  in  her 1937 publication where Kaberry shows the ‘Kimberley 
Division’ divided into four areas: Northern, Southern, Eastern Kimberley 
and Daly River area, numbered I–IV respectively (Figure 7.1). Number III, 
‘Eastern Kimberley’, includes the language groups (or ‘tribes’) Wolmeri, 
Kunian, Djaru, Lunga, Djerag and Malngin, which with the exception 
of the Djerag  corresponds to Kaberry’s statement cited above from 
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Kaberry’s 1937 account (91). Kaberry’s assemblage of language groups or 
tribes on her map reflected her views that members of  some different 
language groups could be placed together on the basis of commonalities 
of language, laws, culture, beliefs and practices. 
Figure 7.1: Kaberry’s language map of the Kimberley
source: map reproduced by kind permission of oceania publications. Oceania 8.1, 1937, 94.
A comparison of the data presented in Table 7.1 with Kaberry’s map 
(1937,  94) shows some inconsistencies in the accounts. Absent from 
Kaberry’s map is Wula, a group she described in her text as occupying 
territory that ‘extends from the western side of the Durack Range out 
towards the coast north of the Leopolds’ (ibid., 91). The Durack Range 
is just over 60 km northwest of Turkey Creek and the Leopold Range 
runs some 80 kms north of Fitzroy Crossing. Mapping the Wula on to 
country given these geographic references yields uncertain results but 
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would appear to place the Wula in Kaberry’s division I (North Kimberley) 
or division II (South Kimberley), or perhaps division III (East Kimberley) 
and maybe all three. In her writing, Kaberry’s division I is reflected in 
item  5 of Table  7.1, but with the addition of Wula. Constituents of 
Kaberry’s division II are found in items 3, 4 and 6 of Table 7.1 with the 
addition of Wula in items 3 and 4, while item 6 includes a name found 
in division III. Kaberry’s division III is broadly the same as item  7 in 
Table 7.1. 
Kaberry’s ‘tribes’ and language groups and native title 
anthropology
The term ‘tribe’ is common in both the early as well as much later 
ethnography relating to Aboriginal Australia. The term resonated with 
colonial notions of the primitive, evoking a small-scale territorial political 
unit typically with the ‘chief ’. A ‘tribe’ was to be found in pre-industrial 
pre-Christian societies in contrast to the nation states of England, western 
Europe and later north America. While anthropology, particularly 
in Africa, sought to render ‘tribes’ a tool for analysis, it remained 
(and remains) a troublesome term that evokes more problems than it can 
ever remedy. It is likely that Kaberry came to the field with the baggage of 
the term ‘tribe’, which she employed rather loosely but with some attempt 
at definition. In the Kimberley region, she found such an entity to have 
no political structure, no overall leader and to be composed of several 
different dialects of a single language. 
Kaberry accommodated the term ‘tribe’ to her data by venturing the 
proposition that the tribe was composed of a community of speakers 
of a common language (or of dialects of what was understood to be 
the same language), whose members recognised more or less bounded 
land associated with that language as well as having cultural practices 
and beliefs in common. However, Kaberry’s data on how these ‘tribes’ 
were named served to demonstrate that these language groups were not 
exclusively or definitively named, but appeared to have had membership 
and characteristics that shifted though time. Names were sometimes 
multiple, non-exclusive and variable over time and place. Languages 
themselves were internally divided, raising the question of the unity of 
the whole and how dialects were, in practice, differentiated from other 
mutually intelligible and adjacent languages.
AusTRAlIAN NATIvE TITlE ANThRopoloGy
172
Kaberry’s data relating to language use is more satisfactory. Kaberry 
established that in the area of the Kimberley where she worked there were 
distinct language-speaking groups whose members sustained substantial 
mutual intelligibility with proximate and near proximate neighbours, 
but which generally lessened with distance. But Kaberry understood 
that language was not the only means whereby social intercourse 
could be organised and cultural bonds were evoked for the purpose of 
trade, ritual and finding marriage partners. Cultural similarities and 
dissimilarities were the stuff that bound or separated groups into those 
who shared commonalities and could be grouped as divisions on her 
map, or as different societies whose commonalities could and often did 
transcend language group boundaries. While Kaberry’s field data and her 
conclusions in this regard are, in my view, not entirely consistent, she 
does conclude, without ambiguity, that the Walmanjari, Djaru, Kunian, 
Kidja and Malngin all formed a ‘group’. Recognition of commonalities 
was based in practice on mutual intelligibility of language as well as 
social interaction and shared understandings. These conclusions leave the 
baggage and preconceptions of ‘tribes’ far behind and, freed from such 
constraints, provides for a sounder analysis.
Working through Kaberry’s ethnography is no simple matter and that 
perhaps is the first lesson to take from this exercise. Foundation ethnography 
is likely to be complex, data inconsistent and the understandings of the 
time in which it was written likely to cloud or colour the author’s findings. 
Accepting this, there are some important pointers to the likely nature of 
the societies Kaberry studied relevant to identity, social formation and 
commonality.
The first of these relates to the fact that Kaberry recorded numerous 
language groups in the area in which she worked. Foundation ethnography 
recovered from Kaberry’s writings can serve to show the degree to which 
modern naming and identity labels have survived and serve to demonstrate 
the radicular nature of the contemporary account – or otherwise, as the 
case might be. Kaberry mapped language groups (if somewhat generally) 
on to country, and this account should find some degree of congruence 
in the contemporary account of those seeking recognition of native title 
today over the same areas of country. Some of the names Kaberry recorded 
may have changed. For example, in the east Kimberley the name Lunga 
is almost never heard in my experience, the term having been replaced by 
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Kidja. However, this is consistent with the apparently ephemeral nature 
of language names noted by Kaberry so is not inimical to the continuity 
argument.
The second helpful contribution that ethnography of the sort I have 
reviewed here may make to a native title inquiry relates to the complex 
issue of the native title society – a matter I discussed in an earlier chapter 
of this book (see Chapter 2). Kaberry’s data on groups and identity reveal 
that those with different language identities (dialect or different language) 
who could understand one another perceived themselves to be of a single 
mind with respect to the practice of customs, rituals, their beliefs and 
ways of doing things. In some cases members of such a group could very 
well share the same single language association. However, this need not 
necessarily be so and group community membership could, given the 
acceptance of other cultural commonalities, include those who spoke 
another language. Members of these different language groups can, in 
consequence, be understood to have formed a society or community.
Again, this is a model that can be applied in native title writing to the 
contemporary ethnographic account. If it is evident that Kaberry found 
a certain set of people to share laws and customs in common and this is 
reflected in the contemporary ethnography, there is a case to be put for 
a continuity of the society since the time Kaberry worked in the Kimberley 
– and so, by inference, to the time of effective sovereignty and beyond.
Norman Tindale9
Norman Tindale worked in many areas of rural and remote Australia over 
a period of more than four decades from his base at the South Australian 
Museum where he held his first post as an assistant entomologist in 1918. 
During these expeditions he recorded his observations on a wide range 
of subjects including entomology, botany, geology, archaeology as well as 
Aboriginal culture. His first trip was in 1921–22 to Groote Eylandt and 
the Roper River in the Northern Territory. Expeditions soon followed 
in 1926–27 to Cape York Peninsula and Koonibba (west coast of South 
9  Philip Jones’s obituary for Norman Tindale provides an excellent account of Tindale’s 
life, professional development and research contribution. See Jones 1995, 9–10 (downloaded from 
www.anu.edu.au/linguistics/nash/aust/nbt/obituary.html).
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Australia) in 1928. During the following decades he made numerous field 
trips to Central Australia, Western Australia, the Northern Territory and 
Queensland up until 1966.10 
Tindale’s voluminous and wide-ranging research interest coupled with 
his scrupulous attention to documenting his research findings has meant 
that his journals, field notes, genealogies and other published as well as 
unpublished works are important documents in any native title claim 
made to country where he worked. The sheer volume of his material and 
the systematic way he recorded his field data means that it must be taken 
into account. Moreover, some of his data were collected comparatively 
early and from those who in some areas at least were born prior to the date 
of the frontier. As the years passed, he clocked up increasingly impressive 
fieldwork credentials over many different areas of Aboriginal Australia.
Tindale was interested in genetics and racial characteristics, particularly 
as they could be related to Aboriginal people of mixed descent. It was 
this interest that led him to collect the many hundreds of genealogies 
and accompanying physiological measurements and observations that he 
gathered from all round Australia and which are now of such interest 
to researchers undertaking native title work. Tindale’s field data, which 
he often recorded in his journals, included accounts of material culture, 
kinship, ritual practices, beliefs and, perhaps most significantly, what he 
came to call ‘tribal’ data. Tindale’s later journals include small maps of 
tribal boundaries and names of what he judged to be territorial groups. 
These data provided the basis for his first major work on Australian tribal 
boundaries published in 1940. He later revised and expanded this work to 
produce his well-known and monumental work on tribes and boundaries 
in Australia that was published in 1974. Tindale’s journals, in particular, 
are a useful source of field data relating to a whole range of cultural beliefs 
and practices; in native title work, it is his genealogies and his ‘tribal maps’ 
that are probably the most commonly cited and which can evoke the 
greatest controversy.
10  For a complete list of the journals he wrote of these trips and other materials, see archives.
samuseum.sa.gov.au/aa338/AA338-04.htm accessed 8 May 2015. For a comprehensive account of 
the many places where Tindale undertook his research with Aboriginal Australians, see Jones 1995, 
9–10 (downloaded from www.anu.edu.au/linguistics/nash/aust/nbt/obituary.html).
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Tribal mapping and ecological determinism11
Tindale’s interest in Aboriginal culture was apparently spurred by his first 
extended period of fieldwork to Groote Eylandt in the Northern Territory 
where, according to one source, he gained an interest in the boundaries 
that delineated a group’s rights to country.12 Tindale was influenced by 
a desire to demonstrate that Aboriginal people were not ‘nomads’ in 
the sense that they might popularly have been understood to roam at 
random across tracts of land with no territorial possession (Jones 1995, 
3).13 Boundaries and the tribes that sustained them indicated, in his view, 
‘that Australian wanderings are at present and have long been restricted 
within specific territorial limits’ (Tindale 1974, 10). Tindale understood 
tribes as a fundamental and determining unit of social and territorial 
organisation in Aboriginal Australia and his ideas in this regard appear to 
have been carried through his extensive periods of fieldwork in Aboriginal 
Australia and to have informed his data analyses and subsequent writing 
accordingly.
In his published 1974 account – marking the culmination of his research 
into ‘tribes and boundaries’ – Tindale wrote that the tribe was the central 
feature of Aboriginal social life. He argued that ‘tribal’ members shared:
[a] common bond of kinship and claim to a common territory, even 
though the sharing in it may be the subject of restrictions on the taking 
of certain foods and the exploitation of some other resources may be 
limited without prior arrangement or permissible only by reason of the 
possession of specific kinship ties, for within the tribe there are sometimes 
distinctions between what a man may do in his own clan country, in 
that of his mother, and in those of his wife’s people … In Australia this 
larger unit has a widely recognised name, a bond of common speech, 
and perhaps a  reputation, and even an aura of names – polite, rude, 
or insulting – given to it by other tribespeople who live in adjoining 
territories. (Tindale 1974, 30)
11  I thank Dr L. Sackett for drawing my attention to some of the materials set out in the following 
three paragraphs.
12  www.samuseum.sa.gov.au/collections/information-resources/archives/tindale-dr-norman-barnett-
aa-338, accessed 11 May 2015.
13  ‘Edgar Waite [Director, SA Museum] insisted that Tindale remove tribal boundaries from 
a map of Groote Eylandt and the adjacent mainland being prepared for publication in the Museum’s 
Records, maintaining that nomadic Aborigines could not occupy defined territories. Tindale realised 
that a new paradigm in ways of regarding and describing Aboriginal Australia was sorely needed’ 
(Jones 1995, 3).
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Tindale adopted quite uncritically the idea that boundaries were delineated 
by the environment. He thus asserted that rivers or hills were boundaries, 
seemingly with little field data to support his opinions. Based on this 
assumption he sought ecological distinctions in order to map groups on 
to country and so place ‘tribes’ as corporate entities within delineated 
territorial boundaries. Examples of Tindale’s assumptions in this regard 
illustrate the consequential doubtful conclusions he uncritically advanced 
as a result.
When travelling in the Pilbara region of Western Australia, Tindale 
remarked that the Peawah River east of Roebourne which he crossed was 
‘Of course the Ngaluma-Kariara tribal boundary’ (1953a, 573). Tindale 
wrote of the eastern boundary of the Kariyarra that it was ‘At Wodgina 
…Wodgina Range marks the boundary’ (ibid., 249). He wrote that the 
Kariyarra boundary with the Yindjibarndi was ‘at the Yule River’ (ibid., 
333). Some years later in 1966 Tindale visited the Eastern Goldfields of 
Western Australia during a trip from Adelaide to the southwest of Western 
Australia, as far north as Onslow and back via the Goldfields. On the 
drive from Mt Margaret to Kalgoorlie he noted in his journal:
Knowing that the boundary between the Ngurlu14 tribe and the ‘Kalgoorlie 
side’ Maduwongga15 tribe lay just south of Menzies, the Koara being in 
the mulga country we studied in more detail the relatively quick change 
from the universal mulga scrub of the country where we have been staying 
around Laverton and Leonora, to the mallee and salmon gum country to 
the south. (Tindale 1966, 181 and 183)
Thus changes in vegetation, often corresponding to underlying geological 
formations, were identified by Tindale as boundary markers. Writing of his 
observations of the countryside in central eastern Queensland, he wrote:
The northernmost part of Kabikabi territory south of Bundaberg was 
surprisingly dry looking as we passed along through low range country. 
Further south much of it was rainforest but now almost all of it has been 
replaced by crops. Formerly the whole of Kabikabi territory was said to 
have been rainforest in which limited areas had been opened up through 
Aboriginal burning, with consequent conversion to temporary woodlands 
of Callitris and Eucalyptus. Thus the dry forested country of their western 
14  Underneath is written ‘Nguludjara ngurlu’.
15  ‘Maduwongga’ is written over ‘Kalgoorlie side’.
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neighbours, the Wakawaka, was called by them naran, literally ‘outside’, 
indicating an ecological distinction they were able to make. (Tindale 
1976, 24)
I have noted in an earlier chapter of this book (see Chapter 3) that the 
nature of territorial boundaries in customary arrangements in Aboriginal 
Australia was likely marked by areas of shared country as the rights of 
an individual often formed a palimpsest of entitlements across different 
country group areas. Tindale himself was told on a number of occasions 
that country was shared,16 but this does not appear to have caused him to 
modify his hard-line boundaries or to have accommodated a system that 
evidently had greater flexibility than the one he represented on his maps. 
Given that ‘boundaries’ are innately problematic in this context, assuming 
a priori that they were determined by ecological factors renders the 
analysis flawed. It is possible that in some cases boundaries did coincide 
with changes to the ecology, but Tindale does not provide consistent field 
data to establish that this was the case in the examples cited above.
Tribal mapping: indeterminacy of boundaries and 
named groups
Tindale’s published data also reflect a further complexity of his analysis. 
In  his 1974 work Tindale explained that his aim in mapping tribal 
boundaries across Australia was to render them as they had been at or 
before the time of European settlement (Tindale 1974, 5). This attempt 
at reconstruction adds yet another layer of complexity to his accounts as 
his attempts to reconstruct boundaries retrospectively by many decades 
necessarily meant that he had to speculate on the former position of 
boundaries.
That Tindale failed to understand fundamental truths of the anthropology 
is illustrated by the interesting case of the Maduwongga and the Kalamayi 
of  the Eastern Goldfields of Western Australia. In 1966, Tindale 
interviewed a man called Don Roundhead and his wife Nuna Roundhead 
at Kalgoorlie. He noted in his journal that Don was ‘of the Kala:mai tribe’ 
and that ‘in language terms he spoke Kabul’ so it would appear that the 
‘tribal’ name was not the same as the language name – but the matter is 
not explained (Tindale 1966, 187). Don gained his country and ‘tribal 
16  For example, see Tindale 1953a, 581 (Kariyarra and Ngarluma boundary); Tindale 1974, 245 
(Kukaja and Djaru boundary); Tindale 1974, 247 (Mangala–Nyikina boundary); Tindale 1974, 254 
(Nyikina–Mangala boundary).
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identity’ from his father’s father. Tindale reported that Kalamayi country 
extended from Southern Cross, east to Kalgoorlie and also northwest 
from Kalgoorlie to include a sweep of country that included places called 
Kanowna, Broad Arrow, Orabanda, Callion, Davyhurst and Goongarrie. 
Tindale then noted that ‘It is probable therefore that the Kala:mai 
boundary of my map17 should be placed a little further to the northeast 
since it seems to reflect a SW push of the Wa:ljeri or “Wanggai Junggara” 
to Kalgoorlie in the 1890s’ (ibid., 193, 195). Tindale’s comment sought 
to correct his earlier mapping (based on 1939 fieldwork) and to establish 
the pre-sovereignty arrangement of boundaries that, in this case, had 
been influenced by the apparent incursions of the ‘Wa:ljeri’ or ‘Wanggai 
Junggara’ from the northeast, so pushing the Kalamayi to the southwest. 
Tindale recorded his interview with the Roundheads. A transcript of the 
interview (Barwick 1999) reveals that Tindale sometimes had trouble 
hearing Aboriginal names correctly. For example, he was unable to 
differentiate ‘Ngata’ (his hearing) from ‘Nyatha’ which is what Nuna 
Roundhead is recorded as saying (ibid., 5). Tindale’s ‘Kabul’, which he 
recorded as being Don’s language, was in fact a mishearing of ‘Kapurn’:
NBT: 18 and what language was that?
DR: we call it Kapurn, Kapurn.
NBT: Kabul.
DR: Kapurn, that’s all my …
NBT: Say it again.
DR: Kapurn.
NBT: Kabul.
DR: Yeah. (Barwick 1999, 1)
Don Roundhead’s final gratuitous concurrence allowed Tindale to run with 
the erroneous ‘Kabul’, the term that made it into his 1974 publication. 
The error in reporting ‘Kabul’ instead of Kapurn, while unfortunate, 
is understandable. However, in the ensuing conversation, Tindale slips 
from discussions about language group names (specifically, the Kapurn) 
17  Presumably his 1940 published map.
18  NBT = Tindale; DR = Don Roundhead; and NR = Nuna Roundhead.
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to asking the location of an individual’s country. Consequently, it is not 
apparent whether he was eliciting information about the location of the 
speakers of a particular language or about their proprietorial rights to 
country. Moreover, he found himself in possession of an additional two 
group names (Marlpa and Ngatjunmaya) that threw further complexity 
and ambiguity on his account which he sought to represent as ‘tribal 
groups’ mapped on to country. Tindale elicited place names that Don 
Roundhead identified as his country that were consistent with those 
noted above and taken from his 1966 journal (Kanowna, Broad Arrow, 
Orabanda, Callion and Davyhurst). But Don also told Tindale that his 
father’s country included Norseman and Balladonia (ibid., 8) but then 
stated that people in these places spoke ‘a different lingo altogether’. 
At Balladonia they spoke Marlpa or Ngatjunmaya (ibid.). Later he stated 
that his father’s ‘run’ included Fraser Range (between Balladonia and 
Norseman), commenting, ‘yes he worked there when he was a young fella, 
he growed up there himself, before he met Mum’ (ibid., 10). It is, then, 
unclear from the interview whether rights to country reflect a language 
group territory or some other arrangement. The territory associated with 
the language (Kapurn) is similarly unclear as its relationship to a different 
(perhaps larger?) unit the Kalamayi is nowhere explained. There is 
confusion as to the meaning and significance of the terms collected in 
this interview: was the territorial group the Kabul (that is, Kapurn) or the 
Kalamayi and how were they differentiated? Finally, the language Marlpa 
or Ngatjunmaya appears to be associated with a separate area of country 
within which Don’s father also exercised customary rights. However, the 
basis whereby these rights were legitimated is not established.
In his 1939 journal, Tindale wrote of the Maduwongga. He expressed 
the view that members of this group ‘originally came from the spinifex 
country to the east of their present location. They drifted in at the time of 
the first gold rush (middle 1890s)’ (Tindale 1938–39, 907). In his 1940 
map, he shows the group occupying a band of country from Kalgoorlie 
north (1940a). Wishing to check his earlier account, Tindale asked Don 
and Nuna Roundhead about the Maduwongga but found that ‘neither he 
nor she recognise Maduwongga and inferred it referred to the Maduitja of 
Meekatharra’ (1966, 195). The discussion ran:
NBT: An old man at Norseman once told me that the Marduwongga 
lived at Kanowna and Kalgoorlie.
NR: Yes.
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NBT: But I don’t know whether he meant on the other side of Kalgoorlie, 
he was talking from Norseman and he was saying you know Marduwongga 
live north and he pointed up Kalgoorlie way.
NR: No, Martu-itja live what’s a name, Wiluna side, Meekatharra side, 
they call them Martu. (Barwick 1999, 10–11)
Tindale did not admit Don and Nuna’s information to his subsequent 
re-drafting of his map. He reproduced the Maduwongga group and 
their boundaries in his 1974 book more or less consistent with his 1940 
map, apparently ignoring his own later field data both with respect to 
the Maduwongga and his own journal note to place the boundary of the 
Kalamayi ‘a little further to the north east’. Inexplicably he gives the term 
‘Kabul (language name)’ as an alternative to Maduwongga, implying that 
Maduwongga, Kabul and Kalamayi were one and the same, although the 
1974 map has Maduwongga and Kalamayi as separate groups. Tindale 
added, ‘Statements suggest a protohistoric19 movement from the east 
displacing Kalamaia people west beyond Bullabulling. Their language 
was called [‘Kabэl] and was understood as far west as Southern Cross’ 
(1974, 246). This would suggest that the Maduwongga’s pre-sovereignty 
country lay to the east of where Tindale places them on his 1974 map, 
the exact location depending on where ‘spinifex country’ is considered to 
commence but ignores the Roundheads’ opinion that the Maduwongga 
came from further north and in the vicinity of Meekatharra or Menzies. 
The basis for Tindale’s conclusions about demographic movements is 
unclear and seemingly speculative. The unhelpful permissive passive 
‘statements suggest’ implies that he was told this by those whom he 
interviewed. Older informants alive at the time of his 1939 fieldwork 
would have had first-hand experience as far back as the 1880s or possibly 
the later 1870s, which accords with the date of effective sovereignty for 
parts of the area being discussed. However, according to his 1939 data 
the group that moved southwest was the ‘Wa:ljeri’ or ‘Wanggai Junggara’, 
terms which are not found on his maps. Considered together, Tindale’s 
data from 1939, 1966 and the final production of his tribal map in his 
1974 publication are inconsistent and unsatisfactory. His data provide 
a slim basis upon which to support a conclusion that a whole ‘tribe’ 
19  Tindale’s use of the term ‘protohistoric’ is arcane. Mulvaney (1975, 19–49) uses the term for 
that period prior to permanent European settlement of the continental land mass of Australia but 
following European and other peoples’ discovery of the continent.
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relocated from the spinifex to the west,20 whatever it was called, while 
the names Maduwongga, Kalamayi and Kabul are ambiguous and their 
functions as social, territorial or linguistic units are unclear. 
Table 7.2: Eastern Goldfields, WA: some ‘tribal’ names recorded 
by Tindale





Kαla:mai Kalamayi The language of southern Cross; 
those in vicinity of southern Cross.
Tindale 
1938–39, 915








Kalamaia Kalamayi Extended south to include 
Norseman and perhaps balladonia.
Tindale 1966, 
195, 196
Kalamaia Kalamayi language derived from Kala = fire. 
Informant considered Kala:ko and 




Kalamayi Kalamayi boundary at Widgiemooltha but 
formerly not as far east.
Tindale 1974, 
243




Kala:mai, Kabul Kalamayi; 
Kapurun
Kala:mai name of tribe; Kabul 








Takalako Kalarku Takala:ko people.
Tindale 1974, 
243
Takalako Kalarku Alternative for Kalamaia.
Tindale 1974, 
243




Kalarku Kalarku malba is alternative term.
Tindale 
1938–39, 904
Ka:bu(d)n Tr. Kapurun Ka:bu(d)n Tribe called Kαla:mi.
20  Movements of desert groups westward are well documented in the literature. See Christensen 
1981, 60, 100–102; Stanton 1984, 60–63.
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Ka:bu(d)n Tr. Kapurun Four words in the Ka:bu(d)n 









Kapurn Kapurun southern Cross to Kalgoorlie.
Tindale 1974, 
280
Kapurn Kapurun Alternative name for maduwongga.
Tindale 1966, 
196









Annotation for Nellie Champion.
I have extracted Tindale’s data on the Kalamayi, Ngadjunma, Malba, Kabul 
(i.e. Kapurun), Kala:ko and Maduwongga from Tindale’s 1939 journal 
(1938–39), his genealogical sheets (1939b), his 1966 journal (1966) and 
his 1974 publication (1974). I have summarised these data in Table 7.2. 
The table reveals that Tindale’s field data show there to be both a diversity 
of names and a lack of consistency or definition over their employment. 
This instructs that Tindale’s so-called ‘tribal’ names with clearly delineated 
territorial boundaries, determined at times by ecological markers, are not 
a true reflection of his original field data. These names appear to represent 
other forms of social formation that were neither exclusively applied nor 
delineable as units of territory.
Tindale’s late appearances21
Tindale’s ‘tribal’ mapping and the data upon which it was based have 
been subject to the attention of native title researchers because Tindale 
characterised these tribal groups as having a proprietary interest in 
land.22 This is particularly evidenced by Tindale’s maps which show an 
apparent named group in possession of a bounded country. These maps 
and accompanying accounts of clearly defined boundaries mask the 
21  Peter Sutton has shown in a detailed and scholarly analysis the inconsistencies between Tindale’s 
field data and some of his later views with respect to local organisation. See Sutton 2015.
22  See Christensen 1981, 75–82 who provides a critique of both Tindale and Birdsell. Christensen 
concludes, in part, ‘The only substantial evidence supporting the existence of relatively discrete 
“tribal” groupings in the Western Desert has been provided by Tindale and Birdsell’ (ibid., 80).
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complexity and variability of group names but dazzle with their rendition 
in fundamentally European terms of bounded blocks of land such as you 
might find on a land titles register. These ‘tribal’ models have a beguiling 
attraction to both Indigenous claimants and those who advise them and 
can easily come to inform native title applications and, in time, may be 
invested with authority. I have seen many instances of claimants turning 
up at meetings to press their rights to country with photocopied pages 
of Tindale’s map in support of their suit. Clear boundaries lead to a clear 
division of benefits that may devolve from winning native title rights. 
They work to both include and to exclude. The passion of modern native 
title politics is familiar enough to those who have been working with claim 
groups both prior to and after native title. The essential task for the native 
title anthropologist is to peel back the postmodern interpretations and 
reveal the likely nature of the foundation ethnography. This is essentially 
the focus of the court’s attention in seeking to determine whether the laws 
and customs of the claimants’ society are radicular. Satisfying the present 
political desires, demands and aspirations of claimants is another matter.
The accounts I have provided in the analyses of the examples considered 
above are not meant to demonise Tindale. There can be little doubt that 
in some areas Tindale’s data better reflected the ethnographic reality 
than the examples I have subjected to scrutiny. Tindale chose a large 
canvass, attempting to map all ‘tribal’ groups across a whole continent. 
In attempting to paint the larger picture it is understandable that some 
of the details got lost, were obfuscated or were just plain wrong. Tindale 
had an idea about local organisation that led him to focus on a particular 
way of interpreting his data and impose his paradigm on his fieldwork 
findings. It is easy looking back over his magnificent corpus to judge him 
too harshly or to minimise his accomplishment and quiet achievements. 
However, in native title work, winners may be selected on the ground 
of the court’s acceptance or privileging of one early ethnography over 
another – as was clearly shown in the Jango case23 and to the detriment 
of the applicant.24 Tindale, then, needs to be thoroughly scrutinised and 
fully evaluated before his ethnographic account is either relied upon or 
rejected.
23  Jango v Northern Territory of Australia [2006] FCA 318.
24  Sutton 2015, 26.
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Lessons from the ‘tribal’ literature
Language names may sometimes be helpful in establishing those who lived 
in a particular region and who together shared cultural commonalities 
through the use of a shared language. However, identity names which 
may evoke referents other than language are sometimes inconstant over 
time, the groups they identify labile and members may share cultural 
commonalities across different identity groups. Interpreting data from 
Kaberry, Tindale and many other early ethnographers on named groups 
and their members’ territorial associations requires identification of 
the significant research issue that should be addressed when seeking 
an understanding of customary rights to country. In coming to an 
understanding of how systems of rights to country worked in Aboriginal 
Australia, it is not the names of identity groups that are important. These 
were not landed entities, being rather ephemeral terms derived from 
language styles, characteristics of speech or geographic location. Their 
significance is relevant to considerations of how groups shared laws and 
customs together and how members of different groups interacted and 
forged and perpetuated commensal relationships that helped sustain their 
common interests and existence. In summary:
• Different sorts of aggregations of people may be named and a person 
may belong to more than one named group. Consequently, identity 
labels may not necessarily be exclusively applied.
• Language groups and other identity units are not corporations 
whose members are capable together of holding rights to country. 
In Aboriginal Australia the land-owning group was the local descent 
group, not the larger language speaking or ‘tribal’ group. 
When it comes to understanding the system whereby rights to country 
were pressed and sustained, the important task is to identify the ancestors 
of claimants and the locales within which they are likely to have asserted 
customary rights as close to the time of effective sovereignty as possible. 
Where there is a system of the descent of rights, the task is, then, to develop 
an understanding of how such rights have been transmitted to subsequent 





The promise of the Native Title Act was that it would deliver ‘justice and 
certainty’. The Act provided a framework whereby Indigenous Australians 
could make application to the Federal Court for recognition of those 
rights that had survived the settlement of their continent by (mostly) 
European peoples. The new settlers had imposed a novel set of laws and 
asserted a new set of rights in relation to the land. Indigenous – or ‘native’ 
– rights had survived, so it was acknowledged in the Preamble to the 
Act, in certain circumstances. Part 3 of the Act set out in detail the rules 
for making application for the recognition of native title and so, too, 
determined the procedures that would be followed. The Federal Court was 
given the power to hear and decide native title applications. The National 
Native Title Tribunal (NNTT), established under Part 6 of the Act, had 
powers to mediate native title and compensation claims referred to it by 
the Federal Court so the matter could be settled by consent. The Registrar 
of the NNTT was required to apply the registration test to claims to 
determine whether they had merit.1 
I think it true to say that in designing the architecture of the Native 
Title Act, the overall goal of delivering ‘justice and certainty’ was seen 
in terms of righting past wrongs and creating certainty for land owners 
and developers as well as for state and territory governments. The ideal 
1  The Native Title Act, Commentary, 52 and 53.
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resolution was to accomplish this through a mediated outcome – between 
the claimants (the prospective native title holders) and the respondents 
(the state or territory, pastoralists and developers) through the agency of 
the NNTT. Disputes between Indigenous Australians who sought justice 
and certainty were not explicitly factored into the process as proposed. 
Disputes were to be expected but these were likely to be between the 
claimants and the miners, pastoralists and state governments (which 
indeed they were), rather than between competing Indigenous interests, 
claims and counter claims.
As things have turned out, the reality is rather different. Applications made 
for the recognition of native title have increasingly been characterised 
by intra-Indigenous disputes that most commonly have as their focus 
disagreements as to who are the individuals or groups with customary 
rights to the country of the claim.2 This contested field is manifest in 
many different ways. It may be that one particular family or an individual 
feels aggrieved that they are not included in the application. On a larger 
scale the dispute may develop from the complaints of members of 
a language group who argue that the land claimed belongs to their own 
language group rather than that identified in the application. In whatever 
way the battle lines are drawn, the result is a dispute between competing 
Indigenous parties that is often acrimonious and evokes strong emotions.
My own experience has been that the NNTT originally operated 
to mediate intra-Indigenous disputes.3 The NNTT has the function to 
mediate disputes on its own account (Native Title Act section 108) or, 
originally, at the direction of the Federal Court (Native Title Act section 72; 
repealed 1998). At the time of writing, the Tribunal’s website advertised 
its function as mediator as a service that could be requested through 
a  Tribunal office.4 However, the Australian Law Reform Commission’s 
Connection to country: review of the Native Title Act (1993) noted in 
2015 that ‘from 2007, the NNTT has sole responsibility for mediation, 
but in 2010, the mediation function was transferred from the NNTT 
2  See Burnside 2012 for a discussion of the problem from a legal perspective. The problem was 
subject to comment early in the native title era by Edmunds (1995).
3 ‘The primary purpose of the Tribunal was conciliation and mediation. A proposal in 1995 that the 
Tribunal be redesignated as “The National Native Title Mediation Service” fell on deaf ears’ (French 
2003, 8). Article downloaded from www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/18.html, 
accessed 12 October 2016, pp. 1–29.
4  www.nntt.gov.au/assistance/Pages/Assistance-with-indigenous-dispute-resolution.aspx, accessed 
11 October 2016. See also ibid., 10, 15–16.
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to the Federal Court’.5 While the Federal Court advocates mediation in 
intra-Indigenous disputes, it lacks the resources of the original NNTT. 
Moreover, given the intransigent nature of many disputes mediation 
has often been an unrewarding experience. The upshot is that disputes 
between Indigenous groups frequently result in the disputing party 
seeking to be joined as a respondent to the application. This effectively 
means that a mediated outcome reflective of some compromises on both 
sides is discarded in favour of a court ruling. In this it is the judge who 
must decide on the merits of the disputing Indigenous parties and their 
various claims and counter-claims.
This has resulted in a function for the Federal Court and its judges 
that requires that it make decisions relating to disputes between 
Indigenous Australians with respect to property rights founded upon 
customary principles but adjudicated in terms of postcolonial legislation. 
In applications that go to trial where there are Indigenous respondents, an 
issue before the court is whether the granting of native title will damage 
or reduce the rights of that respondent.6 The question then before the 
court is more complex than was originally envisaged: whether native 
title has survived more or less intact through demonstrated continuity of 
laws and customs. Rather, the court has to decide whether the granting 
of the application might be detrimental to the Indigenous respondent. 
Presumably, a part of this assessment would be to determine whether 
the respondent could rightly be regarded as a native title holder – either 
as a  part of the application or on their own. In cases where there are 
overlapping claims (that is, two applications are made over the same land, 
either in whole or in part) the claims may be heard together or the matters 
delayed pending some ultimate resolution through mediation. In such 
cases the question before the court must be not simply whether native title 
rights have survived but rather, if this is so, which set of claimants are the 
‘correct’ set for the country of the application or applications.
While this seems to me to raise some difficult questions about processes 
and outcomes, it is a significant feature of native title claims and one 
into which anthropologists are likely to be willingly or unwillingly drawn. 
My own view is that in the post-native title era challenges to the integrity 
5  Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) 2015, 3.41.
6  ‘The Federal Court may at any time join any person as a party to the proceedings, if the Court 
is satisfied that the person’s interests may be affected by a determination in the proceedings and it is 
in the interests of justice to do so’ (Native Title Act section 84(5)).
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of native title bodies, claim group membership and authorisation will 
become increasingly matters brought to the attention of the Federal Court 
for determination. I think that there is a good case to re-evaluate the 
role of the Federal Court in this regard and consider providing a special 
division within the court to deal with such native title matters, as has been 
suggested by two eminent jurists (Hiley and Levy 2006). The Australian 
Law Reform Commission noted the lack of mediation services (ALRC 
2015, 10.117–10.123) and suggested that the Australian Government 
consider establishing a national Indigenous dispute management service 
(ibid., 10.124).
Given this background, native title anthropologists must be prepared 
for a contested field of action and understand the complex and often 
uncomfortable nature of these disputes and their contribution in bringing 
them to some sort of a resolution in the court. This raises significant 
questions about our practice, ethics and methodology. Anthropologists 
as experts are likely to play a role in these disputes so it is important that 
we understand both the potential of the discipline of anthropology to 
assist the court in these matters, as well as the limitations of our social 
science. In this chapter I consider the processes and difficulties that face 
anthropologists when asked to provide an opinion based on their research 
when rights are contested between Indigenous groups. I examine likely 
scenarios that illustrate the complexities of a process that seeks to engage 
anthropology in dispute management and settlement. I define the limits 
of useful anthropological involvement in these circumstances. I set down 
a practice guide to what is possible and likely to be helpful for use by both 
anthropologists and those who seek to use their services.
Native title disputes and anthropological 
evidence
In native title claims disputes arise when one person or group holds a view 
about their customary rights to country that is not shared by another. 
The truth of an assertion made by one party is then contested by another. 
Subject to the Federal Court process this translates to an adversarial 
relationship between the applicant (the claimants) and an Indigenous 
respondent or competing (overlapping) claim group. In seeking to 
convince the court (that is, in the first instance a single judge) of the veracity 
of their claim, each seeks to rely on evidence. This is likely to  include 
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the testimony of the individuals involved. However, contradictory oral 
accounts are the hallmark of overlap or membership disputes and provide 
a neutralising and often irreconcilable dialogue that invites appeal to other 
data – a matter I have considered in Chapter 6. Moreover, the use of oral 
accounts with respect to the reconstruction of a system as it might have 
been over 200 years ago raises issues as to the reliability of the oral account, 
which has been questioned elsewhere (Sansom 2007) and defended to 
some extent by me (Palmer 2011a). Typically in a native title claim, 
rights to country are understood to derive from filiative relationships and 
associations that are at some historical distance from the present. Given 
that such a time depth may be well beyond oral recall, reliance cannot 
be placed on the recollections or present-day opinions of the individuals 
involved, but rather on documentary materials like genealogies or early 
ethnography which shed light on the legitimacy or otherwise of claims 
and counter-claims of rights to country.
In the previous chapter of this book, I discussed the use of what I term 
‘foundation ethnography’ in the native title research process to provide 
a  reconstruction of a pre-sovereignty society for comparative purposes 
(see Chapter 7). This is one means to tackle the continuity issue in native 
title: is the society and its laws and customs one that has continuity with 
the past? By comparing the way the society may have been understood at 
or about the time of sovereignty or effective sovereignty and the way it is 
now, it is possible to provide a view as to the nature of the changes that 
are evidenced in the contemporary ethnography. The degree or quality of 
change that might be understood to accommodate the continuation 
of a system of law and custom consistent with the case law of the Native 
Title Act is a principal matter for consideration by the court. However, 
the use of early texts is not restricted to the formulation of foundation 
ethnography. It may also be called upon to serve a related purpose. Early 
texts may assist in illuminating past genealogical relationships or an 
individual’s country of association or his or her language identity. As such, 
they can be used to posit language group affiliations of an ancestor from 
whom a party to the dispute traces descent. Genealogical particulars or 
language group identities collected some many decades ago and prior 
to the advent of native title disputes may provide a basis upon which 
a disputed matter can be adjudicated by the court. Alternatively, they 
may provide information about the ancestor’s place of birth or country 
identity. Application of this methodology finds particular utility in cases 
where there is a dispute between Indigenous parties to a native title claim.
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Rights contested by Indigenous parties in native title applications may 
then be subject to inquiry in the context of early texts. A proficiently 
trained anthropologist has competence in the interpretation of early texts 
and their comparison with contemporary ethnography. We can provide 
an understanding according to the paradigms of our discipline of such 
things as the nature and structure of society, land-owning groups and how 
people are recruited to them and how rights of its members are articulated, 
perpetuated and transmitted through time. In this the requirement 
to answer questions as to the continuity of these social processes and 
meanings by comparison with the foundation ethnographies is critical. 
Thus a question as to whether this group or that occupied the claim 
area at the time of sovereignty becomes a matter of the interpretation of 
early texts with all the inherent difficulties, problems and qualifications 
attendant upon the process – such as are illustrated in my earlier chapter. 
It is appropriate for the anthropologist to provide an expert view in this 
regard – and, indeed, providing such an expert view should be the basis 
of much of the work we do.
As an analytical exercise, however, this cannot be undertaken without 
due consideration of the difficulties inherent in the interpretation of 
early texts – as I have discussed them in Chapter 7. Accounts provided 
by  early  ethnographers need to be understood in the context of the 
intellectual environment within which they were produced. This may 
be a product of the proclivities of the individual writers themselves, or, 
more broadly, within the context of the prevailing intellectual thinking 
of the time that was brought to bear by the authors on the materials they 
considered. In addition, the extent of the account is also of considerable 
relevance to its usefulness today. Much early ethnography was partial, 
incomplete and covered only certain and sometimes rather esoteric aspects 
of the culture described. Thus, reliance on some accounts yields a limited 
reconstructed ethnography with many gaps and omissions. Early records, 
such as government registers or birth, marriage or death certificates may 
contain errors or misapprehensions and need to be critically appraised. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, these ethnographies were not 
collected with native title questions in mind and it may be tempting to 
assume data are relevant to the contemporary dispute when, in fact, they 
are not. 
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Contested truths in native title
In native title applications, contemporary disagreements amongst 
claimants  regarding the legitimacy or otherwise of the claims of others 
primarily focus on one or the other of two contested truths. The first 
relates to a dispute over which is the ‘right’ group for an area of country. 
This may be manifest as overlapping claims (that is, a claim lodged over 
another in whole or in part). Data on the number of overlapping claims 
rapidly becomes out of date. In December 2007, 45 per cent of claims 
were overlapped, some with as many as five or more overlaps (Neate 2010, 
207). More recent figures are elusive but the Australian Law Reform 
Commission identified overlaps as one of the factors that leads to delay 
and increased costs (ALRC 2015, 3.4, 3.79). In South Australia, as in 
most jurisdictions, overlapping claims ‘have been a significant issue’ while 
‘in recent years there have been more overlapping claims and more intra-
Indigenous disputes’ (ibid., 3.27).7 Figures provided to me by the NNTT 
in March 2017 identified 227 ‘registered claims’ of which 128 were ‘subject 
to overlap’. Figures from the NNTT website set out in Table 1.1 show 
there to be 316 applications at that date, so presumably the difference is 
made up by non-registered claims.8 Such data as there are, then, indicate 
that a little over 56 per cent of registered claims are overlapped.
This is consistent with my own experience where overlapping claims are 
now common and the majority of the applications I have worked on over 
the last decade have exhibited one or more overlaps. The second contested 
truth I look at in this chapter relates to an individual’s right to be included 
in a claim group. My sense of this is that the profile of this area of 
contestation has increased over the last few years – perhaps as individuals 
become more aware of their rights, have gained access to pro bono legal 
advice and have gained a better understanding of the potential benefits 
7  Despite this the same report states that, ‘Overlapping claims, while still an issue, have 
significantly reduced since the 1998 amendments that introduced both the authorisation provisions 
and the registration test’ (ALRC 2015, 10.19, footnote omitted).
8  The data provided was accompanied by the following qualification: ‘Please note: Genuine 
overlaps are as listed in native title determination application compliances. There may be claims 
that have not had compliances completed as at today’s date and overlaps that may be determined 
as genuine following compliance may not be represented in these results. The National Native Title 
Tribunal accepts no liability for reliance placed on enclosed information. The enclosed information 
has been provided in good faith. Use of this information is at your sole risk. The National Native Title 
Tribunal makes no representation, either express or implied, as to the accuracy or suitability of the 
information enclosed for any particular purpose and accepts no liability for use of the information or 
reliance placed on it.’ (Data provided by the NNTT to the author, 9 March 2017.)
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of being an unambiguous member of the claimant group. While not 
invariably so, excluded persons are often manifest in the claims process 
as respondents.
Overlapping claims and Indigenous respondents remain a significant 
impediment to the successful resolution of many applications. Both 
overlapped claims and the joining of an Indigenous respondent renders 
the application almost impossible to resolve via consent with the state. 
At trial overlapped claims may result in the representation of Indigenous 
respondents (or applicants, if the claims are heard together) adding to 
the legion of difficulties in proving the applicant’s case while furnishing 
distracting or (worse still) substantive issues that can be pursued by 
other respondents. At the community level intra-Indigenous disputes 
fuel lateral violence and cause social, emotional and economic damage.9 
Given what is at stake both in terms of community relationships and 
potential benefits or losses resulting from the court’s final decision, being 
involved in intra-Indigenous disputes is likely to be an uncomfortable and 
probably unforgettable experience for the anthropologist.  
While every dispute is different, I noted above that most fall into one 
of two classes. The first is typified by a disagreement over the language 
group identity of the claimed area and the constituent language group 
membership that comprises the claimants. I identify this as ‘right people 
for country’ and it frequently results in an overlapping claim or the 
contesting of the registered application. The second relates to membership 
exclusion. Typically this happens when the members of a particular family 
are not accepted as being claimants because their ancestor is not accepted 
by the claim group as being of the country of the claim. Simply put, this 
is a dispute about claim group membership. 
Contested truths: right people for country
The fundamentals of the dispute
It is not unusual for a claim group to be identified by reference to a language 
group name. Members of the group make application to the court for 
recognition of native title by authorising the application (and thereafter 
9  See Mick Gooda, Koori Mail 2011, issue 513, 13, aiatsis.gov.au/collections/collections-online/
digitised-collections/koori-mail/koori-mail-issues, accessed 15 March 2018.
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subsequent action) and together can be called ‘the applicant’.10 The claim 
and its proponents, then, easily adopt a language group identity and act as 
a legal entity with an apparent corporate structure. I wrote in a preceding 
chapter that language groups (or ‘tribes’ as they are sometimes called) 
are identity groups and, in customary arrangements at least, lacked 
such corporate characterisation. Native title law has the effect, then, 
of transforming a customary formation that is amorphous but whose 
members share cultural commonalities into a corporation with a structure, 
a decision-making process and the capability of legal recognition. In short, 
the ‘tribe’ becomes the thing that purports to hold native title rights to the 
country of the claim. The morphing of one type of formation into another 
for the purposes of a native title application is not, of itself, a problem. 
The difficulty is that it leads to misapprehensions that have the potential 
to be particularly damaging in intra-Indigenous disputes. This is because 
the dispute over who are the right people for the country in question is 
understood in ‘tribal’ terms. The argument is put that the country of the 
claim (or a portion of it) ‘belongs to’ the such and such ‘tribe’, rather than 
understanding that the members of the language group named in the 
application were and continue to be commonly associated with it but did 
not in a customary manner constitute a corporation exercising rights as 
owners. The discourse typically runs as follows:
• That country always belonged to the X tribe. This is what we were 
always told by the old people.
• Now members of the Y tribe are saying it is their country and they’ve 
put a claim over it.
• I am a member of the X tribe. I have always known this. 
• Those Y tribe people are trying to steal my country.
Members of the ‘Y tribe’ can be understood for their part to assert 
much the same thing and ‘Y’ and ‘X’ are transposed according to their 
argument. The contested truth is, then, whether the country in question 
belonged to the Y tribe or the X tribe. In pursuit of the ethnographic 
truth both the proponents and respondents evoke a plethora of maps 
purporting to show ‘tribal’ boundaries, of which portions of Tindale’s 
1974 publication often figure prominently, along with those produced by 
linguists and others, many of whom based their maps on Tindale’s work 
and his accompanying texts. Even in so far as the maps and associated 
10  Native Title Act subsection 61(2).
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texts can be regarded as providing a rough indication of where speakers 
of particular language or dialect were to have been found, such mapping, 
generally done remotely and without regard for multilingualism, shared 
country and the vagaries and fluidity and flexibility of identity formation, 
are inherently unreliable and unsatisfactory.
In my view such debates reflect only the legal arrangements occasioned 
by compliance with the native title application process. They do not 
and indeed cannot reflect customary process or reflect the land-owning 
units of customary formations – a matter I have discussed in some detail 
above (see Chapter 2). The error is aided and abetted by the native title 
process that comprehends identity groups as corporations. In customary 
arrangements rights to country are held by the country or estate group. 
Members of several such groups together in aggregation comprise 
a  language group although membership is not fixed and descent group 
members may espouse more than one language group affiliation.
For the anthropologist involved in disputes over ‘right people for right 
country’, the first and essential step is then to appreciate the science – 
however the matter is represented through the courts, mediation or by 
the proponents and respondents. Searching for ‘tribal owners’ is not only 
naive but it is likely to be futile at least in terms of attempting to resolve the 
dispute. What is required is a thorough examination of the question: who 
was in command of the disputed area at the time of effective sovereignty? 
Their language group association is only of importance if its discovery 
or establishment assists in responding to this question. 
Identifying the ancestors who commanded rights within a particular area 
many decades ago is no simple task and such data may well be absent from 
the ethnographic records. This is not always the case. Some reliance can 
be placed on early genealogies including Bates, Radcliffe-Brown, Elkin, 
Kaberry and more recently Tindale and Birdsell – if they are available for 
the area in question. However, such accounts are sometimes incomplete, 
unclear or simply lack the sort of data required to establish ancestral 
country. In these cases it is important that the anthropologist be clear 
about the limitations of the materials available. While there may be some 
pressure on the researcher to ‘come up with’ the facts that will settle the 
matter, the reality is that this may simply not be possible. In the end, 
all that can be provided is an informed opinion based on the materials 
available with the limitations clearly enunciated for the court.
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Other archival materials may also be of assistance. Generally, the official 
records (various registers, government departmental files, birth, marriage 
and death certificates) are of little assistance in determining country of 
affiliation as this was not a matter of interest to the official record. Some 
registers from the Northern Territory are an exception, while the official 
record may assist in identifying where a person was at a particular date. 
This does not, of course, mean that this was their traditional country 
but it may add to other material and so enable the researcher slowly to 
build a case. Birth, marriage and death certificates often include the name 
of parents as well as location of the event, so may help in establishing 
family relationships. None of these materials is likely to provide a swift, 
unambiguous or definitive answer to the question before the researcher 
– ‘Who was in command of the disputed area at the time of effective 
sovereignty?’ In my own experience, trawling through archival materials is 
as time-consuming as it is often unrewarding, at least in terms of answering 
the question. However, by careful and conservative examination and by 
amalgamating indications derived from several data sources, it may be 
possible to provide an expert view that will be afforded some weight by 
the court. This relatively optimistic view should be balanced by the reality 
of working with early texts. The difficulties with their interpretation are 
often a major impediment to the formulating of an unambiguous expert 
view on the part of any of the anthropologists involved. It is important 
that these limitations are clearly acknowledged to the court by all the 
anthropologists involved as experts.
Contested truths: claim group membership
A common source of dispute in a native title application relates to the 
legitimacy of membership of the claim group. A typical example of this 
is when a family or individual presses to be included in a claim and the 
members of the claim group reject the request. The rejection is often based 
on the ground that it is not evident that the apical ancestor for the family 
originated within the claim area and exercised customary rights within 
it. Alternatively, or in addition, it may be argued that the petitioning 
individual or family are unknown to the claim group, as a whole, and 
were never known to be a part of the claimant community in times past.
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Separating group acceptance from findings of fact
Issues of community recognition were highlighted in a Queensland 
case11 where the judge held that the Native Title Act stipulated certain 
requirements for claim group membership:
Inevitably, these requirements lead to the conclusion that for the purposes 
of the Native Title Act, it is the claim group which must determine its 
own composition. … A claim group cannot arrogate to itself the right 
arbitrarily to determine who is, and who is not a member. As to substantive 
matters concerning membership, the claim group must act in accordance 
with traditional laws and customs. As to matters of process the claim group 
must act in accordance with traditional laws and customs or, in the absence 
of relevant laws and customs, pursuant to such process as it may adopt.12
His Honour continued that the jurisprudence:
clearly demonstrate that membership must be based on group acceptance. 
That requirement is inherent in the nature of a society. However the 
society may accept the views of particular persons as sufficient to establish 
group acceptance.13
His Honour accepted that while ‘the test is community acceptance … 
such acceptance may be demonstrated by the absence of opposition 
from senior people’ (ibid., 262). He found that, in relation to the female 
ancestor Minnie:
the claim group must determine that question. To date they have refused 
so to recognize her. I cannot take that decision for them. Nor can I find 
that during her lifetime, the Waanyi people, as a whole, accepted her as 
being Waanyi.14
These findings as to the nature of claim group membership under the 
Native Title Act are in contrast to the judge’s ‘factual findings’. Based on 
the evidence of the expert anthropologists (there were three) and the lay 
evidence reviewed at some length in the judgment (ibid., [226] to [249]), 
the Judge found in part that:
On the balance of probabilities, I make the following factual findings:
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during her life, Minnie identified herself as a Waanyi woman and asserted 
such affiliation;
such self-identification was based on her belief that she had at least one 
Waanyi parent.15
My lay reading of these findings is that the question for the anthropologist 
in relation to native title and disputed claim group membership is one that 
needs to focus on how group acceptance and community composition 
operate consistent with customary practice relevant to the groups in 
question. ‘Factual findings’ with respect to genealogical descent and self-
identity in times past may not be of much assistance to the court since, 
in  this judgment at least, findings of fact did not prevail over findings 
framed in terms of the Native Title Act since this is the determining 
legislation in the matter.
The Aplin case and the politics of social inclusion and exclusion in 
that native title case have been discussed by David Trigger in an article 
that  examines his role (along with two other anthropologists) in the 
trial (2015a). Trigger notes that the judge cited him in the judgment in 
relation to the quantum of community acceptance required (ibid., 203). 
It was Trigger’s view that there has to be ‘a reasonable degree of acceptance’ 
or a ‘significant proportion’, or no longer a ‘significant number prepared 
to argue overtly against’ the inclusion or when ‘no senior Waanyi person 
is willing to dispute the claim publically’ (ibid., 203, 205). How this 
would translate to social practice is unclear, although the implication is 
that there would need to be some sort of assessment of numbers and 
opinion. In cases where the claimants hold a common and mostly unified 
view, ‘community acceptance’ is not an issue. However, in my experience, 
claim groups are often characterised by substantial divergences of 
opinion. How many members of the group would constitute ‘substantial’? 
Given an absence of a customary means to determine this matter, would 
a simple secret ballot be sufficient to settle the matter? These are legal and 
administrative matters that lie outside of the anthropology.
15 ibid., [250].
AusTRAlIAN NATIvE TITlE ANThRopoloGy
198
Anthropology and group acceptance
The court must decide who holds native title and does so on the basis 
of the operation of traditional laws and customs. Consequently, the 
task for the anthropologist is to identify the process that is relevant to 
acceptance of group membership. The focus of experts’ deliberations in 
relation to disputed membership has to date been very much in terms of 
genealogical reconstruction and descent. This is because in most native 
title claims descent from an ancestor, typically identified and accepted 
as being a member of a particular language group, remains the defining 
factor in being a member of the claim group. In these cases, descent is 
determinative. Without it a person cannot be a member of the language 
group, unless they are adopted. Anthropological research may be able to 
assist in seeking data that will either support or discredit the identity of 
an ancestor and whether or not his or her country was within the current 
application area. However, there are substantial limits to what can be 
accomplished in this regard. Experts for the different sides in a dispute 
may simply exhaust to the point of inconclusiveness their inquiries and 
subsequent opinions on these matters. Given the poverty of some archival 
materials and the ambiguities implicit in their interpretation, debates 
between experts employed by the different parties to a dispute may 
furnish opinions that are, taken as a whole, inconclusive. The extensive 
debate, material considered and opinions provided by the experts result 
in a sort of evidentiary cul de sac that is of little or no assistance to the 
court. Moreover, and significantly as noted above, it appears that in native 
title ‘findings of fact’ in relation to prospective claim group membership 
may not be material to the decision of the court – although subsequent 
jurisprudence may of course change this.16
This does not mean that anthropological inquiry has no place in these 
disputes. Establishing genealogical facts – if indeed such can be established, 
may be effected through archival research and the examination of early texts 
or other records. The provision of an expert view based on these inquiries 
may be influential in opinion formation within the group and acceptance 
or rejection of the petitioning party. Indeed, some claimants with whom 
16  Dowsett J wrote in this judgment that, ‘There is, as far as I am aware, no precedent upon which 
to base a decision as to the availability of judicial relief in the event that persons who, according to 
traditional laws and customs, are entitled to Native Title rights and interests, are wrongfully excluded 
from membership of the claim group’. His Honour goes on to list a number of cases that, by analogy, 
might provide relief. Aplin [270] (Dowsett J).
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I have worked have suggested that research of this sort may be significant 
in how they might regard the matter. However, research findings will be 
only one factor that influences opinion formation within the group and 
may be disregarded if other considerations prevail. In the absence of an 
evident ability to establish genealogical facts, anthropologists should turn 
to two other criteria that claim group members might consider to be 
important when framing their views about the assertions of a petitioning 
family or individual. The first relates to knowledge of the country held 
by the group seeking membership of the claim group; the second to what 
can be called ‘social relatedness’. In this I refer to how dealings with the 
individuals concerned are accommodated within the kinship relationships 
that typify the social intercourse of customary interactions.17
Country, kin and group membership
Local organisation in Aboriginal Australian has as its fundamental building 
block the local descent or country group. Aggregations of local groups that 
share or shared commonalities of language, cultural practices and beliefs 
and held proximate country together comprised language groups – often 
referred to in the earlier literature as ‘tribes’. Such aggregations depend 
for their continued operation on social and ritual relationships, as well 
as mutual obligations and co-dependency. Local groups whose members 
trace common ancestry are ‘local’ in the sense that they relate to, have 
spiritual affiliations with and consequential rights and duties in relation 
to the country or estate. People without country cannot be situated 
within the social fabric and network of relationships that are needful for 
the language group to have vitality, coherence and integrity. Without 
certainty as to their country there is no way they can be accommodated 
within the network of relationships that characterise the claimant society. 
They are, simply stated, sui generis.
In many areas of Aboriginal Australia, the manner whereby Indigenous 
Australians interact in both daily exchanges and ritual dealings is 
determined by reference to a categorical system often referred to as the 
‘section’ or ‘subsection’ system (depending on its form) and, more 
colloquially, as ‘skins’ or by a term of the claimants’ own language. Even in 
areas where the categorical system is absent (and was so, on the evidence, 
in earlier times too), classificatory kinship systems articulate and define 
17  These are considerations also addressed by Trigger (2015a, 204).
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a person’s place within his or her social universe. Such relationships, 
whether determined by reference to categorical classification, kinship 
reckonings or both in complementarity, determine obligations and duties 
with respect to quotidian interaction, roles in ritual and to the use of 
country and the benefits that derive from it.
From an anthropological perspective, then, lack of knowledge of the 
requirements of social relationships and the system that frames them 
renders the person outside of the language group as they cannot be 
accommodated within the network of relationships that comprise its 
visceral quiddity. In some areas where I have worked a person without 
a ‘skin’ is classified as a ‘stranger’, being referred to by a term from the 
claimants’ language that carries this meaning. A ‘stranger’ in this sense 
is not just an outsider but is unknown and therefore unpredictable. 
Consequently, they are to be regarded with suspicion, as potentially 
inimical to the language group members and beyond the boundaries of 
ready accommodation. They are intruders to the exclusive command 
of rights to country that the claimants assert to be theirs. In earlier times 
they were regarded as being so dangerous that they were killed. 
Participation in the sets of relationships that make up the language 
group requires attributes that must be evidently declared, recognised 
and accepted by others. These components are the fabric upon which 
opinions and emotions about relationships and the degree of acceptance 
or otherwise are based. A family that lacks known and agreed ancestral 
connection to an estate within the country of the language group cannot 
be afforded recognition of that group. Similarly, a family whose members 
lack the wherewithal to effect social accommodation through section 
term attribution or known kinship relationships is similarly unable to be 
accommodated within the language group membership. These principles 
are evidently customary in that they derive from key aspects of cultural 
practice that are likely to have been in evidence prior to sovereignty. 
Their application to cases of disputed membership would then equip 
a claim group to make decisions about membership ‘in accordance with 
traditional laws and customs’ (Aplin [256] (Dowsett J)).
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Methodological and ethical issues
How many anthropologists does it take … ?
The expert’s first duty is to the court and not to any party to the 
proceedings. We should be and should be seen to be independent and 
non-advocatory. Having two or sometimes more anthropologists as 
experts is common practice in contested native title claims, reflecting the 
use of experts by opposing parties in a trial. Where there is a strongly 
antagonistic environment this may be the only way forward as claimants 
sometimes consider that having ‘their own’ anthropologist will be an 
advantage for them. Moreover, as things often turn out, the anthropologist 
who commenced the research, working with the initial claim group, may 
be seen as biased or unreliable by an opposing group. This may be only 
a perception on the part of the members of the group who are in dispute 
but it remains an impediment as we can only work with those willing to 
work with us. The anthropologist should seek to reduce these fears from 
the outset, but these are matters that are hard to control as a researcher. 
A difficulty with having an anthropologist for each disputing party is 
that each gains data from only one group so there is no ability for one 
researcher to assess the whole of the data, particularly the views of both 
sets of claimants.
The nature of the legal process as it is currently designed does not readily 
accommodate the use of a third expert appointed by the court – although 
this is not unknown.18 This would appear to provide one means of limiting 
the possibilities for bias in an account that treats only one side of the 
data. However, a court appointed expert may have difficulty in gaining 
unfettered access to claimants and respondents and by my understanding 
the procedure is not one that is common for the Federal Court. The Land 
Commissioners appointed under the Aboriginal Land Rights Act (NT) 
invariably had an anthropologist to advise them, but as far as I know those 
so commissioned did not undertake any primary fieldwork. 
To my mind, the use of two anthropologists rather serves to confirm 
the potentially partisan nature of the expert – at least in the eyes of the 
claimants. In the practice of our profession we work closely with people in 
18  See G. Davies 2005. The Federal Court’s ‘Expert Evidence Practice Note (GPN-EXPT)’, 
October 2016, paragraph 2.1, also recognises this possibility. 
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order to gain their trust and to establish a relationship that will facilitate 
discussion of quite personal information and often deeply held beliefs and 
practices. It is hard to develop such a relationship without also forming 
friendships or at least sympathetic attitudes. However, native title work 
requires that we focus on the end game and we have a duty to explain 
to those with whom we work that our first duty cannot be to them. This 
raises ethical problems and is contrary to the expectation that was formerly 
common amongst anthropologists that they would become, over time, 
advocates for those with whom they worked. Such an approach in the 
context of native title is not only naive but is untenable. A partisan expert 
who is an unashamed advocate for one group has no credibility in the 
legal process and consequently does a substantial disservice to those with 
whom he or she has worked. What is important is that those with whom 
we work know from the outset to what purpose the data they provide 
may be put. This includes the fact that once written as notes in our field 
note book and relied on in the formulation of our expert view, it may be 
discoverable by the court and so to other parties hostile to the application. 
The ideally independent position required of the expert facilitates his 
or her working with those who are on opposite sides of the dispute. 
In these circumstances where emotions often run high and passions are 
deep, transparency is all. My personal approach is to explain my role as 
an independent anthropologist and expert to the court to all those with 
whom I propose working. The legal representatives of the various parties 
must be included in this process. I also act on the principle that I do 
not discuss data provided to me by one group with another, resisting 
sometimes quite strong demands that I do so. My stock answer to such 
requests is to explain that should a group or individual wish to know what 
another group told me, then they should ask them, not me.
The experts should have the opportunity to meet to discuss their findings 
and to seek to reach agreement on at least some of the issues that lie 
between them. The legal representatives on both sides of the dispute may 
wish to agree a set of questions for the experts which can be helpful in 
giving direction to the conference which is relevant to the legal issues 
before the court. One drawback of this arrangement I have noted is that 
our legal colleagues often wish to overload the experts with an impossibly 
long set of questions (some quite repetitive) and all involved need to be 
realistic about how many questions the experts can usefully consider in 
a day. I set the maximum at about six per day – although if there are 
more than two experts this may be too many. In terms of the practical 
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and realistic allocation of resources, the experts can probably not be asked 
to meet for more than two days, while in many cases a single day should 
be sufficient. Such meetings of experts – best termed a ‘conference’ or 
‘conclave’ of experts although other names are also used19 – generally 
feature as a part of the management of the application by the Federal 
Court and the judge may direct that such a meeting take place usually 
by a particular date. In my experience in recent years the conference of 
experts is chaired by a Registrar of the Federal Court who also records the 
outcomes (points agreed and disagreed and, if the latter, the reasons why). 
The issues agreed between the experts may be accepted by the parties 
and the judge as settled and not meriting any further consideration. 
However, the anthropologist remains only a witness providing a particular 
sort of evidence and even when experts are agreed their views are not 
determinative of legal outcomes.
Uncomfortable spaces
Anthropologists who are involved in disputes often find the experience 
harrowing. This is a research environment often charged with strong 
emotions marked by acrimony, bitterness and sometimes even physical 
threats. The expert is almost inevitably drawn to provide a view that will 
gainsay an Indigenous party’s evidence, raising questions or accusations 
regarding our right to do so and to allegations that as outsiders we 
should not make comments on cultural matters as in doing so we are 
appropriating the knowledge that rightly belongs to others. This can, 
then, be an uncomfortable and challenging environment and is not for 
the fainthearted. This makes it all the more important that we understand 
our special role, the limitations of our science and the methodological and 
ethical standards that we must apply.
Professional anthropologists should be members of the Australian 
Anthropological Society (AAS) and so bound by its code of ethics.20 
The AAS Code of Ethics states:
3.1 Where a conflict of views or interests arises among the parties to 
research, anthropologists should endeavour to ascertain the views of the 
various research participants, as independently and impartially as possible.
19  See Hughston and Jowett 2014. 
20  See www.aas.asn.au/about-aas/code-of-ethics, accessed 21 October 2016.
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This is clearly relevant to research conducted in a native title inquiry 
and supports the proposition that an anthropologist should work across 
competing parties, rather than with one only. Relevant in this context also 
is a subsequent portion of the Code of Ethics:
3.10 Anthropologists should not knowingly or avoidably allow 
information gained on a basis of the trust and cooperation of the research 
participants to be used against their legitimate interests by hostile third 
parties.
The expert’s report (and perhaps, inevitably, this book) is likely to be used 
in a court of law by a respondent or applicant party that may not seek to 
use it in the interest of those who provided the information but against 
them.21 This raises substantial ethical issues since, as writers of an expert 
report for the court, we may have no control over how the report or the 
information within it is used. However, the ethics also instructs:
4.2 Anthropologists should maintain integrity in the recording and 
presentation of anthropological data, and should not discredit the 
profession of anthropology by knowingly colouring or falsifying 
observations or interpretations, or making exaggerated or ill-founded 
assertions, in their professional writings, as expert witnesses, or as authors 
of any other form of reportage related to their work.
In seeking a balance between objectivity, integrity and the betrayal of 
trust and cooperation in situations of contestation and conflict, the role 
to be filled by the researcher and the possible uses to which the material 
may be put must be explained to the participants at the outset. This is 
consistent with the requirement to obtain informed consent from those 
with whom the anthropologist will work (Code of Ethics, 3.4).22
The commonsense approach, then, is to ensure that the researcher explains 
before the research commences the nature of the work, the uses to which 
it may be put and the possibility of consequences that do not accord with 
the claimants’ wishes. Provision of such advice provides claimants with the 
21  See Glaskin 2017, 107–111 for a case study relating to the use of field notes in a trial.
22  The principle of informed consent expresses the belief in the need for truthful and respectful 
exchanges between social researchers and the research participants.
‘(a) Negotiating consent entails communicating information likely to be material to a person’s 
willingness to participate, such as: - the purpose(s) of the study, and the anticipated consequences 
of the research; the identity of funding bodies and sponsors; the anticipated uses of the data; 
possible benefits of the study and possible harm or discomfort that might affect participants; issues 
relating to data storage and security; and the degree of anonymity and confidentiality which may be 
afforded to informants and subjects.’
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opportunity to make an informed decision as to whether they wish to be 
involved in the research process or not. Some potential participants may 
decline to be involved and we need to accept this with equanimity. Non-
participation in the research process by claimants may on at least some 
occasions be detrimental if a court requires expert evidence based on field 
data gathered necessarily from the claimants. Understanding this, then, 
the choice for the claimants as to whether to participate in the research 
may be an invidious one. Indeed, participation is a natural consequence 
of the process of making application for the recognition of native title in 
the first place.
Toward a practice guide
The particular nature of anthropological research conducted in an 
environment of intra-Indigenous dispute invites application of some 
guidelines. These are in addition to the more general ‘Expert Evidence 
Practice Note’ issued by the Federal Court and updated from time 
to time.23 The guidelines I have set out below should not be seen as 
prescriptive but may provide guidance for those who seek to navigate 
these difficult waters. Perhaps the most obvious principle to enunciate is 
that as practising anthropologists we should seek from the outset to avoid 
the necessity to participate as an expert in situations of contested truth. 
Solutions like negotiations and mediation arrived at through discussions 
between the parties are more likely to result in a successful outcome than 
the application of the research findings of an expert anthropologist to the 
dispute. Usually, however, by the time the anthropologist is invited on to 
the scene, the battle lines have been drawn. In such cases the following 
methodological principles may be of assistance:
• Those approached to participate in the research should understand the 
process, the consequences of their participation and the likely uses to 
which their information may be put. 
• The expert must be independent, non-partisan and be fearless in 
expressing sound views. These must be founded upon a reasoned 
account, based on all available materials, fully referenced and 
scrupulously researched. There is no room in this process for bias, 
advocacy or partisanship.
23  www.fedcourt.gov.au/law-and-practice/practice-documents/practice-notes/gpn-expt, accessed 
3 February 2017.
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• The anthropologist should be mindful of the sometimes extreme 
limitations of the materials with which he/she deals. The anthropologist 
should ensure that those who commission expert views based on 
archival materials and early texts understand the likely limitations of 
such research before it is undertaken.
• Anthropologists should seek clear questions, which it is their task 
to address. Vagueness and imprecision in the brief provided to the 
anthropologist has the potential to yield imprecise or ill-focused 
commentary and will diminish the usefulness of the opinion to the 
party commissioning the research and so, too, to the court. 
• The anthropologist as expert is qualified before the court to provide an 
opinion on matters that are within his or her expertise. Consequently, 
the questions that the expert is asked to answer must relate directly 
to the expertise of the anthropologist. The anthropologist should 
be consulted first about the questions contemplated and reject any 
questions that he or she considers to lie outside of their area of specialist 
knowledge. The list is best developed by agreement between the legal 
team and the researcher.
Disputes in native title are a notable feature of the legal, administrative 
and research environments. As more of the difficult (i.e. contested) 
claims come to the attention of the court and post-native title procedures 
seek to test membership and jurisdiction, I think that they are likely to 
increase rather than diminish. Anthropologists are now unlikely to avoid 
involvement in issues of contested rights. Nor, to my mind, should they 
seek to do so if the application of their discipline to real-life situations is 
a part of their understanding of the proper uses of anthropology. In facing 
these challenges there needs to be a more realistic understanding and 
declaration of the limits of anthropology in this particular regard – and 
that in relation to the research I have discussed in this chapter there is 
no ‘God’s Truth’ out there to which anthropologists have access via the 
interpretation of archival texts and early ethnographies. Practitioners need 
to be cognisant of the particular issues that should be the subject of their 
research that have relevance to disputes over ‘right people for country’ 
and claim group membership. These methodological as well as ethical 
issues need robustly to inform our practice and give direction to the sort 




Genealogy as an anthropological tool
At the heart of every good native title claim lies a robust genealogy. 
I  iterate this truism because it is not always evident. Genealogies tend 
to get left behind in the research process – being regarded as a task that 
does not merit immediate attention and that might well be left to some 
more junior person to complete. This is a grievous error and one that will 
compound difficulties not only during the native title claim itself but, 
upon its resolution, thereafter as those charged with administering the 
native title rights recognised by the court seek answers to questions about 
membership and rights that are likely to lie, in part at least, within the 
genealogical account. Long after the legal disputes about extinguishment 
and continuity of laws and customs have been forgotten, the genealogy 
will remain an important point of reference. As such, it is our duty to make 
sure that we provide genealogical data that are the best possible given the 
circumstances, our resources and the problems we will encounter when 
dealing with genealogical knowledge. Genealogies, whether in analogue 
or digital form, become ‘things’ in the sense that they exist in the context 
of their own creation divorced from the diverse research environment 
wherein their component parts were created. It is essential, then, that 
their integrity is able to withstand a lack of attendant exegesis, explanation 
or excuse. We cannot now ask Tindale what he meant by writing on 
a genealogy that a person was ‘of ’ such and such a place, which would 
be handy given such annotations are commonly referred to in native title 
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inquiries. The deficiency now limits the usefulness of the original text 
and, had Tindale paid greater attention to his meaning, our research task 
would be all the easier today.
The idea of a genealogy or family tree has a long history dating back well 
beyond the development of anthropology as a discipline. They feature in 
the Old Testament and are found in many non-literate societies as formal 
recitations of lineal descendants passed on from generation to generation 
as oral tradition. Commentators on the history of genealogical recording 
have noted that ‘genealogical reckoning came to serve as a model of 
distinction in early European society’, and that ‘aspects of its visual 
representation appear in fascinating diffraction in many places’ (Bamford 
and Leach 2009, 4). These authors provide an illustration of a family 
tree hung in the Royal Palace of Jogjakarta in Central Java (ibid., 5, 20). 
They continue:
By the end of the twelfth century, genealogy had become the surest means 
of preserving the memory of one’s ancestors and of enhancing the prestige 
of an elite family. Demonstrated birth and membership in an aristocratic 
family became the legitimizing criteria for anyone who wanted to take 
advantage of the automatic inheritance system for fiefs. By 1500, a ‘well 
born’ man thought of his ancestors and descendants as a group of people 
through whose veins flowed the same noble blood. (ibid., 4)
Barnes (1967, 101) suggests that family membership and family position 
(presumably meaning social status) are used ‘as criteria for membership 
and position in larger social units’. He shows how genealogical accounts 
have been a part of many cultures for many centuries in both Europe and 
elsewhere (ibid., 102–103). Barnes’s epigraphic citation to Oswald Barron, 
contributor to the 1911 Encyclopaedia Britannica, confirms the antiquity 
of genealogical study, but raises an associated difficulty of veracity:
The medieval baron, knight or squire, although proud of the nobility of his 
race, was content to let it rest upon legend handed down the generations. 
The exact line of his descent was sought only when it was demanded 
for a plea in the king’s courts to support his title to his lands. From the 
first the work of the genealogist in England had that taint of inaccuracy 




Genealogies prepared in relation to claims of right or title are not neutral 
documents existing in some space separate from bias or even, in extreme 
cases, fabrication. While genealogies purport to set out either as text 
or as a diagram the lineage of a person, they must also be understood 
potentially as social constructs. 
Barnes distinguished ‘pedigrees’ from ‘genealogies’ while accepting that the 
two terms were often used interchangeably (Barnes 1967, 102–103). The 
former is a charter of lineal descent that serves to support an asserted social 
position or status. The latter is a statement ‘made by an ethnographer as 
part of his field record or analysis’ (ibid., 103). For the most part in native 
title research we are likely to be collecting ‘pedigrees’ (as Daisy Bates also 
called them). However, the term ‘pedigree’ has connotations that relate to 
the animal kingdom and is probably best avoided as this may give offence.
In Australia, Sir George Grey was perhaps the first European observer to 
make use of genealogies with respect to social inquiry – proving a list ‘to 
show the manner in which a native family becomes divided’ (Grey 1841, II, 
Appendix A, 391–394).1 He collected these names and relationships from 
the Perth area, Western Australia,2 being interested in how obligations 
developed from family relationships, and used his genealogical data to 
provide an indication of age (Grey 1841, II, 231, 247). W.H.R. Rivers 
is generally credited with introducing what he called the ‘genealogical 
method’ into anthropological practice (Rivers 1900; Barnes 1967, 104). 
Rivers had visited the Torres Strait as a part of the Haddon expedition in 
1898. Wishing better to understand the relationship between those upon 
whom he and his expedition colleagues were conducting psychological 
tests, he commenced collecting genealogies. He found, ‘the knowledge 
possessed by the natives of their families was so extensive, and apparently 
so accurate’ that it spurred him to collect genealogies from a substantial 
majority of those resident on both Murray and Mabuig islands (ibid., 74). 
Rivers defined his own fieldwork methodology (ibid., 75–76), noting that 
issues of confidentiality were a concern on Murray Island and claimed the 
‘essential accuracy’ of his data (ibid., 76). He also raised two additional 
points to which I return later in this chapter. One related to the difficulty 
he encountered when trying to ascertain what he termed the ‘real’ father 
in a system that classified a number of individuals (typically ego’s father’s 
1  Available from gutenberg.net.au/ebooks/e00055.html
2  Grey 1841, II, 324.
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brother) as a ‘father’ (ibid., 75, 77). The other related to the issues of 
adoption, common in Torres Strait societies (ibid., 76–77) and a frequent 
feature of native title genealogical accounts. 
Rivers saw genealogies as a means to study kinship (ibid., 77–78), 
marriage choices and customs (ibid., 78–80), totemism, fertility and 
history (ibid.,  81–82). Rivers recognised the potential for genealogical 
information to provide the means for the analysis of abstract concepts 
through the provision of ‘concrete facts’ by those he interviewed – the 
provision of which he regarded as the product of their ‘extraordinary 
memory for detail’ (ibid., 82). Interestingly, Rivers notes that two 
lawsuits had been tried before the court on Murray Island, both dealing 
with disputes over title to land that ‘turned on the question of adoption 
and on the real parentage of two men’ (ibid., 77). Rivers tells us that his 
genealogies matched the accounts provided in the trial but he did not 
appreciate at that time what a seminal role genealogies would later play in 
native title and intra-Indigenous disputes over land (ibid.). 
Pioneering Australian anthropologists including Radcliffe-Brown, Elkin, 
Kaberry and others (including Daisy Bates) all collected genealogies 
as a means to better understand the social relationships of those with 
whom they worked, how different family members were named, their 
rules for marriage, the descent of totemic affiliation and, at least to some 
extent, their rights to country through patrifiliation. For good reason the 
genealogical method became a stock-in-trade for anthropological inquiry 
and a frequently encountered component of a good ethnography.
Genealogies and native title
The collection of genealogical data and the construction of genealogical 
charts commonly feature in native title research in two forms. 
The researcher can use genealogical data to explore with claimants kinship 
terminology, marriage preferences, totemic affiliations and relatedness 
and this should provide a basis upon which at least some aspects of the 
laws and customs and associated normative referents are defined for the 
community of native title holders. This provides a valuable insight into 
the likely continuity (or otherwise) of these rules and ways of behaving 
since the date of effective sovereignty. Such information does not have to 
be elicited through genealogical research, but this is a task that will most 
likely have to be undertaken in any event, unless of course it has already 
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been done by a reliable and accurate researcher previously. The second form 
of genealogical research is the account of descent from an apical ancestor, 
and this research activity tends, in my experience, rather to overshadow 
the first-mentioned activity to the former’s ultimate detriment.
Native title claims are typically made by those who are described in the 
application as being the descendants of one or more of those listed as 
ancestors of the claimants. These forebears are known commonly as ‘apical 
ancestors’, which simply means they are at the apex of the genealogical 
account. It is sometimes the case that research undertaken in relation to 
the early texts (including the genealogies of pioneering anthropologists) 
will reveal additional names beyond those listed as apical ancestors on 
the Form 1 application.3 Locating the names and country identities of 
individuals even one generation above the apical listed on the Form 1 
extends the compass of knowledge about the descent of rights and is 
likely to be helpful to the application. Claimants are unlikely to know the 
names of those more than two or, in some cases, three generations above 
ego, so it may be useful in any discussion to employ the name of a person 
who is remembered by the older claimants as a point of reference with the 
lineal relationship included. Thus, in a fictitious example, apical ancestor 
John Brown whose father’s father is discoverable from an early genealogy 
as Jinggandari is rendered as ‘Jinggandari, FF of John Brown’.
The wording on the Form 1 will vary on a case-by-case basis and it is not 
unusual for those adopted, perhaps ‘according to the laws and customs 
of the claimants’, to be included. In addition the requirement that there 
be ‘community recognition’ of claim group membership may also find 
a place in the Form 1 wording. As I have discussed in the previous chapter, 
these are important legal qualifications that may require consideration by 
the anthropologist.
Native title genealogical essentials
In terms of the anthropological inquiry the genealogical account of 
descent from a named ancestor is, in its essentials, straightforward. 
Assuming that the system under review is one based on a descent of rights 
through filiation (that is, through a perceived relationship between ego 
3  The ‘Native Title (Federal Court) Regulations 1998’ require that the ‘Form 1’ be used for an 
application mentioned in s. 61(1) of the Native Title Act 1993 by a claimant for a determination 
of native title in relation to an area for which there is no approved determination of native title. 
See www.fedcourt.gov.au/forms-and-fees/forms/native-title-regulations, accessed 6 November 2017.
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and a forebear), what is required is an account of the genealogy, showing 
descent through agnatic or cognatic links (as the case may be) with lineal 
antecedents stretching back to the apical ancestor. Ultimately, what is 
required is evidence that the ancestor was in command of the claimed 
land (or a portion of it) at the time of effective sovereignty or before. Data 
brought to bear on this issue derive either from the claimants themselves 
as part of their oral account of their ancestral connection or from the early 
literature and in some cases from more recent prior native title research. 
While the essentials are disarmingly simple, the reality is indeed much 
more complex.
W.H.R. Rivers, and the early Australian anthropologists who followed, 
collected their genealogical data from those with whom they worked. It was, 
then, strictly an oral account, although Rivers noted that the ‘chief ’ on 
Mabuiag had himself drawn up genealogies of residents of the island that 
River found agreed, for the most part, with his own data and augmented 
them (1900, 76). Anthropologists working in Aboriginal Australia on 
native title claims are unlikely to have such a clear run. Genealogical 
accounts collected by previous researchers may serve to confirm, correct 
or contradict the oral account. This can lead to disputes between groups 
and a variance of opinion between the claimants and the anthropologist 
should the genealogical record not accord with that now espoused by the 
claimants. In my experience claimants sometimes turn up to native title 
meetings with their own independently researched genealogies, which 
they may or may not wish to hand over to the anthropologist who is 
researching the claim. The provision of a number of genealogical sources 
seldom results in unambiguous concurrence, or the material available may 
be uncertain, unclear or incomplete. All the difficulties I have already 
discussed in preceding chapters relating to the use of early texts apply. 
The potential for disagreement and conflict is, then, high, particularly as 
claimants usually see the genealogical materials as the pass to claim group 
membership, which indeed in part at least, it may be.
Given that this is an important and often contested field, it is important 
that  genealogical research be undertaken with due respect for method, 
the time required and resources needed. It is a task that requires careful, 
methodical and professional application. In what follows I set out just some 
of the guiding principles that may assist, noting that others have written 
at length on the genealogical method, including Barnes (1967) and, with 
respect to native title, Sutton (see, in particular, 2003, 179–205). 
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Some methodological and procedural issues
Despite the shallowness of the genealogical record (Barnes 1967, 119; 
Sansom 2006), the claimants’ own knowledge of their family and 
antecedents remains an important basis for preparing the research 
documentation required for a native title claim. The court generally 
regards genealogical accounts provided by claimants as ‘evidence’ but 
of course has to allocate them weight according to the credibility of the 
witness, consistency and other factors including whether it is likely that 
the data have been derived from books, papers or lawyers during the native 
title process. For the anthropologists, in terms of field research, collecting 
genealogical data means sitting down with senior claimants to gather 
genealogical information. A necessary precursor to this process (as with 
all field research) will be an explanation of the process to be followed 
and the reason why genealogical data are so important, what will happen 
to the data once collected and the uses to which they will be put. For 
each individual, names should be recorded, place and date of birth noted 
and country affiliation and language group identity sought. Other data 
that might be helpful include section or subsection terms and totemic 
affiliation, but the data to be collected will depend on both availability 
and relevance to the native title arguments. Each item of information 
should be explored as thoroughly as possible. A person may have several 
names and multiple language identities. If the knowledge is absent, make 
a note that this is the case. Different cultural conventions govern the use 
of names, particularly of the deceased, so it is probably best to discuss this 
first before attempting to collect a genealogy as it is next to impossible to 
do so accurately without using the names of deceased ancestors. As with 
all field data, the resulting chart and accompanying notes should be dated 
and the persons from whom the information was gathered set down. 
Genealogies should be checked with the claimants that supplied them as 
well as with members of other branches of the family that share the same 
ancestors. Generally, however, I have found it a sound rule not to discuss 
genealogical details belonging to one family with another as this is usually 
seen as a betrayal of confidential information and should be avoided.
The systematic methods required to collect these genealogical data in the 
field have been set out elsewhere (Barnes 1967, 105–112). The researcher 
should decide on the symbols to be used in the charts, typically  for 
a woman and r for a man and perhaps a £ or ¯ if the sex is not known. 
A deceased person can be marked by a solid infill of the symbol or a / 
through it. The person from whom the genealogy is collected should 
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be identified as ‘ego’ and his or her ascending generations are shown by 
vertical lines, collaterals by horizontal lines. Marriage is shown by the use 
of =; alternatively and sometimes more convenient if there are multiple 
wives, by a horizontal line with short terminal vertical lines above linking 
marriage partners. Names should be included where they are known. 
There is some preference for distinguishing males from females by the use 
of capitals for the former and lowercase for the latter, particularly if the 
symbols noted above are not used (Rivers 1900, 74). Some researchers 
have reversed this arrangement including Daisy Bates who often has her 
women in capitals and her men in lower case, as did Norman Tindale. 
Whatever convention is adopted, it should be explained in the text or 
along with the genealogical charts so the reader can be clear as to the data 
the genealogical chart presents. The date, place of collection and identity 
of  the ego of the chart should be noted on the chart or genealogical 
account.
Discussion of relationships is best done by reference to conventional 
abbreviations. Thus F = father, MF = mother’s father, mm = mother’s 
mother, z = sister, S = son and so on. Males are distinguished from females 
by the use of the upper case for the former and the lower case for the 
latter. A fuller account of these conventions is provided by Sutton (2003, 
181–182), which date back to Murdock’s writing on genealogical method 
in 1947 (cited in Barnes 1967, 122–123). 
Genealogical accounts required for a native title claim, which provide 
explanatory text as to how claimants are descended from a named 
ancestor, are necessarily complex and sometimes tortured affairs. They 
should be kept as simple as possible while ensuring that there is no 
ambiguity resulting from the loose use of pronouns. Thus statements 
like ‘Molly had a daughter Jessie and her mother’s sister was called Jane’ 
leave the reader uncertain as to whether Jane is Jessie’s mz (aunt) or 
Jessie’s mmz (great  aunt). It is better to repeat a name than risk such 
misunderstandings. Thus, ‘Molly had a daughter Jessie. Molly’s sister was 
called Jane’. Or, ‘Molly had a daughter Jessie. Molly’s mother [name] had 
a sister who was called Jane’.
Genealogical accounts as text should be properly referenced to the 
source in the researcher’s field notes. In this way material collected from 
the claimants about their knowledge of an ancestor can be sourced to 
a particular claimant and consequently the bases for any resultant expert 
view is evident to the reader or those who seek to adjudicate the matter.
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Reliance will also have to be placed on archival and earlier anthropological 
work, particularly genealogies collected in the past. The limitations of 
these data, if apparent, should be considered, and such deficiencies as are 
considered to qualify opinions made clear. Conclusions must be founded 
on these data as a whole and, in the event that there is insufficient materials 
available from all sources, the anthropologist should simply state that 
there is insufficient data available to form a concluded view.
A critical task is to provide an opinion on whether each apical ancestor 
was in command of portions of the application area at or before the date 
of effective sovereignty. This requires the provision of a likely birth 
date for the ancestor in order to show whether the individual was born 
prior to the date of effective sovereignty. If these data are not a part of 
the archival record (which in the majority of cases it is not), then the 
researcher has to provide reasonable grounds for estimating one. When 
seeking to posit dates of birth of those in the higher generations beyond 
oral recall it is my practice to work backwards from the oldest person 
whose birth date is known with some certainty – perhaps from a Tindale 
reference, a birth, death or marriage certificate or other document. 
This may not take us back very far but from then on the application of 
calculated birth dates is one way to proceed, provided the method and 
its assumptions are clearly set down for the reader and the limitations of 
the system accepted. In computing possible birth dates, where these are 
not known from the archival or other records, I allow 20 years between 
generations for a woman and 25 years for a man. This is a rough estimate 
given that women may be younger and men often older than this when 
their first child is born and other researchers have adopted different inter-
generational time periods (e.g. Sutton 2003, 162, 168). However, what 
I suggest provides a helpful guide as to possible birth dates of ancestors 
when no other information is available in this regard while the bases for 
ensuing conclusions in this regard are set out for the reader to evaluate.
The identity of the ancestor’s country is also seldom readily available from 
the evidence so, again, the researcher must provide reasonable grounds 
for the provision of an opinion with respect to this and some reliance will 
have to be placed in this regard on the archival record, if such is available. 
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Tindale’s genealogies
Tindale collected many hundreds of genealogies from all round Aboriginal 
Australia. As I discussed in Chapter 7, parcels of Tindale’s gargantuan 
corpus frequently figure in native title claims and his genealogies are no 
exception. Consequently, given the widespread use of Tindale’s genealogical 
data in native title claims, these materials merit commentary here. While 
other early researchers have also collected genealogical accounts, including 
charts which are used in native title claims, an evaluation of the use of 
Tindale’s genealogical materials also provides lessons applicable to the 
materials collected by others. 
Understanding Tindale’s genealogies is first about developing an 
appreciation of their original purpose. Keen, in an article he titled ‘Norman 
Tindale and me’ (1999), pointed out that the genealogies prepared by 
Tindale now provide a ‘wonderful resource for many Aboriginal people 
… in the preparation of native title claims’. However, they were also 
the work of a man who was ‘a strong advocate of assimilation and the 
dispersal of Aboriginal communities in the southeast, at the time of the 
White Australia policy’ (ibid., 99). Tindale was of the view that mixed 
race Aboriginal people should be absorbed as rapidly as possible into 
the mainstream population (white, Anglo-European). He was interested 
to discover which of the many racially mixed groups would best adapt to 
assimilation (ibid., 102; Tindale 1941, 68). He identified mixed race 
individuals in his genealogies by the use of the annotations F1 (typically 
a European father and Aboriginal mother) and F2 (the child of two F1 
individuals). He also used the then popular terms like ‘quadroon’ and 
‘octroon’ or by the fraction value of the ‘mixed blood’ he calculated from the 
genealogical information available to him (Keen 1999, 100). This ‘racial 
reductionism’ as Keen called it (ibid., 103) is both striking and disturbing 
to a modern reader but it explains Tindale’s apparent preoccupation with 
collecting genealogies, which he often coupled with his anthropomorphic 
measurements, mental ability tests and photographs, undertaken at times 
with his long-term colleague Joseph Birdsell (Tindale 1940b). 
A good example of Tindale’s research interests in this regard is found 
in a page of his journal, written in 1939 while visiting the Aboriginal 
settlement of Koonibba on the west coast of South Australia (1938–1939, 
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10204). Tindale made a copy of a ‘Work Classification’ evidently drawn up 
by Pastor Traeger who became the superintendent of Koonibba Mission 
in 1936. Traeger’s list was, in turn, based on a ‘similar list used by Pastor 
Mueller’ (ibid.), the previous superintendent of the mission. Tindale’s 
entry takes the form of a table and comprises a list of men employed at the 
mission and a ranking of their ability to undertake employment. The table 
has four columns with the headings, ‘Men able to undertake contract 
work successfully’, ‘Men reliable when left to work alone’, ‘Men who give 
best results if white man works with them’ and ‘Unreliable’. Against each 
name is a measure of the individual’s ‘blood’ – that is, F1, F2, ¾ and so 
on with a cross reference to the genealogical chart he had drawn up as part 
of his research program. All the names in column 1 are classified as F1; 
of the nine names in column 4, six are classified as ‘fb’, two as ¾ and one 
as F1. Elsewhere Tindale reported that F1 individuals showed ‘apparently 
greater adjustment to white life’ than did F2 individuals, but he was 
unable to explain why this was so (1940b, 282). Tindale commented in 
his journal, ‘when fully analysed this list should be very instructive as an 
independent assessment of the high place taken by F1s as compared with 
F2s and others’ (1938–1939, 1021).
The quality and legibility of Tindale’s genealogies vary enormously. 
Some are quite sparse in terms of their details, while others appear to 
have been the product of a number of sessions, with copious information 
squeezed in to a corner, with lines showing family connections that could 
not otherwise be accommodated in the space available. Tindale generally 
wrote the European names of the people he recorded, using upper case for 
women and lower case for men. Tindale also annotated some of the names 
he recorded, but there is no consistency in this regard. He sometimes wrote 
‘tribal’ names alongside the name of individuals where these were known 
or collected as well as a geographic location. The significance of these 
locations is unclear. Tindale sometimes wrote that a person was ‘of ’ such 
and such a place, or ‘at’, the implication being that the former preposition 
indicated that the place was their traditional country, the latter that they 
were living at the place mentioned. However, this apparent differentiation 
is not explained by Tindale and can only be drawn by inference. It is 
important to remember that Tindale did not generally record details 
of the country wherein a person held customary rights but rather used 
4  The copy of the journal I have accessed has two sets of page numbers. The one cited here appears 
to have been Tindale’s original. A portion of the original journal has been renumbered, commencing 
as page 2 for the 24 March 1939 entry.
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a ‘tribal’ identity to situate them within a social setting. Tindale also 
sometimes gave approximate ages and other comments or annotations 
that can sometimes yield helpful ethnographic information he obviously 
collected at the time he took the genealogy.
Tindale did not identify his ‘ego’ (that is, the person from whom he 
collected the genealogy) although this, too, may sometimes be inferred by 
his cross reference to a record card (e.g. ‘R726’). These cards were prepared 
by Tindale or by his co-researchers and contain additional data collected 
on such things as social history, ‘tribal affiliation’ or anthropometric 
data, depending on the expedition and his style of research at the time. 
The cards sometimes provide additional data and are worth consulting, 
if they are available. Tindale also took portrait photographs of his subjects 
Figure 9.1: Tindale sheet 89 collected from Point Pearce, SA, in 1939
source: Genealogy reproduced by kind permission of the board for Anthropological 
Research Collection, south Australian museum. Courtesy of lewis yerloburka o’brien, 
south Australian museum collection AA346/5/3/6_point pearce_89.
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I have provided a copy of one of Tindale’s 1939 genealogies as Figure 9.1. 
Tindale collected this genealogy from Point Pearce on 6 March in that 
year. He generally wrote the place of collection at the head of the chart, 
along with the date, while the numbering of the genealogies makes 
referencing unambiguous. 
Genealogies such as the one shown above provide useful information in 
native title research, provided of course that they can be directly linked to 
the claimants. Difficulties arise when names are uncertain or when names 
very common at the time they were collected by Tindale may result in 
misidentification. So, for example, if a family know they had a forebear 
whose name was Daisy it is possible to erroneously assume that a woman 
in a Tindale genealogy with this name was that woman. Consequently, it is 
important to cross-check other details like date of birth, place of residence 
or ‘caste’ (which Tindale often included in his annotations) to provide 
greater certainty as to the applicability of the genealogy. Tindale sometimes 
collected the name of the same person on more than one genealogy and 
appears to have been quite thorough in providing cross-references to these 
names. It is important, then, to check these cross-referenced sheets to see 
what other information might be available there relating to the family. 
Tindale’s annotations are sometimes hard to read and copies provided 
through Native Title Representative Bodies are always photocopies of the 
originals (which are held at the South Australian Museum in Adelaide), 
while some are clearly copies of copies with resultant deterioration. I have 
even come across copies that have been amended by an unknown hand, 
and in one case some names were actually crossed out and rendered 
illegible – presumably because someone disagreed with Tindale’s record of 
the family. Perhaps the greatest and most frequent point of dispute relates 
to the ‘tribal’ identity, which may be the subject of subsequent debate 
particularly in areas where group names were variable or inconsistently 
applied.  
Working with Tindale’s genealogies requires practice and patience, 
extensive cross-checking where this is possible and sound contemporary 
fieldwork to ensure that the genealogy considered is indeed relevant to the 
family being researched. At their best Tindale’s genealogies may provide 
evidence of an ancestor’s links to the application area. By calculating birth 
dates backwards from those Tindale supplies, individuals represented in 
Tindale’s oldest generation level may be shown to have been in possession 
of the claim area at the time of effective sovereignty. At their worst, 
Tindale’s genealogies provide data that is inconsistent with other materials 
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and contrary to the evidence of the claimants. In any event, if there is 
a Tindale genealogy relevant to a forebear of a claimant, it must be properly 
and comprehensively assessed, taking into account the circumstances of 
its collection, Tindale’s purpose in making it and any other data that may 
be relevant to the conclusions and opinions that may be drawn from it. 
Genealogies and adoption
Adoptive relationships are common in native title genealogical accounts. 
Some are asserted to be of some antiquity (that is, said to have occurred 
three or more ascending generations above ego) but others may be 
comparatively recent. The former may be subject to some differences of 
opinion amongst claimants when relied upon to assert membership of the 
claimant group. Since both the adoptee and adopting parent or parents 
are now long dead, it is not possible to gain first-hand field data about 
the adoptive relationship, its qualities and characteristics. Consequently, 
forming a view about the nature of the adoptive relationship must rely 
on the memory of the claimants or, most likely, on an oral tradition of 
unknown pedigree. The reliability of such conclusions is readily open 
to negative scrutiny. 
At the heart of the difficulty is the concept of filiation. Anthropologists 
distinguish between descent and filiation (Sutton 2003, 188–191; Meyer 
Fortes 1959, 203). Filiation can be understood as the relationship between 
a child and his or her parents and grandparents, as recognised by peers and 
relations. Filiation in this context is the social, emotional and practical 
aspects of a family relationship between parent and child.5 The substance 
of these relationships is the flux that quickens the descent of rights through 
genealogical connection. ‘One-step filiation’, ‘two-step filiation’ and ‘serial 
filiation’ are terms used to accommodate relationships between ego and 
their parent, grandparent and through successive ascending generations, 
respectively (Sutton 2003, 188). Descent is somewhat different and has 
been defined as ‘a genealogical connexion recognised between a person 
and  any of his ancestors or ancestresses. It is established by tracing 
a pedigree’ (Meyer Fortes 1959, 206).
5  Oxford English Dictionary, filiation: ‘the fact of being the child of a specified parent. Also a 
person’s parentage; “Whose son one is”’.
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It is commonly the case in native title claims that claimants cite serial 
filiative links with known forebears as the basis for their claims to 
country. Sutton observes, ‘members of a descent group share a common, 
identifiable individual ancestor, or sometimes a set of ancestors such 
as two or three siblings, or a married couple, from whom they reckon 
their group membership’ (2003, 189). Consequently, the normative 
system that is relied upon to determine rights to country is one based on 
descent from a named ancestor and the filiative links to ego’s parents and 
grandparents. These filiative links generally rely on consanguineal ties. But 
in some cases they must rely on other forms of filiation, such as adoption. 
Transforming adoption into descent with recognition of filiation requires 
the transformation of a baby (or child) into a son or daughter. That such 
a transformation has taken place requires community acceptance in order 
to have validity within the country group membership. Social recognition 
and non-recognition are creatures of social relationships, local politics, 
personal preferences, antagonisms and even grudges. The question that 
generally excites debate is whether an adopted child, who is not a member 
of a country group lineage by birth, can acquire filiation through adoption. 
It is the anthropologist’s job to show that the recognition of descent 
within an adoptive relationship is neither arbitrary nor contingent but 
rather based upon a system of customary principles. 
A useful first step is to determine whether the idea of adoption is 
recognised in the Indigenous language of the claimants and is the subject 
of laws and customs. In some areas where I have worked, I have been 
able to collect a term from the claimants’ language that translates as 
‘adopted’. In some cases the term is glossed as ‘growing up’ which may 
be understood to carry the meaning that the child is ‘just like’ a natural 
child in terms of gaining rights to country. However, the ethnography 
is the determining factor when deciding how to represent an adopted 
child on a genealogical chart and how they should be described in the 
explanatory text. Generally, in my experience, it is often accepted that if 
a man or woman ‘grew up’ a baby, then it would be accepted as his or her 
natural child. By amalgamating field data in relation to such principles 
that can be understood to endorse the view that an adoptive relationship 
has become equal to and indistinguishable from a relationship based on 
descent, implied filiation can be understood to provide a relationship that 
bears graphic representation as a child on a native title genealogy.
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The difficulties that develop from complete reliance on an oral tradition 
with respect to adoptive relationships that are asserted to have occurred 
in times prior to the claimants’ recollection finds no simple resolution. 
Sometimes it is possible to locate independent archival references that 
support the fact of an asserted adoption. For example, I once found 
a reference in a Native Welfare File that a man had paid all the education 
expenses of a child who was not his natural daughter, which lent weight 
to the assertion that he was the child’s adopted father. In other cases I have 
canvassed a range of views from numerous claimants and found a clear 
consensus that an adoptive relationship was ‘the same as’ one based on 
biological descent. However, I have also come across many cases where an 
asserted adoption was subject to dispute amongst claimants. In these cases 
the best that can be done is to provide an account of the competing views 
and any relevant laws and customs and set out such independent archival 
accounts as might be available. In this way an expert view can be provided 
if there is sufficient data available – otherwise, the anthropologist must 
simply state that there is insufficient data available to form a concluded 
view as the claimant testimony is contested. In such cases it may be 
a matter to be determined by the court. 
Genealogical truth
W.H.R. Rivers was sanguine about the accuracy of the genealogies he 
collected on Murray and Mabuiag islands. He described his ‘extensive 
genealogies’ as possessing ‘a high degree of accuracy’ (Rivers 1900, 76). 
On  Murray he obtained genealogies ‘from two or more independent 
sources, with the result that different accounts corroborated one another 
to  an extent which forms the best guarantee of the truthfulness and 
accuracy of memory of the natives’ (ibid., 76). On Mabuiag Island, Rivers:
often compiled [his] genealogies sitting in the huts, or on the sand, with a 
crowd of women and children sitting round listening to the information 
which the men were giving me. In some cases, even the women were 
consulted. Often I was able to get several of the older men together, who 
consulted about points of detail, and it was obvious that some were looked 
up to by the rest as authorities on the subject. (ibid., 76)
Cross-checking and collaboration were the tools Rivers used to bring 
some certainty to the oral genealogical account. I stated above in the 
section ‘Methodological and procedural issues’ that, in the contested field 
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of native title genealogical research, discussing family history with anyone 
other than the members of the family in question can be controversial. 
However, checking genealogical details before a jural public can provide 
confirmation of a general acceptance of the account as rendered – or, 
alternatively, alert the researcher to potential disputed ground. The 
availability of genealogies collected by earlier researchers, particularly 
those produced in the pre–native title area, provides a useful corrective 
to and confirmation of the contemporary account, although there is no 
certainty that genealogies collected by Elkin, Kaberry, Radcliffe-Brown or 
Tindale (and others) were without error. Rivers sought to establish that 
his data ‘possessed a high degree of accuracy’ (ibid., 77). In native title 
inquiries the anthropologist can strive for the best genealogical account 
available. However, there should be a clear qualification to any genealogical 
account that it is founded on data that reflect a social construction of the 
past. Orally transmitted genealogies are best understood as one account 
of family relationships and a representation of the way people understand 
themselves to be related to others, both living and dead. This means that 
oral genealogical accounts derived from different claimants may exhibit 
differences in detail or even in how relationships are calculated. In an 
oral genealogical tradition, the nature of relationships in the third and 
higher ascending generation level is sometimes assumed, imprecise or not 
remembered. Additionally, some relationships in lower generation levels 
may not be accurately recalled, particularly in the case of an extended 
family with numerous affinal relationships and many children. The larger 
the genealogy, the greater is the likelihood of errors or variations 
being identified. Genealogies will need to be subject to correction and 
emendation as new information comes to light. It is best to set out these 
qualifications as to the accuracy of the oral account at the beginning 
of any discussion of the genealogical data. 
In some cases the oral account can be corroborated by historical or other 
documentary sources, as I have discussed above. The accuracy of archival 
records should not be taken for granted. Government officials were 
susceptible to error and prone to misunderstandings, particularly in cross-
cultural encounters. The use of historical sources provides an adjunct to 
an oral account, enabling the construction of genealogies, in some cases, 
beyond that which relies on the comparatively shallow oral account. 
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Managing genealogical data
Anyone who has attempted to assemble genealogical accounts will know 
all too well that data are multitudinous and their representation poses 
some formidable challenges. In times past it was usual for anthropologists 
to draw up their genealogies by hand on long sheets of paper, glued end 
on end such that the total length of the genealogy was measured in many 
yards. There was, I recall, a certain pride that characterised some PhD 
research, occasioned by citing the length of the accompanying genealogy. 
These mute memorials to the genealogical method were inaccessible, 
impractical and had little to recommend them. Fortunately, the digital 
age has rendered them redundant and provided a range of alternatives that 
are now important tools for native title research.
Genealogical programs are widely available on the internet for download 
or obtainable in some stores. Prices are generally well below $100 and 
most provide updates, web support and tutorials. The principal problem 
with this software is its evident ephemeral nature, its sustainability over 
different operating platforms over time and the compatibility of different 
programs. At the time of writing (early 2018), two formerly popular 
programs (Family Tree Maker and The Master Genealogist) used by many 
Land Councils and Native Title Representative Bodies were no longer 
available as stand-alone programs, although many of us continued to use 
our existing software successfully. Despite the apparent demise of these 
programs, a search on the internet revealed 10 other programs that were 
readily available for purchase that appeared to perform in a very similar 
manner to those with which I am familiar. The choice of the software 
program is a matter for the commissioning organisation, which needs to 
consider suitability, cost, reliability and ease of use as well as security. 
Consultants undertaking genealogical research should be asked to use 
the same software or ensure that they can readily generate the common 
genealogical transfer data file (known as a GEDCOM file).6 Organisations 
6  ‘GEDCOM (an acronym standing for Genealogical Data Communication) is an open de facto 
specification for exchanging genealogical data between different genealogy software. GEDCOM was 
developed by The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS Church) as an aid to genealogical 
research. A GEDCOM file is plain text (usually either ANSEL or ASCII) containing genealogical 
information about individuals, and meta data linking these records together. Most genealogy software 
supports importing from and exporting to GEDCOM format. However, some genealogy software 
programs incorporate the use of proprietary extensions to the format, which are not always recognized 
by other genealogy programs, such as the GEDCOM 5.5 EL (Extended Locations) specification. 
While GEDCOM X and several other files have been suggested as replacements, the current 1996 




will need to ensure that they maintain and update their genealogical 
files on a regular basis and that this is undertaken by a person who has 
had proper training and is equipped to manage the system and generate 
the data required. Genealogical databases are vulnerable to mis-entries, 
duplication and even erasure, so they need to be managed according to 
the same standards that apply to accounting software and digital archives. 
This is no simple or cheap task. However, genealogical databases will 
be required in the post-determination administration and will be of 
fundamental importance to the management of any benefits that develop 
from the recognition of native title. It is, then, essential to get this aspect 
of data management right from the outset.
Genealogical databases have significant advantages over hand-drawn 
charts. First, they can be easily updated should new or corrective material 
come to light. Second, they are easily accessible. Any named individual in 
the database can be readily found and details of his or her relationships, 
children, partners and personal particulars recovered. Third, they are 
easily used by the researcher in the field (on laptop or tablet), obviating 
the necessity to do battle with yards (metres) of paper. Fourth, they allow 
easy input of additional data including all important authorities for 
information, scanned copies of archival materials including genealogies, 
certificates and photographs. A single entry is, then, a gateway to a whole 
volume of supportive data, readily available to the researcher. Finally, they 
are easily transmissible in toto and relatively flexible and adaptive to other 
formats. 
Some of these evident advantages also bring with them incipient dangers. 
Genealogical databases are vulnerable and like any digital content can be 
easily erased or corrupted. The research, then, needs to ensure that the 
database is properly managed and that it is subject to regular backups. 
The generation of digital charts (most programs have a choice of several 
different ones) is no substitute for publishing paper charts for safekeeping. 
Generally the charts produced by genealogical software do not provide 
for the symbols common to anthropological genealogical charts (as noted 
above) but rather produce names in boxes, with males distinguished from 
female by the nature of the box border – choice being afforded to the user 
in this regard. In some cases a hand drawn chart may be a better option 
for a native title report if some details or particulars are required to be 
shown. However, in terms of time and resources the production of digital 
charts by a genealogical program (whether printed out or not) is a far 
better option than attempting to draw extensive genealogies by hand – 
as was the case in times past.
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The wealth of data that can be included in a genealogical database has 
significant implications for security and the protection of personal 
information. This is a matter that the researcher will need to discuss with 
the commissioning organisation, prior to the development of the database. 
Organisations holding genealogical databases will also need to consider 
the security of their genealogical materials in the same way as they seek 
to protect legal, accounting or written documents that are confidential to 
their organisation.
A genealogical database, like any digital compilation, is only as good as 
the data entered into it. I have inherited numerous genealogical databases, 
initiated by unknown researchers in times past with varying degrees of 
skill and accuracy. Sometimes it has taken me many hours to correct errors 
in the database, eliminate duplicate names and fix up wrong relationships. 
Genealogical databases are an essential tool of native title research. 
Like other aspects of this very practical enterprise, their use, maintenance 
and data input needs to be undertaken by those properly qualified 
and equipped for the complex task at hand. Genealogical research should 
never be seen as a secondary and lesser research task. It requires careful 




Compensation and native title
The Native Title Act contemplated that the recognition of Indigenous 
rights to land might also require the payment of compensation where 
actions that occurred after the introduction of the Racial Discrimination 
Act 1975 (Cth) on 31 October 1975 by the Commonwealth, states or 
territories had either impaired or extinguished native title. Consequently, 
the Native Title Act ‘provides for the Federal Court to make determinations 
of native title and compensation’ (Native Title Act 4(7)(a)). The term 
‘compensation’ occurs in the ‘Preamble’ to the Act several times, being 
presented in association with the ‘claims to native title’.1 Listed as one 
of the topics covered by the Act is ‘compensation for acts affecting 
native title’ (Native Title Act 4(2)(b)), while a whole Division of the 
Act (Division 5) is dedicated to this matter. The compensation is to be 
calculated according to ‘just terms for any loss, diminution, impairment 
or other effect of the act on their native title rights and interests’ (section 
51(1)). The payment of compensation is subject to qualifications relating 
to compulsory acquisitions (Compulsory Acquisition Act (defined in section 
253)), partial extinguishment (sections 51(3), 240) and single payments 
(section 49). This is complex legislation and well beyond my expertise to 
1  ‘It is important that appropriate bodies be recognised and funded to represent Aboriginal peoples 
and Torres Strait Islanders and to assist them to pursue their claims to native title or compensation’ 
(Native Title Act 1993, Preamble, 3. Emphasis added).
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discuss further, although reviews of this aspect of the Native Title Act, as 
well as how the compensation issue might be addressed by the Federal 
Court, are not hard to find in the available literature.2
Given the relative prominence that compensation receives in the Native 
Title Act it is perhaps surprising that the issue of compensation has received 
little public or scholarly attention. After an initial period during which 
the matter was considered in an abstract and largely theoretical manner,3 
the  subject subsequently received scant attention while the scholarly 
debate and commentary focused on the principal business of the Federal 
Court in relation to the Native Title Act: the determination of applications 
for the recognition of native title. Compensation could only be awarded 
if there was evidence of an impairment or extinguishment of native title 
as a  result of post-1975 acts. Claims for compensation are, then, post-
native title actions so applications can only be made where native title 
can be shown to exist, a factor likely to limit the claims for compensation. 
The Yulara claim was a case in point where a failure to gain recognition 
of native title meant that the claim for compensation was dismissed.4 At 
the time of writing (March 2018), claims for compensation were thin on 
the ground. The National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT) website, ‘Native 
Title Applications, Registration Decisions and Determinations’, revealed 
there to have been only 41 compensation applications5 dating from 
February 1994, of which all but six had either been withdrawn, dismissed 
or discontinued and four determined.6 For both the Tjayuwara Unmuru 
Compensation Application and the Barkandji (Paakantyi) People #11, it 
was determined that native title did not exist, rendering the applicants 
ineligible for compensation. The terms of the De Rose Hill settlement 
were agreed in mediation and have not been publicly disclosed. However, 
the case set the precedent for the awarding of compensation under the 
terms of the Native Title Act.7 A recent attempt to gain compensation 
2  See, for example, C. Humphry 1998, ‘Compensation for native title: the theory and the 
reality’, E Law, 5.1 (March 1998). www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/indices/issue/v5n1.html accessed 23 
December 2016. A short annotated reference list on ‘native title compensation’ was prepared by 
L. Wiseman in 2009, which contains some helpful references and comments (see L. Wiseman 2009, 
‘Native title compensation annotated reference list’, Native Title Research Unit, AIATSIS 2009).
3  See, for example, Burke 2002.
4  Jango v Northern Territory of Australia [2006] FCA 318; 152 (31 March 2006) (Sackville J). 
Summary, 11 and 12.
5  www.nntt.gov.au/searchRegApps/NativeTitleClaims/Pages/default.aspx, accessed 15 March 
2018.
6  Tjayuwara Unmuru Compensation Application, De Rose Hill Compensation Application, 
Town of Timber Creek and the Barkandji (Paakantyi) People #11.
7  See Whittaker and Bunker 2013, for a brief review.
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in relation to the Gibson Desert Nature Reserve (WAD86/2012) was 
discontinued when the Federal Court found that petroleum tenures from 
the 1920s had extinguished exclusive possession rights. This significantly 
affected the state’s compensation liability, and the claim group decided to 
discontinue the application in May 2016.8
Timber Creek, NT
In August 2016, the Federal Court handed down the first assessment 
of compensation in Griffiths v Northern Territory of Australia (Timber 
Creek).9 Mansfield J ordered payment of $3.3 million to the native title 
holders (the Ngaliwurru and Nungali peoples). Of this some $512,000 
was awarded for economic loss, $1.488 million was paid for interest 
that would otherwise have accrued and $1.3 million was paid for non-
economic loss. The payment of $1.3 million for non-economic loss was in 
response to the claim for compensation for ‘the diminution or disruption 
in traditional attachment to country and the loss of rights to live on, 
and gain spiritual and material sustenance from, the land’ (Timber Creek 
[46]). In his judgment the trial judge, Mansfield J, identified the non-
economic loss by the legal term ‘solatium’ following ‘the term used by 
the Territory’ (Timber Creek [59]).10 The decision was appealed to the 
Full Federal Court which handed down its decision in July 2017. The 
appeal court dismissed most grounds of appeal (Northern Territory of 
Australia v Griffiths).11 However, the Full Bench did find that the discount 
on compensation for economic loss should have been 65 per cent of the 
freehold value (rather than the 80 per cent provided by Justice Mansfield). 
The court also did not uphold some damages awarded for invalid future 
acts. Significantly, however, the Full Federal Court endorsed Mansfield’s 
decision to award compensation for non-economic loss and his ‘intuitive’ 
approach for determining the amount to be paid reflecting ‘just terms’ 
8  See www.centraldesert.org.au/native-title-item/gibson-desert/, accessed 24 December 2016.
9  Griffiths v Northern Territory of Australia (No. 3) [2016] FCA 900 (Mansfield J). See McGrath 
2017 for a discussion of this case.
10  His Honour was of the view that, ‘It is also appropriate to adopt the description “solatium” to 
describe the compensation component which represents the loss or diminution of connection or 
traditional attachment to the land. To the extent to which the LAA [Lands Acquisition Act (NT)] 
principles apply, both the Territory and the Commonwealth accepted that adaptation of that 
principle would accommodate an appropriate allowance for solatium. The Applicant was also content 
with using that expression. In my view, it provides a suitable focus for ensuring also that there is no 
overlap of the compensation awarded for the economic loss discussed above, and for this element of 
the compensation to which the Claim Group is entitled.’ Timber Creek [300].
11  Northern Territory of Australia v Griffiths [2017] FCAFC 106 (Timber Creek appeal).
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(Timber Creek appeal [394–396] and [420]).The judgements, as cited, 
are in the public domain at the time of writing. In February 2018, the 
High Court of Australia granted leave to the Commonwealth of Australia, 
the Northern Territory of Australia and the Northern Land Council 
(on behalf of the native title holders) to appeal the decision of the Full 
Court of the Federal Court of Australia ([2017] FCAFC 106). The appeal 
was expected to be heard in June or August 2018. Despite the appeal, the 
compensation claim and the ensuing legal process provide some useful 
indication of the role that anthropology might have in applications made 
to the Federal Court of this sort. That stated, it is important to bear in 
mind that this is an evolving and largely unresolved area of legal action, 
so the comments that follow may need to be revised in the light of the 
developing jurisprudence.
An initial but important observation that can be made in relation to the 
Timber Creek claim is that the majority of actions for which compensation 
might be sought are likely not to be the province of the anthropologist. 
Principal amongst these is the calculation of the value (in dollar terms) 
of land lost to native title. This seems clearly to be the province of land 
valuers and the trial judge devoted some time to a consideration of the 
experts and their opinions provided to the court in this regard (Timber 
Creek [393–434]). The applicant did employ an economic anthropologist 
(Professor Jon Altman) but his Honour stated that it was his ‘intention 
to exclude from this category [‘Consideration: non-economic loss’] 
of damages any element of economic loss’. Consequently, his Honour 
‘preferred to place no particular weight on [Professor Altman’s] evidence 
for this purpose’ (Timber Creek [367]).
It is possible that economic anthropology might be brought to bear on the 
question as to whether customary activity (such as hunting and gathering) 
should be factored in to calculated land values. However, in this case it 
would seem his Honour decided that such value (should it be material) 
was factored in to the ‘less tangible cultural losses’ and was understood to 
be a part of the claimants’ ‘attachment to country’ rather than having any 
economic value ascribed to it (e.g. Timber Creek [364]). 
With respect to compensation, economic loss is understood to include 
the quantum of interest that would have accrued on the sum had it been 
paid at the time the loss was suffered. An important issue here is whether 
the interest that might be paid is to be calculated according to simple 
or compound bases, the former being favoured by his Honour (Timber 
Creek [279]). This, again, is not a matter for social anthropology, although 
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it was a matter that substantially occupied the attention of the court and 
the judgment.12 In these considerations I observe that case law seems 
to have informed the judgment rather than expert opinion (cf. Timber 
Creek [285]).
‘Intangible loss’
In the Timber Creek decision, Mansfield J sets out some legal principles 
for an entitlement to compensation paid as money despite the fact that 
there is no market value for what has been lost or diminished. His Honour 
wrote:
313. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise, as the parties accept, 
that the law provides an entitlement to compensation in money value 
even where there is no market for what is lost and where the value to 
the dispossessed holder rests on non-financial considerations: see 
e.g. Wurridjal at [337] per Heydon J. In Crampton v Nugawela (1996) 
41 NSWLR 176, Mahoney A-CJ observed that:
‘There is no yardstick for measuring these matters. Value may be 
determined by a market: there is no market for this. There is no generally 
accepted or perceptible level of awards, made by juries or by judges, which 
can be isolated and which can indicate the “ongoing rate” or judicial 
consensus on these matters. And there is, of course, no statutory or other 
basis. In the end, damages for distress and anguish are the result of a social 
judgment, made by the jury and monitored by appellate courts, of what, 
in the given community at the given time, is an appropriate award or, 
perhaps, solatium for what has been done.’
314. Albeit in the context of an appeal from a significant award of 
damages in a defamation claim, those observations are nevertheless apt 
to the present circumstances.13
His Honour was of the view that the court needed to consider a number 
of issues that might be relevant to assessing the quantum of the amount to 
be awarded. These included questions of causation and the nature of the 
claimed loss. This claimed loss might include the spiritual significance of 
places within traditional country, the effects of the compensable acts, the 
nature and extent of intangible loss and the extent of traditional country 
12  Timber Creek [246–289].
13 ibid., [313–314].
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affected (Timber Creek [315]). Also identified were such things as ‘“loss of 
amenities” or “pain and suffering” or reputational damage’ (Timber Creek 
[318]). In this regard there appears to have been common ground between 
the parties. Payment of compensation for non-economic loss had been 
agreed in principle (Timber Creek [316]), as was the view that it should 
be assessed according to ‘traditional laws and customs acknowledged and 
observed by the Claim Group’. There was also agreement that it be paid 
to the group as a whole14 (Timber Creek [317]). In terms of making an 
assessment of compensation to be based on these and related issues, his 
Honour was of the view that ‘evidence about the relationship with country 
and the effect of acts on that will be paramount’ (Timber Creek [318]).
In this regard, his Honour was strongly of the view that it was the totality 
of the land that had to be considered, not specific parcels within it as 
dissociated entities. He wrote:
The direct evidence of Alan Griffiths,15 and the anthropological opinion 
evidence, does not depend on any proposition that some parts of Aboriginal 
landscape are more important than others. As Dr Palmer16 observed, the 
2002 paper of Professor Sansom17 is in relation to the damage of loss, and 
‘the hurt feelings of a hunting ground, of a generalised area, a resource 
lost.’ The broad expanse of the kulungra area18 is a similar example in 
this case. As Professor Sansom accepted, the kind of contention advanced 
by the Territory and the Commonwealth that there can be a significant 
area of landscape that is unimportant to Aboriginal people, or that there 
could be an area that is devoid of spirituality, defies logic in the Aboriginal 
tradition.19
The trial judge listed three ‘particular considerations’ that he regarded 
as being of significance to the assessment of ‘the appropriate amount of 
compensation’ (Timber Creek [378]). The first was the construction of 
water tanks servicing the town water supply (‘the kulungra area’). They 
were built on the path of a Dreaming track, action which his Honour 
found had ‘caused clearly identified distress and concern’ (Timber Creek 
14  With the qualification in parenthesis, ‘with the apportionment or distribution as between 
members being an intramural matter’. Timber Creek [316].
15  Footnote added: A senior claimant and native title holder of the area of the Timber Creek 
town site.
16  Footnote added: Expert anthropologist commissioned by the applicant. 
17  Footnote added: Expert anthropologist commissioned by the first respondent. The article is 
Sansom 2002.
18  Footnote added: The area of Timber Creek where water tanks had been built, so damaging the 
track of the Dingo Dreaming (Timber Creek [352]).
19 Timber Creek [370].
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[378]). The second were acts that had affected the claimants’ ability to 
‘conduct ceremonial and spiritual activities’ not solely in relation to parcels 
of land that had been alienated but on adjoining areas as well (Timber 
Creek [380]). Such a view is consistent with the finding that ‘native title 
is a feature of a wider area of country than any of the particular and 
individual acts now under consideration’ (Timber Creek [380]). Thirdly, 
his Honour found that compensable acts had ‘to some degree’ reduced 
the area over which the claimants could exercise their native title rights:
each in an imprecise way has adversely affected the spiritual connection 
with the particular allotments, and more generally, which the Claim 
Group have with their country. Again, the point should be made that 
that connection is not divisible geographically, but each chipping away of 
the geographical area necessarily must have some incremental detriment 
to the enjoyment of the native title rights over the entire area. Associated 
with that collective diminution of the cultural and spiritual connection 
with land, is the sense of failed responsibility for the obligation, under the 
traditional laws and customs, to have cared for and looked after that land. 
Again, that is not geographic specific, save for the more important sites, 
but it is a sentiment which was quite obvious from the evidence led from 
the members of the Claim Group. That evidence, understandably, was 
more focused on the area of the town water tanks, as that is clearly a more 
significant area, and in other areas in the vicinity of Timber Creek which 
were also of significant importance.20
Accepting that the jurisprudence is still developing, these ‘particular 
considerations’ may be helpful when thinking about the sort of 
anthropology that might be embarked upon in future research that 
seeks to assist the court in determinations of native title compensation. 
His  Honour’s assessment of these specific considerations in terms of 
the quantum of the compensation for non-economic loss was founded 
on the  evidence of the case as well as on the adoption of findings of 
prior native title judgments (Timber Creek [328] to [367]). The detail 
is beyond the scope of this review but is available for further analysis 
in the judgment, which is a matter of public record. The evidence to 
the court comprised complex ethnographic data. It was the product of 
claimant testimony as well as of the expert views of the anthropologists 
for the applicant (Palmer and Asche) and that of Sansom for the Territory. 
In summary, his Honour had regard to the particular and deeply spiritual 
relationship between the claimants and their countryside, understanding 
the latter comprised a totality of country rather than component parcels 
20 ibid., [381].
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of land that were the subject of compensable acts. This relationship and 
concomitant rights to the country also involved the exercise of a duty to 
protect and safeguard the integrity of that country, including through the 
conduct of (in this instance) restricted male ritual. Land alienated through 
European settlement and development rendered this duty impossible to 
acquit, resulting in guilt, pain, suffering and emotional distress. It also 
resulted in social opprobrium and even negative spiritual repercussions 
(Timber Creek [328–367]).
It was in the context of these understandings that the special spiritual 
relationship between Aboriginal people and their country had to be 
evaluated. This is the determinant of the anguish, emotional pain and 
suffering as well as the alienation of spiritually significant places that are 
relevant to the assessment of compensation (Timber Creek [376–377]). 
His Honour conceded that, given these considerations, ‘the assessment 
of the appropriate compensation is a most complex one’ (Timber Creek 
[374]).
Anthropological research and 
compensation claims
The research undertaken should always respond to the brief issued to the 
anthropologist. As the jurisprudence changes, the issues that the lawyers 
may consider will be helpful to the prosecution of their application 
will undoubtedly change. However, reviewing the judgment delivered 
in relation to non-economic compensation discussed above, I think it 
likely that some elements may remain constant. Compensation for non-
economic loss is about emotional pain and suffering (‘damages for distress 
and anguish’). The anthropologist’s job is to provide understandings 
of how the pain and suffering might be manifest as well as how such 
emotional distress develops from the alienation of land – that is, the past 
acts post-1975 in the native title context. An understanding of emotional 
distress will depend upon a thorough appreciation of how the claimants 
relate to their country in terms of spiritual attachment. A concomitant 
of this relationship are the tenets of the system of proprietary rights to 
country and the duties in this regard that were required (under traditional 
law and custom) of the native title holders. It is the failure (or inability) to 
acquit these duties and responsibilities that lie at the heart of the emotional 
distress that is the basis for the calculation of the solatium. This analysis 
yields three research questions that are fundamental to the case law as it 
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now stands. The first relates to the spiritual relationship between the native 
title holders and their country. The second relates to what might be termed 
broadly the management of country, including the exercise of duties and 
responsibilities. The third relates to emotional distress and suffering. In 
what follows I consider each of these in reverse order, commencing with 
sentiment and suffering and ending with spiritual attachment.
Sentiment
It is helpful when developing an understanding of another culture to 
explore concepts expressed in the language of that culture. This may 
provide an insight as to how those with whom we work think and feel. 
Given the importance of emotions to the assessment of compensation, 
such research into ‘emic’ categorisation can be considered as fundamental, 
which is why I have considered it first. When I commenced research on 
the Timber Creek compensation application in 2012 with Wendy Asche, 
I identified words in the local language (Ngaliwuru) that captured what 
we considered might be key concepts relevant to loss or alienation of 
country and damage to it. In Ngaliwuru paark expresses the idea that 
something is ‘broken’, and can be used of a pencil or a human leg or of 
the countryside itself. Generally, paark conveys the idea that the damage 
is not remediable – that is, something that is paark could probably not 
be fixed. Maring was used of something that was damaged or ‘buggered 
up’, having the sense of being ‘spoilt’, and can be used in conjunction 
with the word for country (yakpali) to mean ‘spoiling the country’. 
Intense personal feelings that accompany an act of spoiling are termed 
puru maring. The word puru means ‘insides’, ‘guts’ but not specifically the 
stomach. The phrase then carries the general meaning of ‘broken up or 
spoiled inside’, which is presumably rather like English ‘broken hearted’ 
or perhaps better ‘churned up inside’ or ‘gut wrenching’.21 Similar phrases 
are found in other languages: tuni kura, for example, in Western Desert 
languages literally translates to ‘bad stomach’ but is a term used to express 
deep-felt emotional distress and upset, even anger. We were then able 
to explore and explain how the claimants’ responses to the loss of land 
in the determination area had adversely affected their feelings and their 
emotions. This gave the necessary background and explanation as to why 
claimants were distressed as a result of those actions for which they sought 
compensation. This included concepts of pain, suffering and reputational 
21  See Timber Creek [350] for evidence adduced on this.
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damage, particularly as a result of an inability to perform a duty. In this 
way we sought to comprehend how the claimants experienced these 
emotions in terms of their own language and culture.
Not all research relating to claims for compensation will be conducted in 
areas where the native title holders have fluency in their own language. 
In such cases terms from Aboriginal English or even standard English 
will need to be explored. In my experience words common to standard 
English may be used by native title holders in a very particular way. 
Moreover, the relationship between certain actions taken with respect to 
country and those who regard it as their ancestral country is quite distinct 
and should be explored fully, elaborated and thoroughly comprehended. 
There should be no diminishment simply because the words used to 
express the emotions are (apparently) words of standard English.
Duty and the management of country
This should be more familiar ground and, given that a claim for 
compensation follows the native title application, data relating to these 
issues should have been included in the expert anthropological report. 
If  the application went to trial (as had been the case at Timber Creek) 
these matters should have been addressed in evidence and the judgments 
of the court. While these are the obvious sources for these data, good 
fieldwork should build on these materials and so affirm the vitality of 
the system in the context of the compensation claim. I have discussed 
the presentation of materials relating to the exercise of duty and the 
management of country elsewhere in this book (see Chapter 3). At Timber 
Creek and elsewhere where I have worked the collection of words from the 
local language are keen aids to exegesis. Thus words for ‘countryman’ or 
‘traditional owner’ (yakpalimululu), ‘stranger’ (miyakari), speaking to the 
spirits of the country (‘calling out to country’ or pampaya), the concept of 
dangerous country (mutkiyan yakpali) are helpful to the ensuing analysis. 
The ritual of introducing strangers to country to ensure the safety and 
proper conduct of visitors may also have a place here. In the Timber Creek 
area the ritual is known as ‘head wetting’ or mulyarp in the local language. 
What is, then, needed are data that show that, according to traditional 
laws and customs, those with proprietary rights to country are considered 
to hold not only rights to their country, but to be required to exercise 
a duty to others with respect to that country. Inability to perform that 
duty is a breach of customary law and brings with it sanctions, social 
opprobrium, reproach and fear of supernatural consequences both for 
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the visitor and owner. The Timber Creek judgment would also appear 
to indicate that the size of the country lost, the extent of the damage 
or impairment and the degree to which ‘amenities’ had been lost were 
relevant to the assessment of compensation. This probably means that the 
research should be undertaken with at least some basic knowledge of the 
location and extent of the potentially compensable land – information 
that was not made available to us during the Timber Creek research.22
Generally in Aboriginal Australia, duties to be exercised in relation to 
country include looking after the countryside to ensure its physical safety 
and so its spiritual integrity. Good research in relation to this aspect 
of customary land management will reveal that this duty extends well 
beyond the actual physical policing of the countryside and attempts 
to prevent unauthorised access and subsequent damage that is deemed 
to be contrary to what is acceptable, according to customary law. Much 
ritual activity, including the spiritual maintenance of certain objects 
through performance and song, is believed to sustain and enliven the 
countryside and so is an important part of a countryperson’s duty to their 
land. An inability to perform these rituals could, then, be understood to 
result in emotional stress to those who feel it their duty to do so. These 
are matters  that can rightly be examined in anthropological research 
undertaken with respect to a claim for compensation.
Spiritual assonance and total country
The third topic that can be identified from the Timber Creek 
judgment is also one that should find plenty of support from the prior 
anthropological native title literature, court transcripts and judgments. 
It is also a subject that I have discussed in terms of research approaches 
in an earlier chapter of this book (see Chapter 5). Although the actual 
areas of land that may be subject to claims for compensation will vary 
on a case by case basis, I think it likely that other applications will, like 
Timber Creek, include ‘parcels’ of land. In this case portions of the native 
title application area were excluded from the determination because they 
had been alienated. This raised the legal issue as to whether compensation 
should only be accorded in relation to the specific bounded parcels – an 
approach which Mansfield J rejected, as I have noted above.23 It will, 
22  Timber Creek [349].
23  His Honour found that ‘a parcel-by-parcel approach to the assessment of those consequences is 
not appropriate, having regard to the fact that many of the acts in issue occurred some 30 or so years 
ago. They were incremental and cumulative’ (Timber Creek [324]).
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then, be an important consideration for the anthropological research to 
provide a full and comprehensive account of the relationship to country 
in terms of spiritual correspondence to the entirety of country. Mansfield 
J commented that the idea that land could be segmented and that parts 
were ‘devoid of spirituality, defies logic in the Aboriginal tradition’ (Timber 
Creek [370]). This finding was based on the evidence provided to the 
court. It is a matter that requires close attention in any anthropological 
research conducted in relation to a claim for compensation in the native 
title context.
Understanding our role
The awarding of an amount as compensation for the loss of native title 
rights and the emotional as well as financial consequences of this loss is 
a function of the Native Title Act. There is no necessity that it be shown 
to have parallels or correspondence with customary dealings within 
Australian Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander societies. While the trial 
judge in Timber Creek made his assessment of compensation payable 
for non-economic loss according to customary considerations, straight 
economic loss (the value of the alienated blocks and loss of simple interest) 
are not matters that require any understanding of customary systems, 
beliefs, practices and normative systems. This necessarily means that there 
is much activity in making a compensation claim that is of no concern 
to the anthropologist and he or she will have no role to play in the legal 
agitation of these matters. It also means that the process of laying claim to 
compensation is even more centrally situated within the mainstream legal 
process than an application for recognition of native title. 
These things admitted, the court has, to date at least, shown itself 
ready to accept that customary values and principles are central to an 
assessment of the compensation that should be paid as solatium for non-
economic loss. Understanding this loss in terms that reflect the thoughts 
and feelings, hopes and fears of the claimants is very much the job of 
the anthropologist. The compass of the inquiry should, however, be 
constrained by the relevance the ethnographic data and accompanying 
exegeses can have to the legal matters likely to be of assistance to the 
court. As the jurisprudence develops further these issues may expand or 
contract. This is very much a question then of ‘watch this space’.
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And in the end?
The native title era in Australian is necessarily ephemeral. Applications for 
the recognition of native title will not continue indefinitely. The time will 
come when no new claims are lodged and those made will be determined 
or will have been discontinued, for whatever reason. Looking back in the 
future, the native title era will be seen as a comparatively short period 
of time marked by the confluences of a postcolonial desire to right past 
wrongs, to bring certainty following the Mabo decision and as yet another 
component in the complex rubric of Indigenous–state relationships. And 
how will it be judged? The deficiencies and limitations of native title will 
be apparent from a reading of this book. Applications for the recognition 
of native title require complex and often expensive legal process over 
which the claimants have little or no control. Outcomes are uncertain 
as claimants cannot know beforehand how the court will respond to 
their application or how it will judge their claims. Proof of continuity 
is not only a problem in terms of the evidence required, but seems an 
especially unfair requirement for those so thoroughly dispossessed and 
who were the subject of multiple policies that worked to eradicate the 
very laws and customs now demanded of them by the native title law. 
For those Indigenous Australians who were hardest hit by the European 
settlement of their country and their cultural dispossession most marked, 
the requirements of the proof of native title are unlikely to be within 
reach. Generally, recognition of native title favours those in remote areas 
of Aboriginal Australia and disadvantages those in urban and rural parts 
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– particularly in the south. This seems hardly fair or equitable. Claims 
are giving rise to considerable disagreements between Indigenous groups 
that have split some communities. Redress is often sought through 
the courts thus furthering the entrenchment of the legal process in the 
determination of proprietary interests in land for Australian Indigenous 
minorities. While recognition of prior rights to country is undoubtedly of 
value to many Aboriginal people, the tangible and economic benefits of 
native title may prove elusive in some cases at least.  
There will, then, be some harsh judgments. Some I expect will say that 
it was ‘too little too late’. Others, better understanding the necessity of 
the native title legislation, may see it as compromised legislation vainly 
designed to fix a problem that started with the declaration of sovereignty 
by the British Crown in 1788 which had no simple or single solution. 
I commenced this book with some recent history and outlined a number 
of the events, political thinking and idealism that led to the enactment 
of  the  Native Title Act. So, did the Act furnish the opportunities Paul 
Keating  promised it would? Did it provide for certainty where only 
uncertainty had existed? Did it mark an historical turning point and the 
basis of a new relationship between Indigenous and other Australians? 
The  fact is that after the Mabo High Court decisions there was a new 
relationship between Indigenous and other Australians; the Native Title Act 
can take no credit for that. The European settlers had not possessed vacant 
land. It belonged to someone else under a system of laws and customs that 
the settlers’ law belatedly recognised. After Mabo, then, nothing was quite 
the same again, including the relationship between Indigenous Australians 
and the state. For the majority of the Australian landmass, legal certainty 
was achieved by the passage of the Act. While the process required to 
settle native title claims was for many protracted and expensive, the Act 
provided the framework for an orderly settlement of claims as well as for 
the negotiation of just terms for future acts over claimed land. As for the 
‘opportunities’, some at least could have been embraced without native 
title or Mabo. The Keating government’s response to Mabo was a trinity of 
measures. The first was the Native Title Act, validating past grants of land 
to the new settlers and setting up a process for the recognition of rights 
that had survived the colonisation of the continent. The second was the 
establishment of the Indigenous Land Fund managed by the Indigenous 
Land Corporation (ILC) that acquired, by purchase, alienated land for 
Indigenous groups (Sullivan 2009, 8). The third, a social justice package, 
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was never implemented, prompting some to observe that the Native 
Title Act was never designed to provide the full remedy to Indigenous 
disadvantage.
3.75 Stakeholders have pointed out that the Native Title Act was 
never intended to be the sole response to Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] 
and to Indigenous demands for land justice, or to the economic and 
social disadvantage that is a consequence of dispossession. It was to be 
accompanied by a land fund and social justice package, thus providing 
a comprehensive response. 
3.76 In 2008, the then Social Justice Commissioner, Dr Tom Calma, 
commented that ‘the other two limbs did not eventuate in the form 
intended, and this abyss is one of the underlying reasons why the native 
title system is under the strain it is under today’.1
The functions and policies of the ILC are not my concern here, although 
they have received attention by other scholars (see, for example, Sullivan 
2009). The Native Title Act has operated in a policy vacuum that has 
undoubtedly rendered it more imperfect than it otherwise might have 
been. That accepted, the Native Title Act has accomplished a number of 
things that had never been afforded to Indigenous Australians before. First, 
it gave recognition that Indigenous Australians were the first Australians 
and that their rights to country not only existed in a manner capable of 
recognition by the invaders but that some of these rights had endured to 
this day despite repeated acts of aggression, dispossession and ignorance. 
Second, the Native Title Act secured the rights of Indigenous Australians 
to have a say about any future acts planned for country subjected to 
a registered claim. Third, it provided a means whereby rights to country 
could be determined by the Federal Court to have validity, in the same 
way as other Australians enjoyed property rights. Native title applications 
provide one way (and  perhaps now the only way) to gain recognition 
of rights within terms legitimated by the conquerors. Finally, it made 
provision for the payment of compensation (in some circumstances) for 
the loss of native title rights. These are no mean achievements.
1 Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) 2014, 63–64. (Original referencing footnotes 
excluded.)
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The Single Noongar Claim
There are many examples of successful claims in Australia and I could, no 
doubt, have chosen others to illustrate my point. The native title process 
is one that requires an appreciation of the limitations of the Native Title 
Act as well as what is possible given the standards of proof required. But 
it is also one that needs an inspired appreciation of the possibilities. I 
was privileged to undertake the research for the Single Noongar Claim.2 
The report I wrote in this regard is published elsewhere and, as is therein 
noted, much transpired after the initial case was heard in 2005 (Palmer 
2016, vii). While the final outcome was not a determination of native 
title by the Federal Court, protracted negotiations undertaken by the 
South West Aboriginal Land and Sea Council resulted in a number of 
Indigenous Land Use Agreements (ILUAs) approved by Noongar people 
at six authorisation meetings held across Noongar country between 
January and March 2015 (ibid.). This result was not without controversy 
and some members of the Noongar community strenuously opposed 
the settlement. One principal sticking point was that the claimants were 
required to exchange their native title rights for the rights and benefits 
contained in the ILUAs. 
The agreement met a legal obstacle in early 2017 in the form of a court 
challenge to the Tribunal’s registration of ILUAs that were to effect the 
arrangement. In short, it was asserted that not all applicants had signed 
the necessary documents. The majority of the Full Bench of the Federal 
Court found:
244 … if, in relation to any proposed area agreement, one of the persons 
who, jointly with others, has been authorised by the claim group to be 
the applicant, refuses, fails or neglects, or is unable to sign a negotiated, 
proposed written indigenous land use agreement, for whatever reason, 
then the document will lack the quality of being an agreement recognised 
for the purposes of the NTA [Native Title Act].3
2  Single Noongar Native Title Claim (W6006 of 2003 & W6012 of 2003); Bennell v Western 
Australia [2006] FCA 1243; Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84.
3 McGlade v Native Title Registrar [2017] FCAFC 10.
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The decision had implications for many existing ILUAs that had not 
been signed by all named applicants, some of which involved substantial 
development projects.4 The Turnbull government introduced the 
Native Title Amendment (Indigenous Land Use Agreements) Bill 2017 
on 15  February 2017. The bill was referred to the Senate Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee and was eventually passed 
into law on 22 June 2017. It confirmed the legal status of existing 
agreements and ensured that ILUAs could be registered without requiring 
the signature of every named applicant.5 
There can be little doubt that from the outset there was much scepticism 
about the possibility of winning a combined claim to the whole of 
Australia’s southwest. There was substantial opposition to such a claim 
from respondent groups; the more traditional anthropology available 
was, at least in part, not supportive of the proposition that there could 
be shown to be a continuity of laws and customs. The size of the 
claim, the disparate groups and internal wrangling all made this seem 
like a  challenge  of unprecedented proportions. However, the claimant 
evidence was strong, the legal case painstakingly and adroitly put together 
and the field data collected substantial. The trial judge found in favour of 
the applicant although the case was sent back to the court on appeal and 
reassigned to a new hearing, though no finding was made that rejected the 
claim. Out of this seemingly unpromising odyssey came recognition and 
benefits that merit more attention than they appear to have received. As a 
part of the agreement reached between the parties, the Western Australia 
Government passed the Noongar (Koorah, Nitja, Boordahwan) (Past, 
Present, Future) Recognition Act 2016. This is ‘An Act for the recognition 
of the Noongar people as the traditional owners of lands in the south-west 
of the State’. The Preamble to the short Act, which provides recognition of 
the Noongar people and their lands, runs as follows:
A. Since time immemorial, the Noongar people have inhabited lands in 
the south-west of the State; these lands the Noongar people call Noongar 
boodja (Noongar earth).
B. Under Noongar law and custom, the Noongar people are the traditional 
owners of, and have cultural responsibilities and rights in relation to, 
Noongar boodja.
4  See, for example www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/indigenous/george-brandis-failed-to-
act-on-land-rights-warning/news-story/b9e1fe24cd744fdaadfa4250cb7a4906, accessed 9 March 2017.
5  www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId= 
r5821, accessed 9 March 2017. Native Title Amendment (Indigenous Land Use Agreements) Act 2017.
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C. The Noongar people continue to have a living cultural, spiritual, 
familial and social relationship with Noongar boodja.
D. The Noongar people have made, are making, and will continue to 
make, a significant and unique contribution to the heritage, cultural 
identity, community and economy of the State.
E. The Noongar people describe in Schedule 1 their relationship to 
Noongar boodja and the benefits that all Western Australians derive from 
that relationship.
F. So it is appropriate, as part of a package of measures in full and final 
settlement of all claims by the Noongar people in pending and future 
applications under the Native Title Act 1993 (Commonwealth) for 
the determination of native title and for compensation payable for acts 
affecting that native title, to recognise the Noongar people as the 
traditional owners of the lands described in this Act.
[Assented to 16 May 2016]
The website of the WA Department of the Premier and Cabinet describes 
the settlement as:6
The South West Native Title Settlement (the Settlement) is the most 
comprehensive native title agreement proposed in Australian history, 
comprising the full and final resolution of all native title claims in the 
South West of Western Australia, in exchange for a package of benefits. 
The historic agreement involves around 30,000 Noongar people and 
covers approximately 200,000 square kilometres. The Settlement 
represents a significant investment in both the Noongar community and 
the shared future of the Western Australian community as a whole. 
The Settlement will provide the Noongar people with long-term benefits 
and opportunities for developing Noongar interests. The Settlement 
will also provide an opportunity for the WA Government to work in 
partnership with the Noongar people to improve economic, social and 
cultural outcomes for the Noongar community. In addition the Settlement 
will deliver long term cost benefits to the WA Government and land users 
through the resolution of native title and the removal of all ‘future act’ 
obligations across the south west.
6  www.dpc.wa.gov.au/lantu/south-west-native-title-settlement/Pages/default.aspx, accessed 
5 January 2017.
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The settlement package included the establishment of a perpetual trust 
funded at $60 million per annum over 12 years, the establishment of 
regional corporations, and the creation of a Noongar land estate comprising 
a minimum of 320,000 hectares of Crown land into the Noongar Boodja 
Trust over five years. Other benefits included joint management programs, 
heritage agreements and economic development.7
The settlement package will always attract its critics and it will remain 
a  matter for judgment as to whether the deal was a good one. The 
alternative would have been to go back to the court, fight the claim anew 
and await the uncertain outcome of the trial and the inevitable subsequent 
appeals. It stands as a good example of an alternative settlement and, 
on the facts as they are presented in the public domain, has much to 
recommend it. In considering this outcome, it is pertinent to remember 
that the settlement is the product of an application for the recognition 
of native title. Without the forthright engagement in that process by 
Noongar claimants, their lawyers and anthropologists, this end point is 
unlikely to have been reached. The reality of the native title legislation 
and the court findings provided the leverage that effected the final result.
And anthropologists?
Otto von Bismarck is credited with saying that politics was the art of the 
possible.8 In coming to an understanding of what Bismarck may have 
meant by this saying, it is enough to note that Bismarck was a man who 
liked to get things done, generally in difficult circumstances and against 
the odds. The saying is apposite to native title, not because Bismarck 
can be understood to have any correspondence or likely sympathy with 
native title principles (in fact, the opposite is likely to be the case), but 
because it encapsulates a relevant principle. Like politics, native title is 
an art that seeks positive outcomes through an appreciation of what is 
practically obtainable. Anthropologists who participate in the native 
title process need to appreciate this fact and employ that comprehension 
when they become involved in a native title process. What is possible and 
7  www.dpc.wa.gov.au/lantu/south-west-native-title-settlement/Pages/default.aspx, accessed 5 January 
2017.
8  ‘Politics is the art of the possible, the attainable …the art of the next best’. (In German: Die 
Politik ist die Lehre vom Möglichen.) This sentence was printed in the newspaper St. Petersburgische 
Zeitung, on 11 August 1867. Reprinted in, Fürst Bismarck: neue Tischgespräche und Interviews, Vol. 1, 
p. 248 (1895). www.shmoop.com/quotes/politics-art-of-impossible.html, accessed 9 January 2017.
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attainable is circumscribed by three factors. These I distil from the native 
title processes in which I have been involved. They are not, of themselves, 
particularly complex or mentally challenging. However, I am frequently 
surprised by the lack of attention to them by some of my anthropological 
colleagues.
Finding your role in the legal performance
Seeking recognition of native title is a legal process. It is a matter filed with 
the court, mediated by the court and ultimately determined by the court. 
Accordingly, it is a business for lawyers. It will be members of the legal 
profession that decide how cases are to be run, how time and resources 
are to be apportioned and, ultimately, how evidence will be presented to 
the court – including the evidence of experts. The legal process allocates a 
quite specific responsibility to anthropologists – usually as an expert and 
potentially as a witness. It is, then, essential to understand the dynamics 
of the process and the sort of role allocated to the researcher. In this 
anthropologists are unlikely to have, and indeed should not have, an 
executive or directing role. When it comes to the actual prosecution of 
the application an anthropologist in a native title claim occupies a back 
seat. This does not mean that we should be inattentive to the process or 
to the substance of what transpires, particularly if the matter goes to trial. 
Part of the job of the anthropologist is likely to be the provision of expert 
testimony to the court. In this the evidence of the claimants will provide 
an essential part of how we develop our opinions.
Anthropologists do, then, have a substantial and significant role to play 
in native title claims. This contribution is one that must be understood 
in the context of all other players. In this regard I have long advocated 
for a genuine, inclusive team approach to native title work involving 
the claimants, their lawyers, staff of the Representative Body as well 
as the anthropologist. The dynamic observable between lawyers and 
anthropologists has been subject to a degree of exploration and self-
analysis – a matter I have reviewed elsewhere (Palmer 2007). So, part of 
the art of the possible is getting the balance right between those who run 
the claim (the lawyers) and those whose expertise is essential to the success 
of the application. This demands respect and patience on both sides but, 
above all, an appreciation of the true topography of the native title process 
which is governed by legal contours.
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The role allotted to anthropologists in the native title process may not sit 
comfortably with all members of the profession. Some, perhaps as a result 
of long-term relationships formed through fieldwork or, to my mind, the 
erroneous belief that they have a privileged appreciation of those whom 
they study that is denied to others, consider they merit a role and status 
beyond that which is likely to be afforded to them. Anthropologists can 
all too easily become precious about their role and unrealistic about their 
importance. Anthropologists have been reluctant to let go of the special 
access they have enjoyed to social policy development and governance as 
well as input to the drafting of legislation relevant to Australia’s Indigenous 
peoples. Anthropologists have, in my mind rightly, been replaced by 
advice from Indigenous individuals and groups who command now 
greater legitimacy. 
Understanding our role as anthropologists should also instruct us to avoid 
straying too far into the legal domain of analysis and opinion. While it 
is important that we understand what is required of us in a native title 
claim, both in terms of the original legislation and subsequent case law, 
this does not equip us to present views and opinions that should more 
properly be furnished by trained lawyers. 
Knowing what is required
Native title is elemental in the sense that its recognition is determined by 
specific elements identified in the originating legislation and subsequent 
case law. Aspects of the conditions necessary for the recognition of 
native title will be subject to substantial legal argument (if the matter 
goes to trial) and different lawyers will take different approaches – some 
wiser than others. This accepted, there remain some basic factors that 
are important to the proof of native title (or its disproof ), all of which 
(I hope) I have covered in this book. For example, native title recognition 
requires that there be shown to be a continuity of laws and customs of 
the claimant group, including those laws and customs that relate to the 
holding of rights to land. These laws and customs must be shown to have 
substantial continuity since the acquisition of sovereignty by the British 
Crown. The laws and customs observable are the creation of a society. 
Consequently, that society (or societies) needs to be shown to have had 
continuity since the date of sovereignty in order that the laws and customs 
of that society are also understood to have remained, more or less, intact. 
If the system of gaining rights to country is via descent, then accounts 
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of how the claimants trace descent from those who might properly be 
regarded as being in possession of the country of the claim at the time of 
sovereignty must be provided. The court or evaluating respondent groups 
(particularly the state or territory) will be interested to know to what 
degree the laws and customs of the claimant group have remained intact. 
They may be interested to know some detail about how the claimants 
relate to the country of the claim, how it holds special significance for 
them as well as how they visit and use the country today. There are many 
additional strands to what might be included in the anthropologist’s 
account. However, these represent some of the more important ones.
What is not included and what needs to be excluded are data and expert 
opinion on matters that have no relevance to a native title application. 
There is sometimes a danger that a researcher has a favoured topic – 
a bone to pick or pet obsession – and sees the native title report as a means 
of expiation. If this is not eradicated in good time by counsel this can be 
quite damaging to the case: at worst eroding the credibility of the expert 
and at best wasting time and resources by the provision of distracting and 
irrelevant materials. Native title research is not an indulgence but should 
be a focused exercise in applied anthropology.
Understanding what is possible
Anthropologists work from their field data, which must provide a sound 
basis for the opinions and expert views advanced. Field data or the 
researcher’s ethnography are the fundamental building blocks upon 
which the opinions are founded. Should the data not support positive 
responses to fundamental native title questions, then it is imperative 
to state that this is so. Whether commissioned by the applicant or the 
respondent, transparency, honesty and total absence of advocacy are all 
critical elements. The work of the anthropologist is to bring his or her 
expertise to bear on the issues identified for them openly, veraciously and 
with scholarship and proper study.
Forays into the battleground that is the contested realm of Australia’s 
relationship with its Indigenous peoples readily evokes emotion, idealism, 
aspiration and demands for social justice. Native title activity readily 
affords a portal into this beleaguered world. Useful work may only be 
performed by anthropologists in this domain by understanding that their 
participation cannot allow for the distractions of partisan participation. 
Rather, it is a matter of appreciating what can be accomplished with what 
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is available: the native title law, the reality of the claimant testimony and 
their ethnography, the archival evidence, and the role assigned to the 
expert. Those directly involved in the realising of native title aspiration 
need to accept that some claims will never gain the recognition the 
claimants seek. The onus of proof rests with the applicant and the bar is 
set high. Alternatives to recognition of native title rights should never be 
discounted.
Native title is a practice for lawyers and anthropologist that seeks to utilise 
federal legislation that sought to bring certainty in the face of apparent 
uncertainty. This developed from the acceptance by the High Court 
that Indigenous rights had not been wholly extinguished and that terra 
nullius was a convenient legal fiction without basis or foundation. It was 
legislation born of political necessity and tempered by a desire to engineer 
social advantage in the face of persistent and historical disadvantage. It 
was but one of three measures to remedy past wrongs – one of which 
never saw the light of day. This provides for an imperfect and potentially 
unsatisfactory means whereby prior rights can be recognised. In this, 
given the circumstances, the legal context and the imperfections, a sound 
appreciation of what is possible is paramount. A necessary part of the 
pursuit of native title must be a proper and realistic understanding of 
what it is capable of achieving and, most importantly, what it is unlikely 
to achieve. This is the exercise of the art of the possible. It is an art and 
a practice that must be based on both a comprehensive understanding 
of what can be accomplished by application of compromised legislation 
as well as the scholarly representation of the ethnography that it is the 
anthropologist’s task to comprehend and explain to others. Australian 
anthropology pursued in the context of native title claims is a specialised 
endeavour in that it requires a thorough understanding of the parameters 
that circumscribe the hoped-for outcomes and their interrelationships. 
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